UAE-Saudi Arabia Border Dispute: The Case of the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah by Al Mazrouei, Noura Saber Mohammed Saeed
  
 
 
UAE-Saudi Arabia Border Dispute: 
The Case of the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah 
 
 
 
Submitted by Noura Saber Mohammed Saeed Al-Mazrouei to the University of 
Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Arabic and Islamic Studies in October 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material 
and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and 
that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree 
by this or any other University. 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
In 1974, after forty years of negotiations over the disputed sovereignty of the Al-
Ain/Buraimi region, Zararah/Shaybah, and Khor al-Udaid, the governments of Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE signed the Treaty of Jeddah, apparently ending the dispute.  But 
the dispute was not settled as far at the UAE was concerned, owing to discrepancies 
between the oral agreement before the Treaty’s signing and the final text of the Treaty 
itself.  The UAE government did not notice this discrepancy until 1975, likely due to the 
absence of lawyers, technicians, and geographers on its negotiation team.  The UAE has 
attempted to bring Saudi Arabia back to the negotiating table ever since.  In 2004, thirty 
years after the Treaty was signed, the UAE launched a public diplomatic campaign to 
persuade Saudi Arabia to revisit parts of the Treaty, especially the question of the 
Zararah/Shaybah oil and gas field.   The public campaign has had a detrimental affect 
on UAE-Saudi relations and the border dispute remains unresolved to this day. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the Treaty of Jeddah by 
examining the negotiations that led to its signing on 21 August 1974, focusing on the 
period of 1970-74, about which relatively little has been written.  It explains the process 
of negotiations, the context in which they took place, the role and influence of Britain 
(as Abu Dhabi’s protecting power up to 1971), why Abu Dhabi signed a treaty it 
quickly came to regret, the resulting aftermath, and how the UAE might yet obtain the 
Treaty’s revision.   
This thesis argues that Britain, as Abu Dhabi’s protecting power, played different roles 
through the negotiation process, and that Britain did not always negotiate in Abu 
Dhabi’s interests –– particularly during the final years of British protection (1968-71), 
when it increasingly advised Abu Dhabi to compromise. It shows how Abu Dhabi’s 
position weakened substantially after the withdrawal of British protection in 1971, 
while Saudi Arabia’s position was strengthened considerably by the US government’s 
Twin Pillar policy.  It argues that Saudi Arabia maintained an inflexible position during 
1970-74, when it adopted a ‘controlled negotiating strategy’ with aggressive tactics 
(including the threat of military intervention) designed to force Abu Dhabi into a corner, 
giving it no choice but to sign the Treaty.  This approach allowed for a ‘win-lose’ 
outcome only.  Indeed, there were no ‘negotiations’ as such –– the huge differences in 
power between Saudi Arabia and the UAE enabled the former to more or less impose a 
 ii 
settlement on the latter.  Finally, this thesis argues that the UAE’s claim to Khor al-
Udaid, which is the most visible aspect of the dispute since it can be clearly shown on 
maps, is not in fact the most important issue for the UAE –– it is the oil and gas sharing 
arrangements in for Zararah/Shaybah oil field, due to their huge economic implications. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The Treaty of Jeddah signed in August 19741 was expected to be the final step in a long 
process of formal negotiations over the boundaries between Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia –– a process that began in 1935. Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, Director of the 
National Center for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi during the 1970s, 
believed at the time that the signing the Treaty “put a satisfactory end to the problem.”2 
However, when the UAE Government revived the boundary question in 2004, seeking 
the modification of certain Articles in the Treaty, it became public knowledge that the 
dispute had not ended in 1974 and that Abu Dhabi has never been satisfied with the 
Treaty.  The border dispute was reopened very publically in December 2004, during 
Shaikh Khalifa’s first state visit abroad –– to Riyadh –– as the newly-appointed 
President of the UAE.3  The dispute has remained a thorn in the side of UAE-Saudi 
relations ever since. 
This study examines the boundary question during the reign of Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan 
Al-Nahyan (r.1966-2004) and his son, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (r.2004-
present). It attempts to answer whether revival of the border dispute in 2004 occurred 
spontaneously with Shaikh Khalifa or if it had been an on-going issue that nevertheless 
remained dormant during Shaikh Zayid’s rule.  It is important to note that the Saudis 
have insisted that the Treaty was, and remains, a valid agreement; their only complaint 
is that the UAE has failed to cooperate in implementing one of the Treaty Articles 
relating to the maritime boundary.  
To provide insight into the UAE’s revival of the dispute in 2004 and its position 
towards the Articles of the Treaty, the negotiating processes related to the territorial 
                                                
1 Shaikh Zayid of the UAE and King Faisal met in Jeddah on 21 August 1974 to sign the Treaty. 
2 Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History  (London, Croom Helm, 
1978), p.212. 
3 “Riyadh Diplomatic as UAE Grievance Resurfaces”, Gulf States Newsletter no. 760 (24 June 2005) at 
http://www.gsn.online.com/HTML/Subscriber/Back_issues/700s/760%20-760/security.html (accessed 11 
May 2010).	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dispute between 1935 and 1974 need to be carefully examined. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to a better understanding of how Treaty of Jeddah came about, focusing on 
the development of UAE-Saudi territorial negotiations during 1970-74, a brief but 
important period that has been somewhat overlooked and should be addressed. Studying 
the territorial negotiations related to the UAE-Saudi border dispute during the early 
1970s means scrutinizing the development of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute 
before independence, during the ‘colonial period’. Concurrently, the importance of the 
colonial period is to examine how the British role influenced the territorial claims of 
Saudi Arabia and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.4  
During the ‘colonial period’, Britain negotiated with Saudi Arabia on behalf of Abu 
Dhabi in an attempt to delimit Saudi Arabia’s south-eastern boundary. At each stage of 
the territorial negotiations, Saudi Arabia rejected the lines proposed by the British since 
the gap in the proposed lines for each side was too wide.  In 1952, Saudi forces 
occupied the Hamasa oasis in the Buraimi/Al-Ain oasis region5, an event known as the 
Burami Crisis.  A military stand-off ensued, leading eventually to the submission of the 
dispute to international arbitration in 1954.  Negotiations ended in deadlock in 1955, 
prompting the British to resolve the problem through force of arms, expelling the Saudi 
troops from Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region and unilaterally declaring the limits of the 
Saudi-Abu Dhabi boundary. 
Despite the resulting deterioration of Anglo-Saudi relations during the 1950s, the 
British attempted to remain neutral towards Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims. Ivor Lucas, 
for example, cites the Buraimi Crisis (1952-55), the Suez Crisis (1956), and the 
resulting break Anglo-Saudi diplomatic relations (1956-63) as cumulative reasons why 
British officials wished to avoid Abu Dhabi’s claim over Khor al-Udaid in that period.6  
In 1968, Britain announced that it would withdraw its military and protection from the 
Gulf shaikhdoms in late 1971. This thesis shows how, after this announcement, the 
British Government lost interest in resolving the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border case in favour 
                                                
4 Author’s Note: The terms Abu Dhabi and UAE have been applied somewhat interchangeably in the 
text. Historically (1820-1971) the border dispute was between the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia. However, following Britain’s military withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 December 1971, and 
because the United Arab Emirates become an independent state on 2 December 1971, I have used mostly 
used UAE when referring to the border dispute with Saudi Arabia after that date.   
5 Al-Ain/Al-Buraimi oasis region consists of nine oases/villages, seven of which –– Al-Ain, Al-Jaheli, Al-
Qattarah, Al-Muwaiji, Al-Hill, Al-Masudi, and Al-Muhtaredh –– are today under Abu Dhabi’s control, 
while the remaining three, namely Hamasa, Sa'ara and Buraimi, today belong to the Sultanate of Oman.	  
6 Ivor Lucas, correspondence, 24 October 2010.	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of Abu Dhabi, especially during the 1970s. It argues that Britain’s short-term strategy 
for dealing with the dispute in the final two years of their presence in the Gulf (1970-
71) enabled the Saudis to set and impose their own terms until they achieved their aims 
under the Treaty of Jeddah in 1974.  
This study shows that during the last two years of Britain’s presence and its immediate 
aftermath (1970-74), Britain’s role changed in the territorial negotiations between the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Up to 1968, it had been Abu Dhabi’s ‘protector’ defending 
Abu Dhabi’s interests.  After the 1968 announcement of its intention to withdraw from 
the Gulf in 1971, its proclaimed role changed to that of an ‘honest broker’ seeking a 
compromise agreement.7 After it withdrawal on 1 December 1971, its role became that 
of a ‘disinterested party’8 in which the British were observers and advisers, rather than 
actual participants in the negotiations.  As a result, the British were not actively 
involved in the final negotiating phase that produced the Treaty of Jeddah in 1974.  
1.2. Argument of the Thesis 
This thesis examines how Britain’s different roles in the Gulf influenced the course of 
the UAE-Saudi border dispute, an important but unstudied subject.  In the early days of 
Britain’s presence in the Gulf, its involvement and interests were limited to region’s 
coastal areas, defending the ports against maritime attack and suppressing piracy. This 
concern explains Britain’s support for Abu Dhabi’s claim over Khor al-Udaid9 (a 
coastal inlet at the intersection between modern-day Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Saudi 
Arabia); however in the case of the inland Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region, the British were 
neutral towards its periodic occupations by Saudi forces until the Sultan of Muscat, 
Sayyid Azzan bin Qais, and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zayid the Great (r.1855-
1909), formed an alliance to expel the last Saudi garrison from the region in 1869.  
Thereafter, Britain gradually adopted a policy of supporting Abu Dhabi and Oman’s 
claims over the region. 
In 1913 and 1914, the Ottoman and British governments signed two Conventions 
establishing the boundaries between the Ottoman Empire and the shaikhdoms of Eastern 
                                                
7 J. M. Edes, “Oil Company Drilling in Abu Dhabi”, 11 November 1970, FCO8/1314, quoted in Arabian 
Boundaries, vol. 11, ed. Schofield, p. 771. 
8 Morris (Jedda) to FCO  (London), 5 December 1971, FCO8/1616, quoted in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 
12, ed. Schofield, p. 498. 
9 The term in Arabic means an inlet from a large body of water. Khor al-Udaid is a shallow inlet located 
on the eastern side of the base of the Qatar peninsula.    
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Arabia under British protection.  These were defined by a Blue Line (delimiting the 
eastern boundary between Ottoman Hasa and the British-protected coastal states of the 
lower Gulf) and a Violet Line (delimiting the southern boundary between Ottoman Najd 
and the British spheres of Oman and the Aden Protectorate).10  After World War I and 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain argued that Saudi Arabia was the Ottoman 
Empire’s successor state in the Arabian Peninsula and must, therefore, respect the Blue 
Line –– an argument fiercely rejected by the Saudis. Not only was Britain treaty-bound 
to protect Abu Dhabi, it also needed to protect British oil companies operating in Abu 
Dhabi territory (east of the Blue Line) against Saudi territorial claims over the 
potentially oil-rich sands of Arab Dhabi.   
The most significant Saudi territorial claims east of the Blue Line was for Khor al-
Udaid, the Al-Ain/Buraimi region, and the Liwa oasis (where Zararah/Shaybah is 
located),11 all of which were in the Abu Dhabi mainland.  The three separate territorial 
disputes were often treated and negotiated together, hence they can be regarded as 
separate parts of a single dispute.   
Britain staunchly defended Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims in its negotiations with Saudi 
Arabia between the start of Anglo-Saudi negotiations in 1935 and 1968, when it 
announced it would withdraw its military from the Gulf in 1971 and grant independence 
to Abu Dhabi and the other emirates then under its protection. From 1971 onwards, Abu 
Dhabi’s position was further weakened by Britain’s military withdrawal in December 
1971, which left the emirate vulnerable to another Saudi occupation, followed by Saudi 
Arabia’s threatened use of force, and Saudi Arabia’s refusal to recognize the newly-
formed UAE during 1971-74.  The UAE’s external vulnerability was exacerbated by the 
lack of political unity within the federation during its early years.  Beyond this, 
America’s Twin Pillars policy to provide security for the Gulf after 1971 strengthened 
the position of Saudi Arabia and Iran, who were now the designated ‘policemen’ of the 
                                                
10 The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 established an eastern boundary called the Blue Line that ran 
due south from Zakhnuniyah Island, west of the Qatar peninsula, to a point in the Rub al-Khali (the 
Empty Quarter). The 1913 Convention was never ratified by the Ottomans but in March 1914, the British 
and Ottomans agreed to a Violet Line that connected the southern end of the Blue Line with the Aden-
Yemen frontier established earlier; this Convention was ratified by the Ottomans. Cited in Richard N. 
Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula During the Twentieth 
Century,” in Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, ed. Richard N. Schofield (London: UCL Press, 
1994), p.19. 
11 Zararah-Shaybah, known as Shaybah by Saudi Arabia and Zararah by Abu Dhabi,	  a giant oilfield in the 
Eastern Rub al-Kali, is 40 km long and is located immediately south of the Abu Dhabi border in the Batin 
area. 
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Gulf.  This meant that the US would not intervene to help the UAE if it was invaded by 
either state.  This emboldened Iran to occupy the Emirati islands of Greater and Lesser 
Tunbs in 1971.   
During the final years of negotiation following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf, 
Shaikh Zayid was alone without sufficient resources to resist Saudi Arabia power and 
could not negotiate on equal terms.  The result was that the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah was 
an unequal treaty in which Saudi Arabia made significant gains at the expense of the 
UAE.  This is the subject of Chapter 6.  
From the Saudi perspective, the Treaty brought a longstanding territorial dispute to a 
satisfactory end, except for the maritime boundaries, which were left undefined.  But, 
from the Emirati perspective, the Treaty was a disaster. Before the ink was dry on the 
Treaty, Shaikh Zayid embarked on a laborious and ultimately fruitless campaign to 
convince the Saudis to revise some Articles of the Treaty.  Shaikh Zayid approach was 
discreet and patient, conducted behind closed doors, leading the outside world to 
believe that the Treaty of Jeddah had, in fact, resolved the UAE’s border dispute with 
Saudi Arabia.  
However, under Shaikh Khalifa, the UAE government’s position towards the Treaty of 
Jeddah has became clear since 2004: the Treaty of Jeddah did not bring the border issue 
to an end.  It remains a live issue.  The revival by the UAE of the boundary question in 
2004 was followed by an escalation of tension between the two countries over the yet-
to-be-defined maritime boundaries between the two countries.  This was sparked by the 
announcement of an Abu Dhabi-Qatar maritime causeway project in 2005 (yet to be 
completed), the construction of a maritime a pipeline between Qatar and the UAE in 
2004-06, and the UAE’s publication in UAE Yearbook for 2006 of a map showing the 
disputed territories as belonging to Abu Dhabi –– all of which indicate a new assertive 
approach by UAE to the boundary dispute.  This provoked a firm Saudi reply: the 
temporary closure of the Saudi-UAE border in 2009, Saudi political attempts to 
undermine the maritime causeway and pipeline projects, and ultimately a brief fire fight 
between a UAE Navy ship and Saudi Coastguard ships in a disputed maritime zone in 
2010 (resulting in the capture of the Saudi ship, which had sailed into waters claimed by 
the UAE).  
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Among the events that have occurred since 2004, I was interested in knowing whether 
the UAE recognized current political maps. A UAE oilman from ADCO (the Abu 
Dhabi Company for On-Shore Oil Operations) remarked that: “the UAE has not yet had 
formal boundaries.”12 The UAE appears to disagree with the Treaty of Jeddah as 
formalised on official maps.13 It requires an agreed map with certain adjustments in the 
south and west, although this would inevitably mean entering a further new series of 
negotiations with Saudi Arabia. However, the UAE’s new assertive approach has not 
succeeded in convincing Saudi Arabia to seriously revisit the issue.  Symbolic meetings 
were convened by UAE to discuss the issue, but nothing resulted from them.  The 
Saudis would not budge.  Saudi-UAE relations have suffered as a result.  This is the 
subject of Chapter 7.   
1.3. Research Questions 
This thesis seeks, first of all, to ascertain how Britain’s role during the ‘colonial period’ 
and after shaped the boundary dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and their 
respective positions.  It also seeks to answer the following subsidiary questions: 
• How did Britain’s role in the dispute evolve over time?  
• What factors hindered resolution of the UAE-Saudi border dispute? 
• What strategies and tactics did the parties to the territorial dispute use during the 
negotiation process (1971-1974)? 
•    How did America’s Twin Pillar policy shape the context of the dispute? 
•   What is the link between the UAE’s revival of the dispute since 2004 and the content 
of the Treaty’s provisions?   
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The UAE-Saudi border dispute is worthy of further study for a number of reasons. First, 
although the dispute has been well covered in the existing literature, most studies 
conclude with Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. Some scholars mention 
briefly that the Treaty of Jeddah ended the dispute but without following the process of 
how the Treaty of Jeddah had come about.  As a result, very little has been written about 
the final years of negotiations: 1970-74. This study aims to fill that gap by examining 
                                                
12 An anonymous UAE oil worker, Interview, Abu Dhabi, ADCO (the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore 
Oil Operations) 15 August 2011. 
13 See Figure 7.4, p.178.	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primary documents and reports in the popular news media, interviews with 
eyewitnesses and experts on the issue, and the identification of themes of change and 
continuity in the periods before and after Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 
December 1971.   
Secondly, despite the fact that scholars have studied the British period extensively, there 
is a fairly large amount of inaccurate information in the literature related to the 
provisions of the Treaty of Jeddah (see Section 1.7.3 below). There are three reasons for 
this: (1) the text of the Treaty of Jeddah remained secret until 1995; (2) scholars were 
either biased or have relied too much on biased sources; and (3) enough government 
documents have been de-classified and released to the public to enable historians to 
reassess the subject.  
Thirdly, and due largely to the efforts of Saudi scholars, Saudi Arabia’s settlement of 
various territorial disputes with neighbouring states has been presented as the result of 
principled, equitable negotiation and mutually satisfactory results –– such as the Saudi-
Qatar agreement of 1965. In contrast, this case study portrays Saudi Arabia in a rather 
different light: it used its power to reach a largely one-sided agreement greatly in its 
favour. 
Finally, this thesis demonstrates the importance of the passage of time in the 
interpretation and settlement of disputes. Before December 1971, Abu Dhabi was a 
British protected state with few resources to resist the power of Saudi Arabia. In the 
early years of the UAE, the federation’s survival depended on maintaining Saudi good 
will at the time the Treaty was signed in 1974.  Thirty years later, when Abu Dhabi 
revived its territorial dispute with Saudi Arabia in 2004, the UAE was in a very 
different position than it had been in 1974: the country developed considerably, it had 
greater wealth and resources at its disposal, it had the means to defend itself against 
Saudi Arabia, and it had considerable experience in international affairs –– all of which 
placed the UAE on a more equal footing with Saudi Arabia. 
1.5. Aims of this Study 
To understand the current UAE position towards the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah 
and why the boundary question has been revived, it is necessary to cover the historical 
events related to the negotiation process and to link them to aftermath of the British 
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withdrawal in 1971, since the present situation is still shaped by the past. This study 
seeks to achieve several aims: 
• To fill a gap in the literature regarding the UAE-Saudi Arabia territorial negotiations 
leading up to the Treaty of Jeddah (1970-74). 
• To explain how Britain’s role in the Gulf influenced the settlement of the dispute. 
• To analyse the UAE-Saudi Arabia territorial negotiations (particularly during 1970-
74) and to identify the major obstacles prolonging settlement of the dispute.    
• To link the UAE’s revival of the territorial dispute in 2004 to its dissatisfaction with 
the Treaty of Jeddah by examining its Articles in the context of the UAE’s claims. 
• To look at the disputed Articles from the perspective of the UAE, and at how the 
Saudi Arabian government views the current UAE position towards the Treaty. 
• To show that UAE government’s dissatisfaction with the Treaty dates back to 1975 
and is not, as the media has suggested, connected with Shaikh Zayid’s death in 2004. 
1.6. Analytical Framework 
This study examines the peaceful methods employed in settling international disputes.  
Peaceful settlements are arrived at through legal and diplomatic means.  This study 
focuses on the latter. ‘Diplomatic means’ consist of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
and inquiry, of which this study will focus on the first two.  
Despite the longstanding territorial dispute between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
formally dating back to 1935, although the claims predate this, both the disputed parties 
attempted to find a peaceful settlement of their dispute through bilateral negotiation and 
mediation. The analytical framework employed here is intended to enhance our 
understanding of the conflict’s resolution rather than its management.  Conflict 
management is intended to bring a conflict under control, while conflict resolution aims 
to end it.14 This study assumes that the both the UAE and Saudi Arabia were determined 
to end their dispute by peaceful diplomatic means during 1970-74. 
The analytical framework used in this thesis is drawn from the literature of negotiation 
and mediation. Chapter 4 discusses in detail and Chapters 5 and 6 apply to the 
                                                
14 Mohamed Rabie, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (London: Praeger, 1994), p.50. 
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negotiation process of 1970-74.  Chapter 5 in particular analyses the first phase of the 
territorial negotiations from 1970 up to Britain’s military withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 
December 1971, while Chapter 6 covers the second phases of territorial negotiations 
from the UAE’s independence on 2 December 1971 up to the signing of the Treaty of 
Jeddah in August 1974 and its immediate aftermath. 
1.7. Literature Review 
1.7.1 General Background 
A fair number of studies have been published on border disputes in the Arabian Gulf in 
the years since the Buraimi Crisis 1952-55, possibly because that incident focused 
international attention on frontier issues in the Arabian Peninsula more broadly.  One 
result of this is that the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute tends to be studied in context 
of Buraimi.  The main examples of this are Wilkinson’s Arabia’s Frontiers, 1991; Al-
Baharna’s The Legal Status of the Gulf States, 1968; Al-Shamlan’s The Evolution of 
National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula, 1987; Kelly’s Eastern 
Arabian Frontiers, 1964 and Al-Shamsi’s The Al-Buraimi Dispute, 1986.   
No single study provides a complete picture of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute; 
scholars interested in the different aspects of the dispute (Al-Ain/Buraimi, Liwa, 
Zararah/Shaybah, and Khor al-Udaid) must consult several accounts to gain a complete 
picture. 
Most of these accounts, however, do not discuss the UAE-Saudi border dispute after 
1971.  Of the studies noted above, almost all focus on the Buraimi dispute and end with 
Britain’s military withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. This study examines the most 
popular works and those touching on the negotiations of 1970-74.  The leading experts 
on the subject are / were J.B. Kelly, Abdulrahman Al-Shamlan, John C. Wilkinson and 
Saeed Mohammad Al-Shamsi 
Al-Shamsi’s The Al-Buraimi Dispute (1986) covers the period of 1820 to 1970 and 
provides a clear and detailed overview and account of the development of the Buraimi 
dispute, with a particular focus on the Saudi occupation of Buraimi during 1952-55, 
which he examines in considerable detail, based on interviews with people who 
witnessed the events. He concludes that Saudi Arabia used various methods to subvert 
the ruling tribunal at the Saudi disposal during international arbitration in 1954.  
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In Eastern Arabian Frontiers (1964), J.B. Kelly discusses the Buraimi dispute although 
in less detail than al-Shamsi. His study, which depends exclusively on British 
documents, focuses on the Saudi Arabia-Abu Dhabi border dispute from the 1930s to 
the 1960s. Both Wilkinson and Al-Shamlan regarded Kelly as being heavily biased in 
favour of the British government’s position on the dispute.  
In The Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southern Arabian Peninsula (1987), 
Abdulrahman Al-Shamlan gives an interesting and more objective account of the Saudi 
south-eastern boundaries during the period from 1935 to 1955. He follows the rise of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the 1930s and his expansionist territorial claim 
east of the Blue Line. He also examines the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute in the 
context of Al-Ain/Buraimi in detail.  
John Wilkinson, in his Arabia’s Frontiers (1991), presents the border issues in the 
Arabian Gulf in the context of Britain’s role in delimiting territories under its 
protection, and examines Saudi territorial claims with Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Oman and 
Yemen. He criticises the way that boundaries were drawn in Arabian Peninsula because 
the British “sphere of influence” concept of claiming sovereignty east of the Blue and 
Violet Lines was neither a valid claim nor recognised under international law.  
Several other studies have been published since the 1990s that include some mention of 
the UAE-Saudi border dispute and briefly analyse the Treaty of Jeddah, such as Richard 
Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the 
Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966-71” (2011), Abdullatif Al-Shaikh’s Saudi Arabia 
and its Gulf Co-Operation Neighbours (2001) and Hesam al-Ulama’s Federal 
Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates (1994). The latter was the first scholar to have 
access to a copy of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1994, a year before it was made public. At a 
time when most other scholars were arguing that on the basis of the Treaty of Jeddah, 
the Zararah oilfield was to be shared between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, al-Ulama and 
Al-Shaikh both concluded that, according to Article 3 of the Treaty, the UAE had no 
right to claim sovereignty over Zararah. Schofield updated their narrative through a 
thorough examination of the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah about which he made 
detailed comments in his Arabian Boundaries: New Documents 1966-1975 (2009).15  
                                                
15 Richard N. Schofield, “Introduction to 1974”, in Arabian Boundaries: New Documents 1966-1975, 
Vol. 15, ed. Richard N. Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 2009), iix-xv 
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Studies of the dispute up to the late 1970s differ from those published since the 1990s: 
the latter include recently declassified information that was unavailable to the authors of 
the earlier studies. When scholars have access to the newer material, they often find 
fault with the previously-accepted explanations or accounts put forward by scholars in 
the past.  As noted above, the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute has been extensively 
covered in the context of Al-Ain/Buraimi and during the period from the nineteenth 
century up to 1971, but they shed little light on the events leading up to the signing of 
the Treaty of Jeddah in August 1974.  
In the absence of Saudi and Emirati governmental records, this study has had to rely 
heavily on British governmental records, mainly from the Foreign Office and British 
India Office.  Most of the British documents on the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute 
used in this study were declassified only a few years ago and were not, therefore, used 
in the studies by J.B. Kelly, Abdulrahman Al-Shamlan, John C. Wilkinson, and Saeed 
Mohammad Al-Shamsi.  Only Richard Schofield appears to have used them.  
An additional matter to consider when using British documents is that they do not 
reveal a uniform policy towards regional issues in the Gulf.  The Foreign Office, India 
Office, and British officials within them and on the spot in the Gulf frequently disagreed 
over the issues. In 1938, for instance, the Foreign Office proposed the idea of offering 
Khor al-Udaid to Saudi Arabia in exchange for settling the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border, but 
the India Office and the British officials in the Gulf strongly rejected the idea.  Officials 
in the India Office, Britain’s Political Residency in the Gulf, and the British military 
offered widely diverse opinions on the Foreign Office proposal, revealing that there was 
no clear British consensus on the question of Khor al-Udaid: was it expendable or not?  
As late as 1970, it appears that little had changed.  On June 1970, Britain’s Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia wrote: “we neither affirmed nor excluded the possibility of discussion 
of [Khor al-Udaid] at some stage.”16 On more than one occasion the British, in an 
attempt to settle the frontier issue between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, attempted to 
use the Khor al-Udaid issue as a bargaining chip.  
A final point to note is that scholars tend to find a common theme in the primary 
sources: partisanship. While most British government documents were created by 
officials of agencies affiliated with the British and British Indian governments, in the 
                                                
16 Jedda, (W. Morris ) to FCO, 12 June 1970, FCO8/1336, London, TNA in Arabian Boundaries, Vol.11, 
ed. Schofield, p. 256.   
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case of the UAE-Saudi border dispute, the archives also include documents prepared on 
behalf of regional rulers or their governments. Perhaps the most significant of these are 
the Saudi Memorial and the British Memorial of 1955, containing documents that were 
assembled for the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations between 1935 and 1955. The 
material included in Saudi Memorial and British Memorial was submitted to an 
international arbitration commission for a verdict on Saudi Arabia’s and Abu Dhabi’s 
territorial claims. Most studies of the UAE-Saudi border dispute use one or both of 
these memorials. It should be noted, however, that some scholars appear to have used 
these memorials to document facts when in fact they are really the historical arguments 
made by the governments of Britain (on behalf of Abu Dhabi) and Saudi Arabia. 
Another example is the Aramco Reports, a series published during the early 1950s 
favouring Saudi territorial claims. These reports produced documentary evidence of 
Saudi territorial claims east of the Blue and Violet Lines that challenged the argument, 
made by Britain, that Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. Of 
course, the Aramco Reports were published by an American oil company that had been 
granted a substantial concession by the Saudi King.  Still, it is not unusual to find 
studies that unquestioningly accept Aramco and Saudi reports as objective sources of 
information.  
The period 1970-74 and the immediate aftermath of the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah is 
relatively unstudied field.  Declassified British government documents have been 
available to the public for only a few years, since 2009.  A selection of the most 
important documents was subsequently edited and published Richard Schofield in 
Arabian Boundaries, 1966-1975 (2009), Volumes 10 to 16.  This important selection of 
documents enabled me to examine the territorial negotiations of 1970-74 between the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia with a particular focus on the British role in the final years of 
British protection (1968-71). In addition to documents released through Wikileaks, US 
documents released in 2010 also shed new light on the UAE-Saudi border dispute. 
Understanding how the Treaty of Jeddah came about, and to what extent the UAE was 
satisfied with the outcome of the Treaty, is critical to understanding the UAE’s 
subsequent reopening of the dispute in 2004. 
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1.7.2 Researcher Bias 
Although I am a UAE citizen, I have endeavoured to assess both sides of the UAE-
Saudi border dispute objectively and to accurately present the perspectives on both sides 
of the dispute. While reviewing the literature on the subject, I encountered considerable 
favouritism, with academics tending to back one side or the other –– most notably John 
C. Wilkinson championing Saudi claims and J.B. Kelly defending Abu Dhabi’s 
position. 
Richard Schofield described J.B. Kelly as “the original Arabian boundaries specialist”.17 
Kelly was extremely well-informed and his publications (beginning in the 1950s and 
continuing into the 1980s) are an invaluable resource for any scholar working on the 
subject.  Nevertheless, Kelly saw no legal merit in Saudi Arabia’s claims,18 writing in 
1964 for example that “the basic issue [of the Anglo-Saudi territorial dispute] is that of 
the continued existence of small states in the face of the attempts of their more powerful 
neighbour to absorb them.” According to Kelly, Britain played its role of Abu Dhabi’s 
protector honourably. That, however, was the problem, according to William E. 
Milligan, who characterised Kelly’s Eastern Arabian Frontiers (1964) as “an unofficial 
counter-memorial [of the Saudi position] on behalf of Britain.”19  Milligan portrays 
Kelly as someone who uncritically accepted British evidence while dismissing all the 
evidence provided by the Saudis.  Kelly, for instance, supported Britain’s argument that 
Saudi Arabia was bound by the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914 because 
it was a successor state to the Ottoman Empire.20   
As John C. Wilkinson has pointed out in Arabia’s Frontiers (1991), W.F. Beckett, a 
Foreign Office lawyer, informed the British government as early as 1935 that Britain’s 
legal argument –– that Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the Ottoman Empire and 
therefore bound by the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914 –– is, in fact, 
invalid under international law, since international law does not recognise spheres of 
                                                
17 Richard N. Schofield, “Introduction to 1974 (Volume 15),” in Arabian Boundaries: New Documents 
1966-1975, Vol. 15, ed. Richard N. Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 2009), ix.	  
18 Abdullatif A. Al-Shaikh, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Neighbours: A Study in International 
Boundary Management, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, UK,  2001), p. 90. 
19 “Comments on J. B. Kelly’s Eastern Arabian Frontiers” in William E. Milligan Papers, Box Two, 
Folder 5, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Research Center, Washington, DC, p.1.  
20 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, p.113. 
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influence.21 The British had justified their argument that Saudi Arabia was a successor-
state of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of a 1913 treaty between Ibn Saud and the 
Ottoman government that was allegedly discovered by British soldiers occupying Basra 
in November 1914 after the outbreak of World War I. It should be noted that the Saudis 
denied the existence of any such treaty, and from 1935 onwards the Saudi government 
rejected the British argument. Wilkinson was not the first person to question the validity 
of the British successor-state argument.  In 1968, Husain M. Al-Baharna remarked that, 
from a legal point of view, “...it seems questionable that the legal status of Ibn Sa’ud at 
the time could be determined on the basis of the alleged 1914 treaty alone which, in any 
case, is not in itself an internationally binding instrument.”22 
Wilkinson updates and expands the existing scholarly attack on the legal argument 
Britain put forth during its negotiations with Saudi Arabia, integrating that attack into 
an anti-British bias that characterises his own scholarly history. In 1971, for example, 
he wrote that “several [of the Trucial States] are entirely separate territorial units.”23 The 
explanation is that he extends his bias against Britain to the states under its protection 
(Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial States), which he consistently portrays as insignificant 
coastal shaikhdoms with little political and economic power. Some scholars, accepting 
the weakness of the Trucial States, have gone further by arguing that Britain’s policy 
was designed deliberately to keep these states dependant on Britain, weak, and divided. 
Cordesman, for example, argues that “Britain simplified its task in ruling each emirate 
by encouraging the various emirs to compete and by promoting family and tribal 
rivalries over territory. These ‘divide and rule’ tactics did nothing to create a solid basis 
for regional self-rule.”24 Offering a slightly different interpretation, Abdulkarim Hamadi 
argues that “internal conflicts [between the Trucial States] did not alarm the British for 
it was easier for Britain to manage hostile and politically divided states.”25 
                                                
21 Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers, p. xi. Note that criticism of John C. Wilkinson concerns only his bias 
against Britain and its protectorates, the Trucial States. Throughout his work, he presents a tremendous 
amount of properly documented information that is generally very reliable and is frequently cited here, 
sometimes to state facts and other times to counter his bias with the views of others scholars. 
22 Husain M. Al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Gulf States, (Manchester, UK: University of 
Manchester, 1971), p.234.	  
23 John C. Wilkinson, “The Oman Question: The Background to the Political Geography of South East 
Arabia,” The Geographical Journal137 (1971), p. 361. 
24 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military 
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1984), p. 416. 
25 Hamadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Limits”, p. 70. 
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In contrast to these claims, Hesam Al-Ulama, who wrote his PhD thesis on The Federal 
Boundaries of the UAE (1994), indicated in an interview with me that Britain did not 
promote rivalry or hostility between the Trucial States so that they could be more easily 
ruled, and cited, as an example, how Britain intervened to end the repeated secessions of 
the Qubaisat tribe from Abu Dhabi in the nineteenth century.26 When asked about the 
way Cordesman and Hamadi characterised British policy towards the Gulf States, Julian 
Walker (a British official who served in the Trucial States in the 1960s-71) states 
emphatically: “we had no policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the Trucial States. We were all 
for Emirati cooperation and did our best to encourage it internally but had limited 
influence.”27   
1.7.3 The Post-1971 Gap 
The gap in the academic literature on the Treaty of Jeddah is due to the fact that records 
relating to the Treaty and the negotiations immediately preceding it (December 1971-
August 1974) have been kept secret, significantly hindering academic study of the 
subject.28  From the 1970s onwards, a number of Arab scholars depicted the Treaty of 
Jeddah as an example of an ‘Arab solution’ by which Arab states could settle the 
disputed areas efficiently and without any interference by the British.  Thus, Abdullatif 
A. Al-Shaikh wrote in his 2001 PhD dissertation that “the resolution of the Saudi-UAE 
dispute was enabled by the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in 1971.”29 A Saudi 
geographer, Abdulkarim M. Hamadi, drew three conclusions about the Treaty of 
Jeddah. First, like Al-Shaikh, he claimed that the absence of British interference 
allowed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to settle their dispute. Secondly, according to 
Hamadi, when the actual participants negotiated directly, resolution became possible. 
Finally, he states that oil was not a major issue in negotiations between Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE.30  
Because the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah remained secret until 1995, these Arab 
scholars based their conclusions on incomplete and inaccurate information.  Hamadi is 
simply wrong about the lack of British interference, since Britain actively urged Shaikh 
                                                
26 Hesam M. Al-Ulama, Interview, Washington DC, 11 November 2010. 
27 Julian Walker, correspondence, 29 September 2010.	  
28 Saudi Arabia registered the Treaty of Jeddah with the United Nations in 1993, and published it 
officially in 1995. 
29 Abdullatif A. Al-Shaikh, “Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-Operation Neighbours”, p. 115. 
30 Abdulkarim M. Hamadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Limits: A Study in Law and Politics”, PhD thesis, 
Indiana University, USA, 1981, p. 80. 
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Zayid, the President of the UAE, to accept King Faisal proposals from 1970 onwards ––
 this is examined in Chapter 5. He is also wrong about oil playing no role. Chapters 5 
and 6 argue that the Saudis rejected any proposal that would not give them unilateral 
sovereignty over oilfields in south of Abu Dhabi. Al-Ulama came closest to the truth by 
relating the Treaty of Jeddah to the solving of some of the problems of the UAE 
federation.31  For example, the Saudis made diplomatic recognition of the newly-formed 
UAE (established 2 December 1971) contingent on the settlement of the UAE-Saudi 
territorial dispute. At that time, Shaikh Zayid was confronting many other problematic 
issues: Iran’s recent occupation of the Tunb Islands, political friction between the rulers 
of the UAE (especially Ras-al Khaimah and Sharjah), and contested borders between 
the emirates.  As a result, the country had no unified policies or federal government 
structure.   
Before the Treaty of Jeddah was made public in 1995, scholars reported and repeated 
inaccurate rumours about the Articles of the Treaty. Al-Shaikh32 and Hamadi33  both 
asserted, wrongly, that under the Treaty of Jeddah, production of the Zararah/Shaybah 
oil field was evenly split between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. John Duke Anthony also 
believed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had split the oil field production,34 and 
claimed, inaccurately, that the UAE gave Saudi Arabia a right of way at Khor al-
Udaid.35 Sometimes the problem could be easily remedied. During an interview, when 
presented with discrepancies between his description of the Treaty’s provisions and the 
actual text of the Treaty of Jeddah, Anthony simply admitted that he had been wrong.36 
He had mistakenly thought that the 1974 agreement brought an end solution to the 
territorial dispute: 
The two states acknowledged in principle that Abu Dhabi 
sovereignty would be recognized over six of the villages in the 
[Al-Ain/Buraimi] oasis region previously claimed by Saudi 
Arabia; that the rich [Zararah] oilfield previously in dispute 
would be divided between them, and that Saudi Arabia would 
                                                
31 Hesam M. J. S. Al-Ulama, “The Federal Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates”, PhD thesis, 
University of Durham, UK, 1994, p. 166.	  
32 Al-Shaikh, “Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Neighbours,” p. 117. 
33 Hamadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Limits,” p. 80. 
34 John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum (Washington: The 
Middle East Institute, 1975), pp. 148-9. Professor Anthony is an American Middle East specialist based at 
Georgetown University, Washington DC. 
35 John Duke Anthony, Historical and Cultural Dictionary of the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates of 
Eastern Arabia (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1976), p. 56. 
36 John Duke Anthony, interview, Washington D.C.,  29 November 2010 
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obtain an outlet to the Gulf though Abu Dhabi in the [Khor al-
Udaid] area.37  
Sir Bernard Burrows, British Political Resident in the Gulf during 1953-58, also had 
misconceptions about the Treaty of Jeddah: 
It is gratifying to discover that in 1974-5 the Buraimi question 
was finally brought to a friendly conclusion between the states 
concerned by the cession by Abu Dhabi to Saudi Arabia of a 
small area of sea coast east of Qatar in return for Saudi 
acceptance of the status quo at Buraimi and the relinquishment 
of their claim to it.38 
According to Muhammed Morsy Abdullah: 
The creation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the energetic 
activities of Ahmad Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister, the 
establishment of stable government and a speedy start to the 
development of the area, as well as the efforts of Prince Fahd b. 
Abd al-Aziz were all factors helping to further friendly relations 
and mutual co-operation between Saudi Arabia and the new 
state. Finally, in 1975 [sic] a frontier agreement was signed by 
both heads of state, which put a satisfactory end to the 
problem.39 
In fact, Abdulrahman Rashid Al-Shamlan, a specialist on the topic of the south-eastern 
Saudi Arabian boundary, stated that the material related to the Treaty of Jeddah was still 
confidential and that the details of the resolution “await further study”: 
The Saudi government has recognized the sovereignty of Abu 
Dhabi over the six Buraimi villages awarded to Abu-Dhabi by 
the British in 1955. In return Saudi Arabia received a corridor 
including approximately 50 kilometres of Gulf shoreline, starting 
from the southern boundary of the base of Qatar at [Khor al-
Udaid]. In addition, Abu Dhabi relinquished part of Sabkhat 
Matti north of [Liwa] and the Saudis shared the [Zararah] oilfield 
in the [Liwa] with Abu Dhabi.40 
                                                
37 John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp.148-9. 
38 Cited in Hesam Ulama’s thesis, p.182, from Bernard, Footnotes in the Sand The Gulf in Transition 
1953-1958, Michael Russell, United Kingdom, 1990, p. 102. 
39 Muhammed Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London, Croon Helm, 
1978) p.212. 
40 Abdulrahman Rashid Al-Shamlan, The Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southern Arabian 
Peninsula: 1934-1955, 1987: p 363 
18 
 
George Joffe believed that the Treaty of Jeddah had “apparently” ended the territorial 
dispute between the two countries.41  
Due to the secrecy of the Treaty of Jeddah before 1995, most scholars writing before 
then made comments about the Treaty based on hearsay or assumption. In this context, 
there is currently no single in-depth study that focuses on events leading up to the 
signing of the Treaty of Jeddah in August 1974, or one that links its Articles to the 
UAE’s revival of the dispute in 2004.   
1.8. Study Methods 
1.8.1 Primary Research Sources 
1.8.1.1  Arabian Boundaries 
Since most studies of the subject offer little or no analysis of events after Britain’s 
military withdrawal from the Gulf in December 1971, they shed little light on the period 
1970-74 (the period covered in Chapters 5 and 6). In order to fill this gap in the 
literature, new sources –– unavailable to historians in the past –– must be consulted.  
This thesis relies on Schofield’s Arabian Boundaries, 1966-1975 (2009), which 
contains copies of documents from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
British Petroleum (BP), and Aramco, as well as dispatches and telegrams from British 
officials on the ground in the Gulf. Although other references were also used in writing 
them, Chapters 5 and 6 depend extensively on material in Volumes 10-16 of Arabian 
Boundaries. 
1.8.1.2 US National Archives 
The US government actively supported and advised the Saudi government during its 
negotiations with Britain over the UAE-Saudi border.  The records in the US National 
Archives in College Park, Maryland, therefore contain a great deal of material on the 
Saudi side of the dispute, as well as the US government’s Twin Pillar policy for Gulf 
security and how it shaped the context of UAE-Saudi territorial negotiations during 
1970-74. 
                                                
41 George Joffe, “Concepts of Sovereignty in the Gulf Region”, in Territorial Foundations of the Gulf 
States, ed. Richard N. Schofield (London: UCL Press, 1994), p.91 [emphasis added]	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1.8.1.3 Wikileaks Reports  
The Wikileaks website was another valuable source of material for this study.  It 
contains classified US government reports for the US Secretary of State (foreign 
secretary) on the dispute after Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in late 1971. These 
sources are used in Chapters 6 and 7.  
1.8.1.4 ADCO Company in Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) provided me with some 
maps showing the location of oil fields in the disputed areas –– most notably oil fields 
discovered in and around Khor al-Udaid (the area ceded in 1974). However, ADCO 
later withdrew cooperation and asked for the maps back (see Section 1.8.2 below). 
1.8.1.5 United Nations HQ, New York 
The United Nations HQ in New York provided me with copies of the 1965 Qatari-Saudi 
Treaty, the 1969 Abu Dhabi-Qatari Treaty, and the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah, as well as 
copies of the extensive official correspondence between the UAE and Saudi 
governments following the UAE’s revival of the dispute in 2004, which both parties had 
lodged with the UN.  The UAE and Saudi permanent missions to the UN were also 
helpful in facilitating my research. These documents are used and discussed in Chapter 
7.  My attempts to gain access to the text of the 1977 UAE-Saudi Treaty were 
unsuccessful however. In New York, the International Treaty Section confirmed that 
this particular treaty had not been registered for public availability, and was not even 
categorized under ‘pending treaties’. Officials in the UAE remained reluctant to talk 
about it. Eventually I obtained a small amount of information on the Treaty, which is 
presented in Chapter 7. 
1.8.2 Some Difficulties During Fieldwork 
In the course of my fieldwork, the availability of data was a problem.  Although the 
Treaty of Jeddah was four decades ago, information about its negotiation, signing and 
aftermath remain sensitive and, in some cases, classified. Many informants would say 
nothing at all without a promise of confidentiality, and even when confidentiality was 
assured, some were still reluctant to voice opinions or provide information. Since this 
study is qualitative in its approach, and because the secondary literature does not 
adequately cover the subject, archival research and interviews in London, the US, the 
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UAE, and Saudi Arabia were necessary. Interviewees included government officials, 
retired British diplomats such as Ivor Lucas and Julian Walker, Emirati and Saudi 
diplomats, UAE oil company employees, tribal leaders, and scholars from the West.  
Their input enabled me to understand the context of the dispute and negotiations, 
appreciate the perspectives of both sides, and better interpret events.  
Access to materials in the UAE, even though I am a UAE citizen, proved problematic at 
the National Central for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi: files on the 
territorial dispute were not made available to me despite repeated visits to the NCDR 
and promises that the material would be provided.  Although officials at ADCO in Abu 
Dhabi were initially cooperative, providing maps I had asked for, they demanded that I 
return the maps after told them that my research was on the contested border with Saudi 
Arabia.  I attempted to interview two prominent figures, Ahmed Khalifa Al-Suwaidi 
(former UAE Foreign Minister) and Maan Saeed Al-Otaiba (former UAE Oil Minister), 
both of whom had played a role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Jeddah, but I was 
told that “no political statement would be made publicly on this topic.”42 
1.9. Structure of the Thesis 
This study is divided into eight chapters, each of which deals with a different aspect of 
the subject. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and includes preparatory background 
material to enable an understanding of the status of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute in 
the academic literature.  
Chapter 2 covers the period of 1800-1930 (before the discovery of oil).  It provides a 
historical background up to the year before territorial negotiations formally commenced 
between Britain (on behalf of Abu Dhabi) and Saudi Arabia, and briefly explains 
concepts that are relevant to indirect territorial sovereignty in the Arabian Peninsula.  
These concepts were used in the territorial claims made by both Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi. The role of Britain in the Arabian Peninsula during the nineteenth century is 
discussed, as is the way that British involvement impacted on territorial issues in coastal 
and inland areas, specifically the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region and Khor al-Udaid. The 
status of Saudi Arabia’s territory is also compared with that of Abu Dhabi during the 
                                                
42 Ahmed Suwaidi’s Assistant, correspondence, Abu Dhabi, 11 April, 2010. I made more than five 
lengthy, time-consuming and ultimately fruitless trips to Al-Ain (where he lives) to meet Ahmed Suwaidi. 
The same was true for Maan Al-Qutiba, with whom I communicated many times in an attempt to 
coordinate a meeting in the UAE, although he now lives in Morocco. 
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nineteenth century. The chapter concentrates on the events that contributed to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, as an independent nation, 
compared with Abu Dhabi’s development as a British protected state.  
Chapter 3 examines the period from the 1930s until 1970s, focusing on the Anglo-Saudi 
territorial negotiations between 1935 and 1955. It examines the roles played by the 
British and US governments in supporting the territorial claims of Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia, and attempts to explain why the lines proposed by the British and the Saudis did 
not satisfy either party. It follows the development of the territorial negotiations, which 
were temporarily suspended when Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia were preparing their 
respective cases for submission of their dispute to international arbitration, and shows 
how, despite several attempts to propose different frontier lines, no settlement was 
reached since the arbitration process failed to end the dispute. The chapter then 
considers the reasons behind Britain’s unilateral declaration of the boundary between 
Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia in 1955, and finally investigates developments in the 
1960s, including the break in Anglo-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1963, the new 
boundary proposed by Britain in 1964, and most importantly Britain’s unexpected 
announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw it military from the Gulf in 1971 and 
grant independence to the British protected states of the Trucial Coast (including Abu 
Dhabi).  It also considers how this announcement impacted on the negotiations.  
Chapter 4 examines the “peaceful diplomatic means” employed in settling disputes. It 
discusses general strategies and tactics that negotiators might use to reach their 
designated goals, as well as third-party / mediator intervention.  After outlining the role 
of a mediator in dispute resolution, it considers Britain’s performance in this role during 
the final phase of the negotiations (1970-71). It also discusses key factors that can affect 
a party’s behaviour during negotiations, such as past history and the imbalance of power 
between parties. Definitions and assumptions in Chapter 4 are drawn from the literature 
of negotiation to build an analytical framework applied mainly in Chapters 5 and 6 to 
the process of negotiation between the UAE and Saudi Arabia during 1970-74.   
Chapter 5 analyses events from King Faisal’s proposal in May 1970 up to the end of 
1971, before Britain withdrew its military from the Gulf. It mostly focuses on the 
British government’s newly-adopted role as an “honest broker” in dealing with the Abu 
Dhabi-Saudi border dispute. It then evaluates the last phase of British involvement in 
the dispute, showing how Britain’s role was influenced by a conflict of interest over the 
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disputed territory (since a British oil company’s investment in Zararah/Shaybah was at 
stake). Significantly, the last two years of Britain’s presence in the Gulf were 
distinguished from the earlier phases of the Anglo-Saudi negotiations. This chapter 
shows that Britain’s role was limited to mediation with the goal of persuading Shaikh 
Zayid to accept King Faisal’s 1970 proposal to settle the dispute. During this period, 
Shaikh Zayid was critical of the British and their passive role during the negotiations. 
He resisted any settlement of the dispute on Saudi terms until Britain withdrew its 
military from the Gulf on 1 December 1971. 
Chapter 6 examines the negotiation process after the formation of the UAE on 2 
December 1971 up to the signing of the Treaty of Jeddah on 21 August 1974. During 
this period, the British declared themselves to be a “disinterested party” in dealing with 
the UAE-Saudi border dispute. The UAE had attempted to find a settlement to the 
dispute, but having failed to find a mediator to offset Saudi power (1971-74), had little 
choice other than to accommodate Saudi Arabia’s demands.43 After Shaikh Zayid had 
exhausted all means for dealing with the dispute, he agreed to settle the dispute at a 
meeting with him on 29 July.  The rulers signed the Treaty on 21 August 1974. This 
chapter was very difficult to write due to the scarcity of records and the reluctance of 
eye witnesses to share information. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Articles of 
the Treaty signed in August 1974 did not reflect the verbal agreement reached the 
previous month, but that the UAE did not come to appreciate this until 1975.  
Chapter 7 provides details of the UAE’s dissatisfaction with the Articles of the Treaty 
of Jeddah that were publicly expressed after the death of Shaikh Zayid, in November 
2004.  Available evidence suggests that the UAE government’s dissatisfaction with the 
Treaty Articles dates back to 1975, not 2004. Chapter 7 examines the Articles, 
pinpointing those parts the UAE seeks to modify.  It shows that Saudi Arabia had been 
fully aware of the UAE’s dissatisfaction since 1975 and, from the 1990s, had taken slow 
steps towards implementing the Treaty’s Articles in the face of this dissatisfaction, and 
considers Saudi Arabia’s reaction to the UAE’s eventual revival of the boundary 
question in 2004.  
                                                
43 It is important to note that the definition of ‘negotiation’ used in Chapter 4 stresses the mutual 
resolution of a conflict. Hence, it was determined that both ‘control’ and ‘accommodation’ were not true 
negotiating strategies. 
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Chapter 8 concludes with a summary analysis and the major findings from the thesis, 
and weighs up possible conditions that might favour a final resolution of the territorial 
dispute between the UAE Saudi Arabia in the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Historical Background of the Disputed Areas, 1800-1930s 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of “Arab solutions”, proposed by Arab scholars to 
explain why the UAE-Saudi border dispute were not resolved until after the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf in late 1971. In order to give the concept of “Arab solutions” 
fair consideration, it is necessary to discuss Britain’s role in the Gulf region.  
This chapter focuses on the period from 1800 to 1930s, from the first Saudi incursion 
into what is now the UAE up to the year before the formal border negotiations began in 
1935. It introduces traditional Arabian concepts that are relevant to understanding 
territorial sovereignty, concepts that were relevant to the 1930s. After the oil discovery 
(as Chapter 3 will demonstrate), Saudi Arabia would use these concepts to press its 
territorial claims against Abu Dhabi. Chapter 2 also discusses Britain’s role as protector 
of trade routes to and from India and how that role was limited to coastal areas in the 
Arabian Gulf with a relative lack of interest in inland areas. 
The chapter presents the status of the areas that were disputed by Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia during the nineteenth century, and the historical background of the Al-
Ain/Buraimi oasis and Khor al-Udaid. Of particular note is Great Britain’s focus on the 
Gulf coast (Khor al-Udaid) and its relative lack of interest in inland areas (Al-
Ain/Buraimi), with both locations serving as examples of the contrasting British actions 
in coastal and inland areas. The chapter shows how Britain’s limited role in the coastal 
areas reflected Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims, and reveals that the British 
response/reaction towards developments over Khor al-Udaid’s affairs reflected their 
concern with maintaining a sphere of influence in the Gulf while keeping in check the 
influence of the Ottoman Empire and of the European powers.  
In addition, the chapter sheds light on the Saudi position regarding Khor al-Udaid and 
Al-Ain/Buraimi, demonstrating, on the basis of the British archival records, that Saudi 
Arabia did not exercise sovereignty over Al-Ain/Buraimi after 1869, and played no role 
in the contest over Khor al-Udaid from the 1820s to the early 1930s. Since Khor al-
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Udaid and Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region would both feature prominently in the disputed 
areas between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia during the twentieth century, the chapter 
looks in depth at the status of Khor al-Udaid in order to prove that the British had 
recognized Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims over Khor al-Udaid since 1871. It also 
discusses the status of Al-Ain/Buraimi region to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia’s 
occupation of Al-Ain/Buraimi was challenged and interrupted by the Ottoman Empire 
in 1818 and again in 1838 until the Saudis were expelled in 1871. At the end, it shows 
the weakness of the Saudis’ territorial claims over areas to the west and east of Abu 
Dhabi. 
The chapter then describes the rise of Saudi Arabia from 1902 to the early 1930s to 
compare it with the situation in Abu Dhabi during the second half of the nineteenth 
century until the early 1930s. Whereas Ibn Saud’s kingdom was established in 1932 as 
the independent Kingdom Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi had been under increasing forms of 
British influence and protection for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and 
did not become a fully independent state until 1971. In this context, it is significant that 
during and after World War I, Britain established relations with Ibn Saud and 
participated in boundary-making along his frontiers with Transjordan, Kuwait, and Iraq 
while leaving Ibn Saud’s boundaries with Abu Dhabi and other British protected 
territories to the south and east undetermined, in what would become a long-lasting 
territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi from the 1935 onwards.  
The chapter argues that from the nineteenth century to the 1930s, Britain remained 
unusually detached from issues concerning Abu Dhabi’s territorial sovereignty, except 
when these issues related to the maintaining of Britain’s sphere of influence in the Gulf. 
For example, when the Ottomans made claims to Khor al-Udaid, Britain recognized 
Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid and eventually authorized Shaikh Zayid to 
take act against the Qubaisat tribes who had made three migrations from Liwa to Khor 
al-Udaid, but only within the context of Britain’s obligation to maintain the maritime 
peace in the Gulf. Otherwise, Britain constrained Abu Dhabi’s freedom of action and 
formalized that constraint under the Exclusive Agreement of 1892. 
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2.2 Territorial Sovereignty in the Arabian Peninsula and The British Impact  
2.2.1 Concept of Traditional Arabian Territorial Sovereignty 
Some scholars are critical of the British role in establishing territorial boundaries in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and have argued that the Europeans arbitrarily imposed boundaries 
on colonial territories that disrupted traditional patterns of migration, economic activity, 
and political organization.44 In a typical example cited by Schofield, when Britain and 
the Ottoman Empire negotiated their respective spheres of influence in the Arabian 
Peninsula in the early twentieth century, the British did not consider “the prevailing 
social and spatial organization of territory in southern Arabia.”45 To understand why 
people in the Arabian Peninsula rejected the Western-style boundaries introduced by the 
British, the basic concepts of traditional Arabian territorial sovereignty that were 
dominant in the Gulf before the arrival of the British need to be discussed.  
The first important traditional concept was that sovereignty was not directly related to 
territory but was vested in human beings. According to Kelly, “there is no concept of 
territoriality in Arabian society…A sheikh exercises sultah or authority over a tribe, the 
members of which signify their loyalty to him and concede authority to him.”46 Robert 
Teague states that people in Arabia knew nothing of the meaning of nationhood,47 while 
Wilkinson noted that Arabs had their own traditional concepts of sovereignty which did 
not mean that they were “any less developed than in our own societies: it is just that 
they are different.”48 Kelly stated that the concept of territorial sovereignty in the 
Western sense did not exist at any part of eastern Arabia.49 Teague referred in general 
terms to the traditional Arab system as “essentially alien to the newly adopted West 
European concepts of territorial sovereignty and statehood.”50 
                                                
44 John C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert 
(London: I.B. Taurus, 1991), xi. 
45 Richard N. Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the 
Twentieth Century”, in Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, ed. Richard N. Schofield (London: 
UCL Press, 1994), p.19. 
46 John B. Kelly, “Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia,” International Affairs 34 (January 
1958), p. 17. 
47 Robert Teague, The Evolution of the Arabian Boundary System: A Study of the Influence of Nomadism, 
Foreign Intervention and Oil, unpublished MA thesis, University of Durham, 1970-71, p. 59. 
48 John C. Wilkinson, “Traditional Concepts of Territory is South East Arabia, The Demographic Journal 
149 (November 1983), p. 301. 
49John B. Kelly, “Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia,” International Affairs 34 (January 
1958): 17.  
50 Teague, The Evolution of the Arabian Boundary System, p. 56.  
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According to a second traditional concept, dira (the territory of a nomadic tribe) was not 
fixed in its location and size. It might shift seasonally or in response to changes in 
climate. A tribe’s dira might not belong exclusively to that tribe as it might overlap with 
the diras of other tribes. It was a system that promoted an individual’s and a tribe’s 
freedom of action.51 Freedom of movement was essential to the traditional way of life in 
the Arabian Peninsula. Abdullatif A. Al-Shaikh argues that “the Western concept of a 
‘boundary’ was rejected…because it interrupted the free movement of Bedouin across 
what they considered their dira.”52 Interestingly, if a tribe or faction of a tribe became 
dissatisfied with the ruling shaikh, they might withdraw their support for him and swear 
loyalty to another shaikh. In that case, the new ruling shaikh would gain sovereignty of 
the tribe’s dira. In other cases, tribes or factions who were dissatisfied with their ruling 
shaikh could move to another area and either become independent or pledge submission 
to another ruling shaikh.53  
The third traditional concept is migration or hijara. For migration to function correctly, 
Wilkinson argues that “the sociopolitical system required openness and flexibility that 
enabled mobility for dissatisfied tribes or factions.”54 Regarding the hijara concept, 
James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf suggest that “the most famous example of a tribal 
secession is the creation of the sheikhdom of Dubai, which declared its independence 
from the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1833.”55 The reseacher adds to this the example of the 
Qubaisat section of the Bani Yas tribal confederation, which made three migration from 
Abu Dhabi and settled at Khor al-Udaid. Their migration complicated the question of 
the western boundary of Abu Dhabi from 1835 to 1869.56 In general, migration occurred 
because a ruling shaikh had failed to maintain his obligations to provide adequate 
protection, resources, and conflict mediation to some of his subjects.  
The fourth important concept relevant to traditional Arabian territorial sovereignty is 
zakat. Scholars disagree about the distinction between zakat as a religious obligation 
versus zakat as a secular tax. Some have argued that payment of zakat is a form of 
insurance against attack, whereas others maintain that the zakat payment signified proof 
                                                
51Ibid., p. 58. 
52 Abdullatif Al-Shaikh,  Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council Neighbours, p. 95. 
53 James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-Oil Gulf: An Historical 
Anthropological Study,” History and Anthropology 17, September 2006, pp. 191-198.  
54 Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers, xii. 
55 Onley and Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-Oil Gulf”, p.196. 
56 See sub-section 2.3.2.3 on the Third Secession of Qubaisat, 1869, p.38. 
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of allegiance and submission.57 On the other hand, in his comprehensive history, 
Eastern Arabian Frontiers, Kelly suggested that tribal payment of zakat to the Saudi 
leader had nothing to do with signifying submission to him,58 and that the payment of 
zakat was not a condition of submission. According to Wahhabi belief, it was the duty 
of the Amir, as a more powerful ruler, to collect zakat from his subjects, and the 
payment to powerful leaders was traditionally defined as tribute that signified the 
submission of a weaker party to a stronger party. Consequently, zakat might be 
described as a combination of governmental tax and religious obligation that could be 
used to support territorial claims.59  
Overall, from the Saudi perspective, the four concepts noted above were the major 
criteria used by Saudi Arabia for defining its boundary with Abu Dhabi after the oil 
discovery. 
2.2.2 The British Role in the Gulf during the Nineteenth Century 
From 1820 onwards, Great Britain gradually assumed the dominant role in the Gulf.  
Britain had not done this before that date since its goals, which were mostly concerned 
with the promotion of trade, and restricting the regional involvement of other 
commercial competitors, were quite narrow. Nor, in fact, was British trade in the Gulf 
itself particularly substantial. The Gulf was important for Britain primarily because it 
was one of India’s imperial frontiers,60 which was why a solid presence was needed. 
To protect its trade and communication route through the Persian 
Gulf and prevent the establishment of a foreign naval base there, 
British India established spheres of influence in Persia and 
Ottoman Iraq, and offered a series of treaties through which it 
became increasingly responsible for the protection of central 
Eastern Arabia and the island of Bahrain. Through these treaties, 
the British were able to get local rulers to collaborate in the 
pacification of the Persian Gulf and in the later exclusion of 
foreign influence threatening British Indian interests.61   
                                                
57 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press), 1959, 
pp.1-2. 
58 John B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London: Frederick J. Praeger, 1964), p. 292. 
59 Teague, “Evolution of Arabian Boundaries”, p. 64. 
60 J. E. Peterson, “Britain and the Gulf: At the Periphery of Empire,” in The Persian Gulf in History, ed. 
Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 279-280. 
61 James Onley, “The Raj reconsidered: British India’s informal empire and spheres of influence in Asia 
and Africa”, Asian Affairs, vol. 40, no. 1, 2009, p. 44. 
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The treaties made by the British with the Rulers of Oman, the Trucial States (present-
day UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, outlawed piracy, naval warfare, and the slave 
trade.62 While the British moved slowly to establish their authority in the Gulf, they 
gradually took on the role of protector in a protector-protégé relationship, but even then, 
while they ruled on treaty violations, the ruling Shaikhs were held responsible for 
enforcing fines and other punishments on their subjects.63  
British policy gradually began to consider the Arabian Peninsula beyond the immediate 
coastal areas, since events inland could be just as damaging to Britain’s system of 
alliances as events at sea.64 Thus, in 1892, Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial States 
entered into an Exclusive Agreement with Great Britain. Britain gained the exclusive 
rights to manage the foreign affairs of each Trucial State, and the Trucial States were 
not allowed to dispose of any land or receive any foreigners from other countries 
without British permission.65 
2.3 The Status of the Al-Ain/Buraimi Region and Khor al-Udaid during the 
Nineteenth Century 
2.3.1 The Al-Ain/Buraimi Oasis Region 
The Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region, encompassing nine oases/villages,66 was an obvious 
objective for Wahhabi conquest. It had been known for centuries for its abundant wells 
and agricultural production, but its most important attribute was its strategic location as 
a crossroads connecting the approaches to Oman and Muscat as well as routes east to 
the coastal shaikhdoms and west inland towards established Wahhabi territory.67  Al-
Shamsi describes it as follows: 
Al-Buraimi oasis is a pivotal point for the crossing of many 
routes in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, including 
most of the major approaches from the coastal towns of the 
Arabian Gulf to the desert hinterlands of Oman. It is a also 
crossroads of tribes coming from the deserts of Saudi Arabia, 
and a meeting place of many nomadic tribes in the region…The 
                                                
62 Husain M. Al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Gulf States, pp. 26-29.  
63 Alexander Melamid, “Political Geography of Trucial Oman and Qatar,” Geographical Review 43 
(April 1953), p. 197. 
64 J. E. Peterson, Interview, Arizona, 8 January 2011. 
65 Kourosh Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf: Abu Musa and Tunbs in 
Strategic Perspective, (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), p. 10. 
66 See footnote, p.5.  
67 John B. Kelly,” The Buraimi Oasis Dispute,” International Affairs 32 (July 1956), p.325. 
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Al-Buraimi oasis is about 37 square kilometres. It is located 
approximately half way between Suhar and Abu Dhabi. Its 
central location gave it its importance in the history of the 
regions.68 
According to Peterson, Abu Dhabi’s presence in Al-Ain/Buraimi substantially predated 
the arrival in 1800 of the Wahhabi warriors ruled by the Saud family, since the Bani 
Yas, a confederation of tribes loyal to the ruler of Abu Dhabi, had established 
themselves politically in Al-Ain/Buraimi in the early seventeenth century.69 The Bani 
Yas shared the oasis of Liwa only with their allies, the Manasir.70 Even Wilkinson, who 
portrays the coastal emirates as weak and without influence inland, acknowledges that 
by the late eighteenth century the Al-Bu Falah ruling Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi owned 
property in Al-Ain/Buraimi and had developed ties with some local Omani tribes.71  
2.3.1.1 The First Saudi Occupation of Al-Ain/Buraimi in 1800 
The Amir of Darayia, Muhammad ibn Saud, supported the new religious reform by 
Muhammad Ibn Abdula Wahhab, and their alliance helped to win over most of the 
central Arabian Peninsula. According to Hamadi, the Wahhabi movement was initially 
directed only at religious reform, but it soon became a political movement that made the 
Kingdom of the House of Saud a significant regional power in the Arabian Peninsula.72 
During their first occupation of Buraimi, the Saudis attempted to place the oasis under 
its sovereignty. The occupation of Buraimi begun when Ibn Saud sent Salim bin Belal 
al-Harik, one of his own slaves, to Oman with an armed group of around 70 men. After 
a lengthy resistance to the Saudi forces most of the tribes, such as Bani Yas, al-Shamis 
and al-Nuaimi, offered their loyalty to the Saudis.73  
At the same time, many of the Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khiamah converted to 
Wahhabism and thus became allies of the Wahhabis during the Saudi territorial 
expansion, with the Qawasim supporting the Saudi invasion of Buraimi. Documents 
                                                
68 Saeed Mohammed Al-Shamsi, The Al-Buraimi Dispute:  A Case Study in Inter-Arab Politics, (PhD 
dissertation, The American University, 1986), p. 36.  
69 J. E. Peterson, “Britain and State Formation in the Gulf: The Case of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Zayid bin 
Khalifa” in New Perspectives on Recording UAE History (Abu Dhabi: National Centre for 
Documentation and Research, 2008), p. 210. 
70 Hendrik Van der Meulen, “The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab 
Emirates”, unpublished PhD thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford 
MA, USA, 1997), p. 104. 
71 Wilkinson, “Traditional Concepts of Territory,” p. 364. 
72 Hamadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Limits,” p. 3. 
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about the Qawasim role in Buraimi contained in Records of The Emirates indicate that 
one of the Buraimi forts had surrendered to the Imam of Muscat after a long struggle 
against the Qawasim, and that the combat roles were played by Sultan bin Saqr, Ruler 
of Sharjah, and Rashid bin Humaid Ruler of Ajman who were allies of Ras-al-Khaimah 
and who also adopted the Wahhabi doctrine.74 Wilkinson notes that the Al-Bu Falah 
Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat led tribal resistance against the 
Qawasim who had allied with the Wahhabis.75 Regardless of how long Abu Dhabi had 
been involved in Buraimi, following the Wahhabi invasion of Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis 
region in 1800, the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Sultan of Muscat would dominate the 
region for decades to come. 
Along with the alliances formed between the Rulers of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of 
Muscat to challenge the Wahhabis, Wahhabi expansionism was also challenged by 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, acting on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottomans claimed political authority in many parts of the Arabian Peninsula that 
were threatened, or already held, by the Wahhabis and it was Muhammad Ali’s 
responsibility to protect the Ottoman claims. He launched his first campaign against the 
Wahhabis in 1815, defeating them and forcing the Wahhabi Amir, Abdullah Ibn Saud, 
to acknowledge the Ottoman Sultan as suzerain.76 In 1818, the Egyptians executed Amir 
Abdullah in Constantinople, and destroyed  Daraiya, the Wahhabi capital.77  
2.3.1.2 The Second Saudi Occupation of Al-Ain/Buraimi in 1833 
Al-Ain/Buraimi remained unoccupied by Wahhabi soldiers for several years after 1819, 
since the Wahhabis were without a leader until 1824, when a new Wahhabi Amir, Turki 
ibn Abdullah, made Riyadh his capital.  Under his leadership, Wahhabi expansionism 
resumed, and with help from the Qawasim he attempted to recover the Buraimi forts 
that had been captured by the Governor of Egypt. In the context of the reoccupation of 
the Buraimi forts, the Imam of Oman assured Lieutenant Colonel Stannus that “the 
present disturbances [in Buraimi] had originated with Sultan ibn Saqr, [Ruler of 
Sharjah] and Rashid ibn Ahmed [Ruler of Ajman], who took advantage of his late 
absence at Mecca, where he had proceeded on a pilgrimage to rebuild the fortification 
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of Buraimi.”78 The events of the second Saudi occupation of Buraimi were also reported 
in Records of The Emirates as follows:  
All the Qawasim chiefs are now at Buraimi in the camp of the 
Wahhabi with whom they have entered into engagements of 
adherence and submission The endeavours [sic] of Shaikh Sultan 
[Ruler of Sharjah] and Shaikh Rashid [Rule of Ajman] to induce 
Omr bin Afeesan to commence hostilities with Shaikh Tahnun 
[ruler of Abu Dhabi] have failed owing to the friendly exertions 
of the Manasir chiefs to establish a good understanding between 
these parties. An active correspondence is now carrying on with 
Abu Dhabi but the Wahhabi leader insists upon the presence and 
personal submission of [Bani Yas]...in order to collect Zakat.79  
The Rruler of Abu Dhabi then allied with Omani tribal chiefs in Buraimi and rejected 
the idea of making any payment of zakat to the Wahhabis. In 1834, a year after the 
second Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, Amir Turki was assassinated and his son, 
Faisal ibn Turki, succeeded his father as Wahhabi Amir. In 1837, the Egyptians again 
invaded Buraimi on behalf of the Ottomans and in 1838 defeated the Wahhabis for the 
second time. The British had not intervened during the first Egyptian invasion of the 
Arabian Peninsula in 1818, but in 1838, fearing Ottoman intervention in the British 
sphere of influence; they pressured the Egyptians to withdraw quickly. After that 
Buraimi was free from military occupation for a several years. The Wahhabis later 
renewed their sovereignty over Buraimi, but during the early 1840s several local tribes 
stopped paying zakat to the acknowledged Wahhabi leader, Faisal ibn Turki.80 
2.3.1.3 The Third Saudi Occupation of Al-Ain/Buraimi in 1848 
From 1848 until 1869 the Wahhabis, allied with the House of Saud, again claimed 
sovereignty over the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region. When the Saudi forces attempted to 
invade the territories of Suhar and Abu Dhabi, the Wahhabi Agent at Buraimi claimed 
payment of the tribute demanded by the Wahhabi Amir, as a result of which some of the 
tribal leaders hesitated about making a zakat payment.81 It appeared that in the 
protector-protégé relationship, the Wahhabis occasionally made a great display of 
taking on the responsibilities required of the protector. For example, in 1853, Abdullah, 
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son of the Wahhabi Amir Faisal Ibn Turki, sent for the Buraimi tribal chiefs and offered 
to mediate in their inter-tribal disputes. He then demanded that the Sultan of Muscat pay 
him zakat in exchange for leaving the Sultan’s territories in peace. Captain A. B. 
Kemball, the acting British Political Resident in the Gulf, intervened at this point and 
negotiated a zakat payment schedule with Amir Abdullah. According to Kelly, Amir 
Abdullah did not stay around for very long after that; nor did he settle any disputes 
among the tribal shaikhs.82  
In 1869, the Sultan of Muscat joined the Shaikhs of the Al-Nahyan faction of the Al-Bu 
Falah to drive the Saudi soldiers out of Buraimi. In 1870 the Wahhabis tried 
unsuccessfully to recapture Buraimi. In 1871 Sultan Qais Ibn Az’an of Muscat claimed 
sovereignty over Buraimi but lacking sufficient strength to exercise power he assigned 
the defence of Buraimi to his ally, Shaikh Zayid bin Khalifa of Abu Dhabi.83 The 
establishment of the strong alliance between the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of 
Muscat was reported in the British archival records as follows: 
[Sayyid] Azan has written from [Buraimi] dated 1st March, that 
Shaikh [Zayid] of Abu Dhabi had arrived at [Buraimi] and sworn 
friendship to him and promised to oppose the Wahabbis’ march 
by force…when [Sayyid] Azan took [Buraimi], he entered into 
alliance with Abu Dhabi and paying him a proportion of the 
tribute which previous Sultans of Muscat had paid to Wahabbi 
Amir, secured the aid of the Abu Dhabi Chief in the protection of 
the [Buraimi] frontier.84 
The Ottomans had also captured the Hasa district in Eastern Arabia in 1871, which 
turned out to be a very important year because it was also the fifth year of an internal 
power struggle that had followed Amir Faisal’s death in 1866,85 and it would be 30 
years before the Wahhabis were again a unified force under Ibn Saud. Importantly, in 
the 1870s, the Wahhabis lacked the organization and unified leadership that was needed 
for the operation of an independent state. When the Al-Rashid tribe of Ha’il, who were 
rivals of the Saud family, captured Riyadh in 1891, the Wahhabi Amir, Abd al-Rahman 
Ibn Faisal Al Saudi, fled to Kuwait with his son, Abdul al-Aziz ibn Rahman Al Saud, 
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who was later to be known as Ibn Saud. The Amir and his son spent ten years in exile 
there.86  
In the context of the Saudi occupation of Buraimi, scholars have different views in 
supporting the Saudi claim.  Husain M. Al-Baharna, a Bahraini legal historian, supports 
their claim on Buraimi for the period from 1800 to 1869, pointing out that the Wahhabis 
held Buraimi “for a period of nearly seventy years.”87 His statement is mostly true but, 
as is demonstrated above, Wahhabi control of Buraimi did not go uninterrupted or 
unchallenged. Kelly, however, argues that “the various Wahhabi occupations of [Al-
Ain/Buraimi] were little more than hostile incursions for purposes of plunder.”88 This 
chapter of the thesis speculates that neither Al-Baharna’s notion of steady possession 
nor Kelly’s idea of intermittent plunder is accurate. It is suggested instead that the 
Wahhabis may have taken Buraimi by territorial expansion. However, the Saudi 
themselves claim a legitimate territorial sovereignty at Buraimi that was based on the 
collecting of zakat as well as performing duties associated with the protector-protégé 
relationship.89  
For the purposes of this thesis, the divisions that effectively prevented the Wahhabis 
from running a state for over thirty years are significant mainly for one reason: after 
1869, the Wahhabi/Saudi state did not exercise sovereignty over any part of the Al-
Ain/Buraimi oasis region. Instead, the Sultan of Oman and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi 
administered the region jointly during the period from 1869.  
2.3.2 Khor al-Udaid 
In Arabic the term khor means an inlet from a large body of water. Khor al-Udaid is a 
shallow inlet located on the eastern side of the base of the Qatar peninsula.  One of its 
earliest descriptions comes from Captain George B. Brucks, who wrote in 1829 about a 
narrow inlet with a channel no more than fifteen feet deep at high tide and an entrance 
that was nearly blocked by small islands. He also noted that a small fort near the 
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entrance had been abandoned because of a severe shortage of drinking water. According 
to Brucks, “this place was used by pirates for securing boats they took.”90 
Early in the history of the British presence in the Gulf, Brucks briefly stated views that 
were consistent with the British attitude toward Khor al-Udaid. The inlet was scarcely 
navigable. The area was barely habitable because the water there was bad. In 1845, 
Lieutenant A. B. Kemball wrote that the town with the fort by the entrance to the inlet 
“cannot be approached by our vessels of war within a distance of between three and 
four miles.”91 To the British, Khor al-Udaid was therefore worthless and its only 
relevant characteristic was its use by pirates. Kemball commented that: “in point of 
appearance it would, perhaps, be difficult to select a more wretched, desolate, and 
barren-looking spot in the whole of the Gulf”,92 and towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, J. G. Lorimer remarked: “there are now no permanent inhabitants at [Khor al-
Udaid], and it is not visited by Bedouins from the interior; but fishermen from Abu 
Dhabi spend some months here in winter, and fine mullet are caught by them.”93 Over a 
hundred years later, in 1956, Kelly described the area around the inlet as “a desolate and 
unmarked tract of Arabia.”94  
The British probably could not imagine why anyone (other than pirates) would have had 
any interest in Khor al-Udaid, but it is important to remember the description attached 
to Khor al-Udaid in addition to Britain’s primary mission in the Gulf, which was to 
safeguard maritime shipping. Understanding both factors can provide an insight into 
events of the later nineteenth century, when the British made the decision to 
acknowledge Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid. Abu Dhabi’s connection to 
Khor al-Udaid became known to the British as a result of three attempted migrations of 
Qubaisat tribal members from Abu Dhabi to Khor al-Udaid. Significantly the Qubaisat 
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had been allies of the Al-Bu Falah, the ruling tribe of Abu Dhabi, since at least the 
sixteenth century when both tribes had been based at Liwa.95  
2.3.2.1 First Secession of Qubaisat,1835  
In 1834, Shaikh Khalifa ibn Shakhbut was unable to prevent various tribes from raiding 
British East India Company trade vessels, which led to the British imposing a large fine 
on the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. In 1835, some members of the Qubaisat, led by Khadim bin 
Nahman Al-Qubaisi, in protest at Shaikh Khalifa’s attempts to raise money to pay the 
fine to the British, left Abu Dhabi and went to Khor al-Udaid. As a result, the British 
held Shaikh Khalifa, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, responsible for collecting the fines from all 
his subjects on behalf of the British. The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) 
reported the following event: 
[The] Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi began to make frequent attacks on 
Persian Gulf shipping, including vessels flying British colors. 
Punitive action was taken by the British, who levied a heavy 
indemnity against the tribe. In 1835 members of the section of 
the Qubaisat of Bani Yas fled to [Khor al-Udaid] in order to 
escape paying their share of the indemnity.96  
When I interviewed members of the Qubaisat in 2011, they recalled the negative views 
of their ancestors about the British, and did not express any clear understanding either 
of the relationship between Abu Dhabi and Britain or of the British role in the Gulf. For 
example, Abu Ali Qubaisi said:  
The Qubaisat and other tribes did not want the English in our 
territories and for this reason; several tribes engaged in various 
activities and raided them. We did not understand very much 
about the papers signed between Abu Dhabi and the English. All 
the Qubaisat knew was that strange faces were coming in and out 
of the coast. According to a signed paper [Maritime Truce of 
1835], we were punished financially because we engaged in self-
defence [the British called it piracy]. Then, we decided to look 
for a peaceful area to escape from payment and it was Khor al-
Udaid.97 
In 1836, the British pursued the Qubaisat and for this mission Samuel Hennell, the 
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, sent two ships to the villages of Doha and Wakra at 
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the entrance to Khor al-Udaid. At each stop, an officer told the Rulers that if they did 
not seize pirates and their boats, the British would fine the people in those settlements.  
In fact, the Qubaisat have their own recollections that are at odds with the British 
record, especially the British charges of piracy. In an interview, Salman Qubaisi said: 
“the Qubaisat never signed a treaty with the British and they never treated us as being 
separate from Abu Dhabi. The British often used the excuse of piracy against us, but we 
never ever participated in piracy activities; it was self-defence.”98 The Qubaisat were 
forced to leave Khor al-Udaid in 1837, when Shaikh Khalifa, having received British 
approval, launched a naval expedition against Khor al-Udaid.99 According to the British 
archival records, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi obtained permission from Samuel 
Hennell in May 1837 to launch a large naval expedition to punish the Qubaisat at Khor 
al-Udaid. With British approval, Shaikh Khalifa’s men killed 53 residents of al-Udaid, 
took 50 prisoners, and seized 20 boats. The village and a fort were extensively damaged 
and the settlement’s well was destroyed.100  
It is significant that the Shaikhs routinely consulted the British about actions that might 
violate the Maritime Truce. In general, the British Resident did not interfere directly in 
the relationships between the ruling Shaikhs and their subjects, and this present chapter 
speculates that when the British approved the naval expedition against the Qubaisat in 
1837, the British tacitly acknowledged Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid. It 
also reveals that the British had interfered in the traditional Arab custom of migration.  
2.3.2.2 Second Secession of Qabaisat,1843  
In 1843, the Qabaisat again seceded from control by Abu Dhabi. Following the death of 
Shaikh Khalifa in 1845, Shaikh Sa’id ibn Tahnun became Ruler of Abu Dhabi, and soon 
after took the Qubaisat who remained in Abu Dhabi as hostages to prevent them from 
escaping. In autumn 1849, Shaikh Sa’id played a trick by inviting the Qubaisat in Khor 
al-Udaid to a lavish reception in Abu Dhabi and issuing a general amnesty for debtors 
from Qubaisat to encourage them to return. Most of the Qubaisat agreed and sailed over 
to Abu Dhabi. However, the night after the reception, Shaikh Sa’id secretly ordered his 
men to strip the sails, masts, and equipment from the boats of the Qubaisat. According 
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to a later summary of events published in the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and 
Central Arabia, “the entrapped [Qubaisat] envoys, thus deprived of the means of 
escape, found themselves obliged to agree to the terms imposed by the Shaikh [Sa’id 
ibn Tahnun], which included, beside return from [Khor al-Udaid], the satisfaction of all 
debts due by the Qubaisat to private creditors and the payment of a fine to himself.”101  
After demolishing the settlements at Khor al-Udaid for the second time under Shaikh 
Tahnun’s orders, the Qabaisat tribal leader, Makhtum al-Butti, despatched a messenger 
to Amir Faisal ibn Turki vigorously petitioning him to rebuild the destroyed settlements 
at Khor al-Udaid if he wished to establish himself on the coast. In 1850, when Mullah 
Hussein, the Agent at Sharjah, learned of al-Butti’s message, he sent a letter to Smith S. 
Hennell, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, urging him to act so as to prevent the 
Wahhabis from setting foot in the coastal area. In case the Wahhabis should move into 
Khor al-Udaid, Mullah Hussein gave his assessment of the situation as follows:  
If [Khor al-Udaid] were once re-established many of the 
inhabitants of [Abu Dhabi] would certainly congregate there and 
also proceed to [Dubai]. By this means the Ben Yas’ capital 
would be ruined. In my opinion should [Khor al-Udaid] fall into 
the hands of the [Saudis], all kinds of piracies and irregularities 
will be committed at Sea –– the  power of the [Wahhabis] over 
the ports on the Arabian Coast will be greatly increased and 
[Khor al-Udaid] will become a refuge and home for all the bad 
characters in the Gulf. They will plunder at Sea and find an 
asylum there. It is therefore advisable that steps should be taken 
to nip the project in the bud. Otherwise it will involve great 
trouble [on the coast].102 
This study did not find any details in the British Archive records about the attitude or 
reaction of the Saudis to Makhtum al-Butti’s message. Nor are there even any records of 
what action was taken by the British to prevent the Wahhabis from stepping in at Khor 
al-Udaid.  In this context, the most significant feature was that the Saudis did not 
approach Khor al-Udaid to rebuild the settlements that had been devastated. 
2.3.2.3  Third Secession of Qabaisat,1869 
The most serious and complex migration occurred in 1869, when the Qabaisat declared 
their independence from Abu Dhabi. During the 1860s, Shaikh Zayid bin Khalifa Al-
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Nahyan, who had ruled Abu Dhabi since 1855, asserted a claim for sovereignty over 
Khor al-Udaid to the British. In fact, Shaikh Zayid wanted the British to take action to 
bring the Qabaisat back under the control of Abu Dhabi, which meant that the British 
had been in contact with the leader of the Qubaisat. More specifically, on 31 July 1871, 
Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident in the Gulf (who was aware of Shaikh 
Zayid’s claim on Khor al-Udaid), cited a report from a Major Smith stating that the 
Qubaisat at Khor al-Udaid had asserted their independence from Abu Dhabi. The report 
further stated that the Qubaisat wanted to join Great Britain under the Maritime Truce, 
and that they had also been offered Ottoman protection and so far had not declined the 
Ottomans’ offer.103  
Thus Pelly and Smith faced an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the Qubaisat were 
declaring both their independence from Abu Dhabi and their willingness to become 
allies of the British. On the other hand, they informed the British that they had been in 
contact with the Ottomans and had not yet refused to accept Ottoman authority over 
Khor al-Udaid. The Qubaisat leader, Khadim al-Butti, was clearly attempting to press 
the British into taking the Qubaisat at Khor al-Udaid under their protection.  
For the British, there was an obstacle to recognizing the independence of the Qubaisat at 
Khor al-Udaid. As Husain M. Al-Baharna points out, if the British chose to consider the 
Qubaisat as a dependency of Abu Dhabi, they would be unable to hold the Qubaisat 
accountable for any truce violations since they had not signed the 1853 Treaty of 
Perpetual Peace.104 In an alternative analysis, Peterson argues that the Ottomans’ 
competing claim on Khor al-Udaid forced Britain to recognize Shaikh Zayid’s claim, 
despite Shaikh Zayid’s inability actually to control the Qubaisat at Khor al-Udaid.105       
The Khor al-Udaid situation was further complicated when the Ottomans claimed 
sovereignty over it. Thus, the claimants at Khor al-Udaid during the 1870s and 1880s 
were the Ottomans and the Al-Thani Ruler of Qatar, who, according to Kelly, made 
claims on Khor al-Udaid both on his own authority and in his role as an Ottoman 
vassal.106 Arguably, the contest over Khor al-Udaid was between Abu Dhabi and the 
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Qabaisat, between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, and, most importantly, between Great Britain 
and the Ottoman Empire. In response to a question about Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over 
Khor al-Udaid in relation to the other claimants, Peterson points out that the struggle 
involved two imperial powers, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, and their client 
states, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, respectively. The British were therefore forced to support 
Abu Dhabi’s claim over Khor al-Udaid. 107  
It can be argued that Britain’s support for Abu Dhabi played an important role in 
blocking Ottoman expansion on the coast. It also reveals that the British had their own 
pragmatic reasons for recognizing Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid and 
that it might have been protecting its sphere of influence in the coastal areas against 
interference by the Ottomans. It is also significant that the House of Saud and its 
Wahhabi allies played no active role in the contest over Khor al-Udaid during the 
nineteenth century. It was reported that in 1871, the British acknowledged for the first 
time Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid.108 Prior to 1871 the British, 
interestingly, had recognized the Abu Dhabi ruler’s authority over people but not 
territory, so that whereas the former British position had been more or less consistent 
with traditional Arabian concepts of sovereignty, the European notion of sovereignty 
defined by territory was introduced in 1871 with respect to Khor  al-Udaid. 
Importantly, the alleged inability of the ruling Shaikh of Abu Dhabi actually to exercise 
control over Khor al-Udaid is a theme that runs through both the primary and secondary 
sources. In the case discussed by Peterson (i.e., the decision of the British officially to 
recognize Shaikh Zayid’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid in 1871), Shaikh Zayid’s 
difficulty in controlling the Qubaisat resulted from insufficient support from the British 
side for Shaikh Zayid’s position in forcing the Qubaisat to rejoin the Bani Yas.  For six 
years after the British had recognized Shaikh Zayid’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid, 
from 1871 to 1877, British officials periodically went on missions in an attempt to 
reconcile the leader of the Qubaisat and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. According to 
Wilkinson, the British continued to acknowledge Abu Dhabi’s prescriptive sovereignty 
over Khor al-Udaid while denying that the Shaikh was strong enough to establish 
effective occupation there.109  
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In June 1877, Colonel E. C. Ross, Britain’s Political Resident in the Gulf, wrote to 
Shaikh Zayid and assured him that Britain would support his efforts to achieve 
reconciliation with the Qubaisat at Khor al-Udaid. By December 1877, Colonel Ross 
had decided that it was not possible to realise a peaceful reconciliation between the 
Qubaisat and the ruler of Abu Dhabi. According to British Archival records, when 
another bout of piracy occurred in the vicinity of Khor al-Udaid, Ross authorized a joint 
naval expedition consisting of the Teazer, a British warship, and seventy boats 
commanded by Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. The Teazer was supposed to meet the Bani 
Yas fleet at Qaffay Island to stage a coordinated attack, but Shaikh Zayid deviated from 
the schedule and attacked before the British warship had arrived. However, by the time 
Shaikh Zayid’s fleet reached Khor al-Udaid, the Qubaisat had fled, and by the time the 
Teazer arrived at Udaid, Shaikh Zayid’s troops had destroyed the Qubaisat boats and 
their settlements.110  
This third and last Qubaisat migration ended quietly without any further British 
interference. By March 1880, the Qubaisat secession at Khor al-Udaid was at an end, 
after the Qubaisat leader, Khadim al-Butti, and the last of his followers had gone back 
to Abu Dhabi, where Shaikh Zayid gave them back their previously confiscated 
property.111 The Qubaisat returned to what has remained ever since a central position in 
Abu Dhabi. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi wished to reinforce ties through marriages 
between Al-Bu Falah family and the Qubaisat tribe, so in 1900, Shaikh Sultan bin 
Zayid, who would rule Abu Dhabi between 1922 and 1926, married Shaikha Salama 
bint Butti Al-Qubaisi, reinforcing the strong relations between the Qubaisat and Abu 
Dhabi’s ruling family which dated back for centuries to the days when both had lived at 
Liwa. Shaikha Salama duly became the mother of two important future rulers of Abu 
Dhabi –– Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (r. 1928-66) and Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan (r. 
1966-2004).112 
2.4 The Status of Abu Dhabi’s Territories from 1880 to the early 1930s   
Shaikh Zayid is known as “Shaikh Zayid the Great” or “Zayid the First” in Abu Dhabi. 
He was of the Al-Nahyan family of the Al-Bu Falah tribe, and he developed strong 
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connections in the Buraimi area with Omani tribes such as the Al-Dhawahir and Al-
Shwamis, who were allied with the Bani Yas tribal confederation of Abu Dhabi. 
Peterson notes that Shaikh Zayid had influence in the district of al-Dharira, and the 
tribes sought his mediation in disputes even though the Sultan of Muscat formally 
claimed sovereignty over them.113 According to Kelly, by the early 1870s Shaikh Zayid 
was the most powerful of the Trucial Shaikhs.114 Even Wilkinson, who consistently 
portrays Abu Dhabi as a weak British protégé, acknowledges that Abu Dhabi developed 
“a primitive sense of statehood”115 under the leadership of Shaikh Zayid. 
Following the death of Shaikh Zayid in 1909, Abu Dhabi became unstable until 
1928.Initially the Al-Nahyan family elected Khalifa, Shaikh Zayid’s oldest son, as the 
new leader; however Khalifa declined the position, and his younger brother, Shaikh 
Tahnun, became Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Shaikh Tahnun died of natural causes in 1912 and 
Hamdan, another of Shaikh Zayid’s sons, took the throne. In 1922, another brother, 
Sultan, shot Hamdan in the back as he was leaving Sultan’s home after having dinner. 
Sultan ruled until 1925, when yet another brother, Saqr, shot Sultan in the back while 
Sultan was on his way to sunset prayers. Saqr became Ruler of Abu Dhabi but came to 
be both insecure and paranoid, and plotted against his brother, Khalifa, who had turned 
down the throne of Abu Dhabi in 1909. When the tribal chiefs learned of Saqr’s plan to 
kill Khalifa, they assassinated him in 1927.116 
In 1928, Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, the oldest son of the Shaikh Sultan who had been 
murdered in 1925, became Ruler of Abu Dhabi. The first major challenge that Shaikh 
Shakhbut had to contend with was the collapse of the Gulf pearling industry in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, as the result of a global economic depression and the 
introduction of cheap Japanese cultured pearls into the world market. There is wide 
disagreement about the impact of these events on Abu Dhabi’s territory. For example, 
on the one hand Wilkinson writes that because the collapse of the pearling industry 
deprived Abu Dhabi of revenue, the Al-Bu Falah's influence was confined to Buraimi 
while western parts of Abu Dhabi’s territory were neglected,117 and Anthony H. 
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Cordesman describes the Trucial States as “a strategic backwater”118 as a result of the 
collapse of pearling. On the other hand, Uzi Rabi insists that Shaikh Shakhbut managed 
his country competently through the collapse of the pearling industry, consolidated his 
hold on existing Abu Dhabi territory both on the coast and in the interior, and “engaged 
in a process of territorial expansion.”119 
These two extreme views of Abu Dhabi during the 1920s and 1930s, one portraying a 
minor shaikhdom in decline and the other portraying a resilient state, cannot be 
reconciled. In response to a question about this paradox, Peterson stated: “it is probably 
true that Abu Dhabi was a minor, poor, entity before oil, but at the same time growing 
into a type of statehood.”120 According to Peterson, beginning with the reign of Shaikh 
Zayid the Great, Abu Dhabi had steadily developed alliances and influence with key 
tribes in the area, which made Abu Dhabi politically important and capable of 
remaining a significant shaikhdom during hard times. 
2.5 The Rise of Saudi Arabia in the Early Decades of the 20th Century 
2.5.1 The Period 1902-13 
 Wilkinson argues that the process of establishing international zones that ended up as 
fixed boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula began in 1902.121  Between 1902 and 1905, 
the British and Ottomans agreed on a frontier in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula 
that separated the British protectorate of Aden from the Ottoman district of Yemen. The 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 established an eastern boundary called the Blue 
Line that ran due south from Zakhnuniya Island, west of the Qatar peninsula, to a point 
in the Empty Quarter (Rub al-Khali).122 In March 1914, the British and Ottomans 
agreed to a Violet Line that connected the southern end of the Blue Line with the Aden-
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Yemen frontier that had been established earlier, and this latter Convention was duly 
ratified by the Ottomans.123  
In 1902 a dormant regional force came back to life again –– this was Wahhabi 
expansionism allied with the House of Saud. During the years in which the British and 
the Ottomans were agreed on their respective zones of influence, Ibn Saud, who had 
become the Wahhabi Amir after the death of his father, had followed a policy of 
conquest and expansion. He organized his own Wahhabi movement by settling the 
Wahhabi brotherhood, the Ikhwan, in villages. These villages provided the Ikhwan with 
agricultural and commercial experience, exposure to religious instruction, and military 
training and arms. The Ikhwan thus became versatile fighters in the service of Wahhabi 
expansion under Ibn Saud.124  
In 1905, Ibn Saud conquered the southern part of Najd, and in 1906, defeated his family 
rivals, the Al-Rashid tribe of Ha’il, and killed Ibn Rashid, their leader.125 Beginning in 
1903, he chose to build connections with British officials in the Arabian Peninsula, and 
during his years of conquest he tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to enter into a protector-
protégé relationship with Britain. For example, in 1903, Ibn Saud sent a message to 
Captain Prideaux to the effect that the Russians had approached him but he preferred to 
establish a relationship with the British.  In 1906, Sir Percy Cox, British High 
Commissioner, and Captain W. H. Shakespeare both advised the British government 
that it was important to establish an official relationship with Ibn Saud. However, 
despite the efforts of Ibn Saud’s envoys and local British officials, the British 
government did not commit themselves to a formal relationship with Ibn Saud.126  
When asked about Ibn Saud’s approach to the British and their refusal to establish 
relations with him, Ivor Lucas argued that the British avoided official relations with Ibn 
Saud because “they were backing Sherif Husain of the [Hijaz] as the leader most likely 
to promote their interests in Arabia (hence the Arab Revolt in World War I).”127 In this 
context, the present chapter speculates that Ibn Saud attempted to establish a 
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relationship with the British as a way of gaining British approval in delimiting his 
boundaries.  
On the other hand, Ibn Saud’s attempts to establish a relationship with a patron were 
more successful with the Ottomans. In 1905, the Ottomans appointed him governor of 
southern Najd.  Peter Sluglett argues that even if a local ruler accepted an Ottoman title, 
that did not necessarily mean that the local ruler’s territory was part of the Ottoman 
bureaucratic state.128 Abdulkarim Hamadi suggests that the Ottomans officially 
recognized the authority of Ibn Saud over the Najd and other districts in exchange for 
Ibn Saud’s acceptance of “the nominal suzerainty of Turkey.”129 By 1913, his status had 
risen since he had succeeded in conquering Hasa, an eastern Arabian province that had 
been held by the Ottomans since 1871. According to Daniel Silverfarb, after his 
conquest of Hasa, Ibn Saud “...was probably the most powerful ruler in the Arabian 
Peninsula.”130    
2.5.2 The Status of Saudi’s Territories from World War I to the Early 1930s 
According to Hamadi, the outbreak of war between Great Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire on 5 November 1914 forced the British to abandon their long-standing policy of 
avoiding commitments in central Arabia.131 The British Government therefore sent 
Captain W. H. Shakespeare to Najd to meet Ibn Saud for the purpose of influencing him 
to remain a neutral party in the event of war. After many meetings, Ibn Saud was 
successfully persuaded, and agreed to sign the Treaty of Darin with the British in 1915. 
Under this Treaty, the British agreed to Ibn Saud’s demand for a delimitation of his 
kingdom, although they delayed for several years over defining a boundary between 
Najd and Hijaz. Somewhat later, during the early 1920s, the British successfully 
negotiated settlements of the borders between Ibn Saud’s kingdom with Kuwait, Iraq, 
and Transjordan.132 However, the negotiating of frontiers did not necessarily mean a 
mutually satisfactory result. For example, in the case of the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone 
established in 1922, Sir Percy Cox successfully insisted on imposing “a defined 
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boundary that was not known to the people in Arabia”133 and was strongly opposed by 
Ibn Saud.  
As for Ibn Saud’s eastern and southern frontiers, the British took no action at all during 
the years immediately following World War I. Julian Walker states: “the limit of Empty 
Quarter was unknown to the British at that time.”134 Asked why the British did not 
delimit Saudi Arabia’s eastern and southern boundaries, Peterson commented,  
First, borders had to be arranged with Transjordan and Iraq 
because they were British mandates. Sir Percy Cox settled the 
Saudi-Kuwaiti boundary to the Saudis’ great advantage because 
he wanted Ibn Saud’s allegiance as an ally. There didn’t seem to 
be as great an urgency elsewhere, nor were Ibn Saud’s eyes as 
firmly fixed [toward the British protégés] as they were on 
northern Najd and of course al-Hijaz, as well as Asir.135   
 Apparently, British officials never considered the issue of Ibn Saud’s southern and 
eastern frontiers. Given wartime pressures and Britain’s responsibilities toward 
Transjordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, Peterson presents a logical speculation as to why 
delimitation of Ibn Saud’s eastern and southern borders was not a priority for the British 
during and immediately after World War I. Delimiting boundaries between Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf protégé states probably never occurred to British policy makers 
who were more focused on maintaining Britain’s overall position in the region. 
Certainly Ibn Saud, after concluding the 1915 treaty with the British, spent the rest of 
World War I defending his rule against internal rebellions and outside encroachment. 
By 1920, he had defeated the Al-Rashid, and by 1925, he had defeated the Hashemites 
of Hijaz, and his capture of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina meant that his status 
rose even higher. He then approached the British again to establish a new treaty that 
would reflect his new status. In May 1927, he signed the Treaty of Jeddah, through 
which the British gave him substantial concessions; Britain also formally recognized 
Ibn Saud’s kingdom as an independent state. Silverfarb describes the 1927 Treaty of 
Jeddah as the beginning of the end of British power in the Middle East, with Britain 
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attempting to maintain its dominance “at a time when its will and power to maintain its 
position by force were diminishing.”136 
Ibn Saud himself was perceived as a ‘holy warrior’ among both Arabs and Europeans. 
St. John B. Philby, for example, who was a British adviser to Ibn Saud, states that Ibn 
Saud relied primarily on religious faith as he organized nomadic tribesmen into an 
orderly society.137 Al-Shaikh also notes that when Ibn Saud backed away from the 
limitless expansion of Wahhabi ideology, “[he] was persuaded by the British 
government to accept [the Western concept of the territorial limit of states], despite 
strong opposition from his army the Ikhwan.”138 However, while there were many 
members of the Ikhwan among Ibn Saud’s soldiers, Ibn Saud’s armed forces did not 
consist exclusively of Ikhwan. Furthermore, Ibn Saud’s fighters themselves had battled 
elements of the Ikhwan as early as 1916. By the middle of the 1920s, the Ikhwan were 
raiding into Transjordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, even after Ibn Saud had settled his borders 
with those countries. This Ihkwan raiding in the 1920s reinforced the existing British 
fears of Wahhabi violence and territorial conquest.139  Joseph Kostiner states that as 
time passed, the Ikhwan had become “the most fanatical adherents of the territorial and 
religious expansion of the Wahhabi state.”140 In contrast, by the 1920s, Ibn Saud’s 
project was to build a modern state that he could control and pass on as a hereditary 
kingdom. 
Importantly, the religiously militant Ikhwan challenged Ibn Saud’s authority; this was a 
serious problem, especially after 1927, when the Treaty of Jeddah defined his kingdom 
as an independent state. At the same time, Ibn Saud faced a domestic threat in the form 
of a longstanding ideology that rejected compromise and limits to Wahhabi 
expansionism.141 In this context, Ibn Saud moved to address the problem that set 
domestic religious opposition against a developing modern state, by consulting with 
prominent imams of mosques, who afterwards issued a fatwa, or religious judgment, in 
support of Ibn Saud in his struggle against the Ikhwan. With British assistance Ibn 
Saud’s army defeated the Ikhwan at the Battle of Sabila in 1929,142 after which the 
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Ikhwan lost their influence in Ibn Saud’s kingdom, which he named in 1932 “The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. Ibn Saud had survived by dropping the Wahhabi extremes 
of expansionism; yet, as Wilkinson writes, “even after Ibn Saud accepted the constraints 
of the ‘civilized’ nations he had no inherent notion of what the limits of his state should 
be.”143  
2.6 Conclusion 
The traditional Arabian concepts of dira, zakat, hijara and the authority they carry are 
linked with sovereignty related to territory. They are the major concepts on which rulers 
in Arabia based their territorial claims. These concepts were discussed in order to 
demonstrate that after the discovery of oil in the 1930s both Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi would use them as a basis for their territorial claims. The chapter showed that 
Britain did not interfere in the traditional Arabian concepts unless within the context of 
Britain's obligation to maintain maritime peace or British interests in the Gulf.  
Despite periodic Saudi occupation of the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region from 1800 to 
1869, there is no documentary evidence in the British Archive records to show that the 
British took any action with respect to Al-Ain/Buraimi apart from the occasion in 1838, 
when the British persuaded the Ottomans to withdraw their Egyptian army from the 
Arabian Peninsula. However, Britain, as protector of the maritime peace, found itself 
obliged to take action regarding Khor al-Udaid, especially when the Ottomans interfered 
in the affairs of Khor al-Udaid in the 1870s. As a result, the British intervened so as to 
protect its sphere of influence by containing Ottoman influence in the coastal area.  
The description of the historical background of Al-Ain/Buraimi and Khor al-Udaid 
demonstrates that after 1869 Saudi Arabia did not exercise sovereignty over any part of 
Buraimi; instead it was jointly administered by the Sultan of Oman and Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi during that period. In the case of Khor al-Udaid, Saudi Arabia and its allies 
played no role in the contest over Khor al-Udaid. The chapter identifies the striking 
contrast between Abu Dhabi’s development and that of Saudi Arabia from 1820 to the 
early 1930s. While Saudi Arabia became an independent state in 1932, Abu Dhabi 
remained a British protected state.    
Britain’s role in the Gulf during the nineteenth century was focused almost exclusively 
on the coast, which explains why the British had never considered drawing the 
                                                
143 Ibid., p. xvi. 
49 
 
boundaries in the Arabian Gulf.  British policy gradually began to consider the Arabian 
Peninsula beyond the immediate coast,144 and during the 1920s and 1930s Britain 
participated in delimiting Ibn Saud’s boundaries with Kuwait, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan. 
However, the British took no action with regard to drawing boundaries between Abu 
Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, and this, as a result, would contribute significantly to a 
longstanding territorial dispute that would involve both Khor al-Udaid and the Al-
Ain/Buriami oasis region. In the late 1930s, as oil became the prominent consideration 
with respect to defining territorial sovereignty, Britain’s failure to delimit the eastern 
and southern frontiers of Ibn Saud’s kingdom led to a deep and persistent controversy 
over Abu Dhabi’s and Saudi Arabia’s conflicting claims. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Anglo-Saudi Territorial Negotiations145 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three discusses the two main phases (1935-49 and 1949-55) of the Anglo-
Saudi territorial negotiations. During the first phase, two new elements were introduced 
to the Arabian Peninsula –– the discovery of oil and the activities in Saudi Arabia of 
American oil companies (consolidated as the Arabian American Oil Company, or 
Aramco, in 1944). The chapter reveals that the question of the boundary between Abu 
Dhabi and Saudi Arabia arose in 1934 after Aramco initiated an inquiry about Saudi 
Arabia’s eastern and southern borders. The British replied that these boundaries had 
been determined by the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914.146 However, the 
Saudis had never accepted the British argument during the Anglo-Saudi territorial 
negotiations. This chapter shows that the British, on Abu Dhabi’s behalf, had proposed 
lines to settle the eastern and southern boundaries with Saudi Arabia, but the British 
proposals had been rejected by the Saudis because none of them included Khor al-
Udaid. Thus, the first Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations ended in a lengthy stalemate 
up to and including World War II and into the post-war period. 
During the second phase of territorial negotiations, Saudi Arabia announced a new and 
expansive territorial claim beyond the Blue and Violet Lines that had established by the 
Anglo-Ottoman Conventions. The chapter discusses the reasons behind these 
expansionist territorial claims.147 The renewed territorial negotiations between the 
British and the Saudis satisfied neither party, and as a result the Saudis occupied 
Hamasa, one of the Buraimi oasis villages. As a last resort, Great Britain and Saudi 
Arabia agreed to an arbitration tribunal that was to be convened in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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However, even as the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations moved towards arbitration, 
with both sides documenting their respective claims, the British and the Saudis both 
violated several agreements that were designed to restrict any activities with regard to 
the disputed areas. When it appeared that no settlement had been reached for the 
disputed areas by 1955, the British withdrew from arbitration, unilaterally declared 
Saudi Arabia’s eastern and southern frontiers, and drove out the Saudis from Hamasa 
village that they had occupied from the Omani oasis.  
The period from 1935 to 1955 must be seen as an anomaly in the history of Britain’s 
role in the areas that were disputed between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. This chapter 
argues that the interests of Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims and of the British oil 
companies coincided very conveniently from the 1930s to the 1950s, with Great Britain 
adamantly defending Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims against encroachment by Saudi 
Arabian and American oil interests. Britain’s active engagement for the interests of the 
British oil companies during that period caused increasing Saudi resentment of the 
British role in delimitating Saudi Arabia’s Eastern boundaries.  
3.2 The First Stage of Anglo-Saudi Territorial Negotiations (1935-49) 
In 1933, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), outbid British oil companies to gain the 
first Saudi oil concession. Peterson gives two reasons why the Americans were able to 
gain an advantage over the British.  First, British support for Trans-jordan and Iraq, as 
well as British resistance to Saudi encroachment in the Trucial States, had turned Ibn 
Saud away from the British. Secondly, since British oil companies had a monopoly on 
concessions in the states that were protected by Britain, the oil companies became 
complacent about developing the Saudi petroleum industry.148 However, Ivor Lucas 
believes that the decisive factor in Ibn Saud’s granting of the concession to the 
Americans was money. SoCal offered the Saudis £50,000 in gold, whereas the Iraq 
Petroleum Company had offered only £30,000 sterling.149 
In 1971, Wallace Stegner, a novelist who was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for fiction, 
wrote Discovery!, a highly flattering account of Aramco’s oil production as well as the 
company’s role as an agent for change in Saudi Arabia’s economic, technical, and social 
development. According to Stegner, “It was almost inevitable that there should have 
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existed in the beginning a certain competitive hostility between American and British 
oilmen, for they represented not only competing commercial interests but sharply 
different philosophies of operation in underdeveloped countries.150  
According to Stegner’s analysis, whereas British oil companies operated in isolation 
from indigenous populations, American oil companies were involved with the 
development efforts of local people, and that the American petroleum development 
model, beginning with SoCal and perfected over the years by Aramco, was a departure 
from the British imperialist model. In fact, Stegner believed that the American approach 
to local development was so superior to that of the British that the British eventually 
adopted a similar approach in the post-war era.	  For example,	   in 1966 Shaikh Shaikh 
Zayid bin Sultan, younger brother of Shaikh Shakhbut, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
deposed Shakhbut in a nonviolent coup.151 The coup against Shaikh Shakhbut 
proceeded with British approval, since Britain considered Shaikh Shakhbut to be too 
conservative, especially when it came to spending petroleum revenues on social 
programmes and the modernising of Abu Dhabi. Shaikh Shakhbut was of the opinion 
that large-scale government spending would corrupt the people of Abu Dhabi. Uzi Rabi 
believes that Shaikh Shakhbut thought that “oil income had to be saved for the future, 
when the country would need it.”152  
The question of the boundary arose in 1934, when the United States government 
enquired from the British government about the status of territorial boundaries in 
eastern Arabia. Britain sent the Americans copies of the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 
1913 and 1914, stating that the two documents defined the boundaries of eastern 
Arabia.153 According to the British, Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the Ottoman 
Empire and was legally obliged to see that its territorial claims conformed with the 
boundaries established by the Conventions. However, the Saudis had never accepted 
Britain’s legal argument about successor-state status that from the beginning had been 
quite dubious, since the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions are not mentioned at all in the 
previous Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915 and 1927.154 During the first negotiations with 
Saudi Arabia in 1935, Britain proposed the “Riyadh” or “Ryan” line that followed the 
southern rim of the Rub al-Khali, except to the north of Hadhramaut where it went 20 to 
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30 miles into the Rub al-Khali to provide a buffer zone for Britain’s Aden Protectorate 
in southwest Arabia.  
The Saudis responded with the “Fuad” or “Hamzah” line, named for the Acting Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Fuad bey Hamzah.155 The Hamzah line was to start at Khor al-Udaid 
and make its way to Aden;156 it would have made Khor al-Udaid part of Saudi territory 
and would also have split the Liwa oasis, the ancestral home of the Al-Bu Falah shaikhs 
of Abu Dhabi, between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. The British rejected the Hamzah 
line; however in 1937 they offered a modified Riyadh line that came close to the Abu 
Dhabi coast and included the Sufuk wells (which bordered the Saudi line 25 miles to the 
west of Abu Dhabi) as Saudi territory. Although Schofield describes the modified 
Riyadh line as “the largest departure from Anglo-Ottoman lines ever offered by the 
British government to Saudi Arabia”157 the Saudis rejected the British proposals 
because they did not include Khor al-Udaid and/or the Jebel Nakhsh, one of the richest 
oil-bearing areas, as Saudi territory east of the Qatar peninsula (Figure 3.1).158   
Figure 3.1: Frontier Claims Map, 1913-55 
 
Source:  J.B Kelly, the Gulf and the West, 1980 and Anthny H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the 
Search for Strategic Stability, p 413 
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Although the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations ended in stalemate in the late 1930s, 
British officials considered several proposals designed to persuade Ibn Saud to remain 
neutral in the event of war between Great Britain and Germany. In February 1938, the 
British Foreign Office proposed giving Khor al-Udaid to Saudi Arabia on the grounds 
that ceding Khor al-Udaid would be a small sacrifice that would help to stop Saudi 
expansion and alleviate Shaikh Shakhbut’s fears of growing Saudi power. The Foreign 
Office noted that 
Shaikh [Shakhbut, ruler of Abu Dhabi,] of course relies entirely 
on the support of His Majesty's Government for the maintenance 
of his independence against Ibn Saud, and that His Majesty’s 
Government would therefore no doubt be in a position to bring 
considerable pressure to bear on him to agree to letting Saudi 
Arabia have Khor al-Udaid.159 
Among documents in the British government archives, this memorandum is perhaps 
unique for its plain assessment of the ruler of Abu Dhabi as weak and dependent on 
Britain. Because it is such a rare statement, it is important to point out that the Foreign 
Office was in the minority with regard to the proposal to give Khor al-Udaid to Saudi 
Arabia. Even though the proposal included provision for making a large monetary 
payment, estimated at £20,000, to Shaikh Shakhbut for the loss of Khor al-Udaid, the 
Government of India, the Political Resident at Bushire, British military commanders, 
and the India Office were all strongly against the proposal. In addition to the Political 
Resident’s assessment that the deal would have no effect on Ibn Saud’s actions in the 
event of World War II, the proposal’s critics argued that if Britain reversed its position 
on Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid, which had been recognized by the 
British in 1871, the decision would have a profoundly negative impact on Britain’s 
prestige throughout the Gulf region.160 
However, according to the Saudis, Ibn Saud had an ancestral claim to the entire coast of 
eastern Arabia, including Khor al-Udaid. On 21 March 1937 George Rendel of the 
British Foreign Office visited Ibn Saud in Jeddah. When Ibn Saud argued that he was 
the only local ruler who could maintain law and order there, Rendel replied that the 
ruler of Abu Dhabi had a strong claim to Khor al-Udaid that had been recognized by the 
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British since 1871 and that the only land route between Abu Dhabi and Qatar lay to the 
west of Khor al-Udaid.161 Rendel’s remark about the land route between Abu Dhabi and 
Qatar is interesting in the context of the question of why Ibn Saud wanted Khor al-
Udaid so much that he would not accept any British proposal that did not include Khor 
al-Udaid as Saudi territory.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Khor al-Udaid was described by the British as having little 
value as a harbour, while the surrounding land was unproductive and devoid of 
resources. So, it is of great importance to state that these factors contributed to Ibn 
Saud’s claim to Khor al-Udaid. One suggestion was that the Saudis wanted to control 
the land route between Abu Dhabi and Qatar as part of a larger strategy to establish 
Saudi domination over the region. It was also suggested that the Saudis wanted 
possession of Khor al-Udaid for internal security reasons. According to this view, a 
Saudi outlet to the Gulf at Khor al-Udaid would help to contain any Shi‘a uprisings in 
eastern Saudi Arabia.162 Schofield believes the main reason behind the Saudi claim was 
to split British control along the eastern Arabian coast from Oman to Qatar.163 Peterson 
suggested four possible reasons: (i) Ibn Saud’s sense of “manifest destiny” made him 
feel entitled to areas held by his ancestors, no matter how briefly; (ii) it may have been 
related to Saudi Arabia’s national security and oil development; (iii) the Saudis may 
also have suspected there were offshore oil deposits near Khor al-Udaid; and (iv) the 
Saudis may have considered Khor al-Udaid as compensation for losing the Buraimi 
oasis.164  
According to a British Foreign Office memorandum prepared in February 1938: 
The Saudis claim that they need the Khor (a) in order to have an 
additional port on the Persian Gulf more easy to develop and 
more accessible to trade than their existing ports at Ras Tanura 
and Uqair, (b) in order to be able to control the smuggling which 
they contend is carried on from that part of the coast into Saudi 
Arabia. It is probable, however, that motives of prestige derived 
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from their general expansionist aims play a considerable part in 
the Saudi desire to acquire the Khor.165  
Despite the Foreign Office belief that the Saudis had no historical basis for their claim 
over Khor al-Udaid, it proposed in 1938 to cede Khor al-Udaid to settle the disputed 
areas between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Interestingly, Saudi Arabia had not claimed 
sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid until after the 1930s.166 Nowhere in the British archives 
records is there documentary evidence of Saudi claims on Khor al-Udaid before the 
1930s, except when the first phase of the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations began. 
However, in the 1930s, Saudi Arabia back-dated its claims to the early 1900s, saying 
that the Al-Murrah and Mansir nomadic tribes that were living in the area around Khor 
al-Udaid had consistently paid zakat and had submitted their loyalty to Ibn Saud. Thus, 
the occupants of some of the settlements that lay to the east of the Blue and Violet Lines 
were his subjects.167  
In February 1949, Saudi zakat collectors appeared in and around Liwa, Buraimi and 
Dhahira to collect payments from the local tribes. At the same time, Aramco sent oil 
survey parties into areas near Khor al-Udaid and west of Sabkhat al-Matti. Shaikh 
Shakhbut complained to Patrick Stobart, the Political Officer in Sharjah, about this 
Saudi zakat-collecting in Abu Dhabi territory. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) also 
protested about Aramco’s exploration activities and asked the British government to 
look after the interests of British oil companies in the disputed areas. On 21 April 
Stobart took a small party into the disputed area where several Aramco camps were 
found. The Americans, who had brought twenty Saudi soldiers with them, disarmed 
Stobart and his men and briefly detained them,168 before deciding to release them. The 
thesis was interested in examining this situation, since in an interview with Julian 
Walker, who was then an Assistant Political Agent stationed in Dubai, he stated that 
“we planned to surround the Aramco team with TOS [Trucial Oman Scouts], shoot out 
their tyres, and then return them to undisputed Saudi territory. We then received a 
telegram from London saying Prime Minister says you should on no account shoot at 
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the Americans except in self-defence.”169 This account is highly significant because it 
demonstrates the strong potential for violent action to occur between the British and 
Americans in the disputed areas as the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations entered a 
new phase. 
3.3 The Second Stage of Anglo-Saudi Territorial Negotiations (1949-55) 
3.3.1 Changed Atmosphere After World War II 
The British protested about Saudi Arabia’s activities west of Abu Dhabi, and for several 
months correspondence was exchanged with Saudi Arabia in an attempt to restrict its 
activities. On 14 October 1949, the status of the western and southern boundaries of 
Abu Dhabi became further complicated when Saudi Arabia and Aramco’s lawyers 
issued a new and expanded territorial claim. The new claim included 80 percent of Abu 
Dhabi’s territory; the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis, the Liwa oasis and Khor al-Udaid.170 In 
response, Britain argued that Saudi Arabia was bound by the Anglo-Ottoman 
Conventions of 1913 and 1914. 171  
It is also importance to note that Saudi Arabia’s territorial claim in 1949 came in the 
context of a radically changed regional and global atmosphere. For example, since 
1947, India had gained independence, and nationalism and anti-colonialism were rising 
throughout the developing world. In the Middle East, two important events occurred in 
1952 that explained this. First, Iran’s Prime Minister, Muhammad Mosadeq, 
nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and second, Gamal Abdul Nasser of 
Egypt overthrew the British-backed government and campaigned for British withdrawal 
from the Suez Canal Zone. The situation was further complicated by the Cold War and 
the growing role of the United States in the Middle East.  
According to Tore T. Petersen, the United States government became more deeply 
involved in the Middle East because Britain was not responding effectively to security 
threats and Arab nationalism, and there was a risk of losing the entire region to the 
Communist bloc.172 In 1951, the Saudis entered a new military agreement with the US 
and turned away from its existing military agreement with Britain. The Americans also 
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stationed unarmed US Air Force aircraft at Dhahran.173  In February 1952, Amir Faisal, 
son of Ibn Saud, visited the United States with the aim of influencing the Americans to 
play a role in negotiations and stand against current the British position with regard to 
the disputed areas. During that visit he met US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and 
informed him that if the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations were not resolved to the 
Saudi Arabia’s satisfaction, the Saudis might be forced to turn to the Communists for 
help.174  
As early as the summer of 1949, Saudi Arabia had asked the US government to pressure 
the British to grant more concessions over the disputed areas, and by April 1950, 
Aramco executives had lobbied the US State Department to influence the British toward 
a settlement. In July 1950, the British government issued a memorandum that proposed 
the creation of a joint Anglo-Saudi Technical Commission to study the issues, provided 
the Saudis agreed to three conditions: first, there should be no efforts to influence 
developments in the disputed areas; second, the joint technical commission would 
address Oman’s claims over Buraimi and the surrounding area; and third, the Saudis 
would have to agree to document claims to any territory east of the Blue and Violet 
Lines of the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914. The Saudis welcomed the 
first and second conditions, but rejected the third requirement.175 
The British requirement that the Saudis should document their territorial claims east of 
the Blue and Violet Lines is interesting. When asked why during the 1950s the British 
had persisted in arguing that Saudi Arabia’s territory was bound by the Anglo-Ottoman 
Conventions of 1913 and 1914, Julian Walker strongly maintained that the British had 
not used that argument in the 1950s.176 But as explained above, the British had argued 
from 1934 onwards that the Saudis were bound by the Blue and Violet Lines. 
At this time, the British were altering various aspects of their presence in the Gulf. From 
the 1950s to the 1960s, a new attitude was developing among many British officials 
who “felt that Britain could not take such a close interest in the people of the area 
without promoting at least a measure of economic and social progress.”177 This 
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changing attitude among British officials coincided with the previously-mentioned shift 
in among British oil companies and their support for local development.178 For example, 
in 1966, the British supported the idea of deposing Shaikh Shakhbut because they 
considered him to be a conservative who was opposed to economic and social 
development in Abu Dhabi. During the 1950s and 1960s, oil was discovered in the 
Trucial Coast and Britain became exclusively focused on the exploitation of petroleum 
resources in the Arabian Peninsula.  
3.3.2 Events Leading to the Saudi Occupation of Hamasa in 1952 
In late 1950-early 1951, the British established a small police force called the Trucial 
Oman Levies (TOL), later renamed the Trucial Oman Scouts, whose headquarters were 
in Sharjah. The plan was for members of the Arab Legion to be brought in from Jordan 
to train the Trucial Oman Levies. Ibn Saud, who had been an enemy of the Hashemite 
rulers for many years, felt threatened by the proposed use of Jordanian soldiers near the 
south-eastern corner of Saudi Arabia, and on 10 January 1951 submitted a formal 
protest to the British ambassador in Saudi Arabia about the issue of the TOL.179  Early 
in the second phase of the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations, the TOL added to the 
rising tension between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
In August 1951, the British and Saudi representatives met in London to negotiate the 
status quo in order to freeze oil exploration and political activities in the disputed areas 
until both sides could reach a tentative compromise. However, the Saudis were 
unwilling to agree to such restrictions because the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company had 
continued its operations and the Levy Force under British command had entered the 
disputed areas. In January 1952, a second Anglo-Saudi conference was held at 
Dammam in Saudi Arabia, at which the British filed a new territorial claim on Abu 
Dhabi’s behalf with Saudi Arabia.180 The British proposed a line “...starting from a 
point at the base of Qatar south of Salwa, and going southwards, turning south-east until 
reaching Quraini, then turning north-east to reach Umm al-Zamul as a tripartite junction 
between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman (see figure 3.1).”181 In 
response, the Saudis rejected this proposal and maintained the basis of their claim of 
1949. The Dammam conference ended on 7 February 1952, because the results of the 
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negotiations failed to satisfy either party.182 At the conference, the British had tried to 
deny Khor al-Udaid to Saudi Arabia, nor had they included the Buraimi issue in their 
agenda because they believed that the Saudis had no right to claim Buraimi Oasis. The 
Saudis felt their concern over the Buraimi issue had been completely ignored and 
reacted by occupying it.183 
As a result of the failure of the negotiations, Saudi soldiers occupied Hamasa, a large 
village claimed by the Sultan of Muscat in the Buraimi Oasis on 31 August 1952. Shafi 
Aldamer has argued that the absence of the Sultan of Muscat and addressing the 
Buraimi Oasis question at the Dammam Conference had signalled to the Saudis that 
they were free to claim Buraimi as Saudi territory.184 It was reported that the tribal 
Shaikhs of Hamasa had invited the Saudis into the village. Since many of the 
inhabitants were Wahhabis, their supporters claimed that the tribal Shaikhs were 
independent of Oman and the Trucial States, while according to Abdullah Taryam, 
residents of Hamasa who had asked the British Political Agent in Sharjah for passports 
had been refused because “they were not nationals of the sheikhdoms whose 
relationship with Britain was governed by treaties.”185 
Asked about the claim that the British Political Agent in Sharjah during the 1950s had 
declined to issue passports to residents of Hamasa, Ivor Lucas and Julian Walker 
responded that they had no knowledge of these claims, but that they sound far-
fetched.186 Most probably the residents of Buraimi Oasis were subjects of shaikhdoms 
under British protection. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Sultan of Muscat had allied 
himself with Shaikh Zayid and defended the Wahhabis in Buraimi in 1869, and since 
then Buraimi had been jointly administered by the Sultanate of Muscat and Abu Dhabi.  
Events at Buraimi were closely monitored by the US government. US officials wanted 
to protect Aramco’s business interests in Saudi Arabia, and the US State Department 
urged Britain and Saudi Arabia to avoid any escalation of hostility at Buraimi.187 On 26 
October 1952 the British and Saudis consented to a standstill agreement according to 
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which both parties pledged to refrain from provocative actions, to maintain their 
existing positions in the Buraimi oasis, and to resume the Anglo-Saudi territorial 
negotiations.188 In 1953, the Saudis proposed a plebiscite in Buraimi to determine 
sovereignty over the villages, but the British rejected this proposal,189 since the 
plebiscite suggested by the Saudis would have been managed by a tripartite commission 
including Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, and the United States.190  
3.3.3 The Arbitration Agreement of 1954 
The US State Department strongly urged both countries to take their disputed areas to 
arbitration and the Americans were determined not to take sides with either Britain or 
Saudi Arabia.191 The British and the Saudis then agreed to sign an arbitration agreement 
at Jeddah on 30 July 1954, which involved an exchange of letters specifying the 
conditions which both parties would adhere to during arbitration with regard to the 
disputed areas. According to the arbitration agreement, each party in the dispute needed 
to present its case for submission to an international Arbitration Commission within six 
months of signing the agreement. On behalf of their respective claimants the British 
government and Aramco therefore prepared memorials that documented the historical 
arguments of the Saudi and Abu Dhabi cases. Both memorials produced information 
related to the question of the disputed areas over the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region, Khor 
al-Udaid, and the Liwa oasis.  
In the British Memorial, Britain provided historical materials to support Abu Dhabi 
claim. The following points served as British evidence: 
• Saudi Arabia was bound by the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913-14.  
• The various Saudi occupations of the Buraimi oasis had been challenged 
and interrupted until they were finally repulsed in 1871. 
• Historical evidence was provided to support the claim that Khor al-Udaid 
and the Liwa oasis had been the ancestral areas of the tribes belonging to the 
rulers of Abu Dhabi.  
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However, in the Saudi Memorial, Saudi Arabia provided evidence to support the Saudi 
claim east of the Blue Line, in which the following points included: 
• Saudi Arabia had practised sovereignty over the disputed areas; thus the 
Saudi claim was based on historical title. 
• The tribes who lived in the disputed areas recognised Saudi authority as 
subjects by paying them regular zakat to the Saudis. 
• The 1915 and 1927 treaties did not mention that Saudi Arabia was bound by 
the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913-14, but recognized Ibn Saudi as an 
independent ruler.192  
3.3.4 Collapse of Arbitration and British Unilateral Frontier Declaration in 1955 
Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, supported by the US government, agreed to arbitration 
as a dispute resolution method that was scheduled to start in September 1955. The 
tribunal was represented by three neutral states, being headed by a Belgian, 
accompanied by two tribunal members from Pakistan and Cuba respectively. Sir Reader 
Bullard, a retired member of the British Foreign Service who had been Minister and 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1936 to 1939, represented the British side, and Yusuf 
Yasin, the Saudi Foreign Minister, represented the Saudi side. When the tribunal opened 
on 11 September the British and the Saudis both produced evidence of violations of the 
various agreements. The Saudis accused the British of being in violation of the 1952 
standstill agreement and the 1954 arbitration agreement, while the British used the 
second and third meetings to charge the Saudis with the same accusations.193  
On 16 September 1954, Sir Reader Bullard withdrew from the tribunal. Pro-Saudi 
scholars have argued that when it appeared the tribunal would go to a verdict in favour 
of the Saudis and without ruling on Britain’s accusations of Saudi misconduct, Sir 
Reader Bullard and the two neutral members left the tribunal. In 1955, when the British 
had exhausted all means (i.e., political and legal approaches) of dealing with the Saudis 
over frontier issues, they unilaterally declared Saudi Arabia’s frontier line,194 and on 26 
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October 1955, ordered the Trucial Oman Scouts (commanded by British officers) to 
expel the Saudis from Hamasa.195  
Scholars have examined the collapse of the arbitration process and have attempted to 
uncover the “real” reason why Bullard resigned from the tribunal before a ruling could 
be reached on the Abu Dhabi-Saudi territorial dispute. For example, Hamadi argues that 
British allegations of unfair Saudi influence on the tribunal ignored the fact that there 
were neutral members of the tribunal. For Hamadi, the evidence strongly suggests that 
the British strategy was aimed at blocking arbitration.196 Wilkinson asserts that Bullard 
resigned because the British knew they would lose the case at arbitration.  
Julian Walker, on the other hand, maintains that Sir Reader Bullard left the arbitration 
tribunal because of alleged Saudi attempts to bribe Shaikh Zayid and a member of the 
tribunal as well as on-going Saudi police activity at Buraimi oasis.197  In an alternative 
version, the main reason for the collapse of the tribunal was the charge of bribery 
offered by the Saudis to Shaikh Zayid, brother of Shaikh Shakhbut, Ruler of Abu Dhabi. 
Shaikh Zayid was therefore brought in to the Tribunal and testified that the Saudis had 
offered him 400 million rupees in cash (equivalent to US$85 million), for which sum a 
thousand camels were needed to transport the money to Abu Dhabi.198 Ivor Lucas 
shares Walker’s views that the international arbitration tribunal collapsed as a result of 
Saudi attempts to subvert it.199 According to Lucas, the British alleged that the Saudis 
had offered Shaikh Zayid a large share of the revenues from any oil found in the 
disputed areas if he would make sure that Aramco obtained a concession in Abu Dhabi 
and excluded the British-owned Petroleum Concessions Limited (PCL).200 
Regardless of what “really” caused the collapse of the arbitration process, subsequently 
the US government did not support Britain. J. B. Kelly mentioned in 1964 “a 
conspicuous lack of support in Washington for Britain’s actions”201 in abandoning the 
arbitration tribunal along with their unilateral declaration of the Saudi frontier in 1955. 
In this context, and for two reasons the Americans protested to the British Foreign 
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Office in London, first because the British had not consulted the Americans before 
declaring the Saudi frontier and expelling the Saudis from Hamasa. Secondly, the 
Americans resented British disregard for American interests in Saudi Arabia. In early 
1956, during a state visit to Washington by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the US President, told Eden that the world and regional public 
opinion should be taken into account in resolving the Anglo-Saudi territorial 
negotiations. Eisenhower also stated that, “the whole Arab peninsula belonged, or ought 
to belong, to King Saud.”202 
The United States had joined the Arab League in supporting the reopening of the 
international tribunal; however, the British resolutely refused to consider reviving the 
arbitration process. In November 1955, Richard Young, an Aramco lawyer who had 
supported the Saudis at the arbitration tribunal, proposed a political solution to the Abu 
Dhabi-Saudi territorial dispute, according to which both Saudi Arabia and Britain, as 
well as the people living in the disputed areas, would benefit. Under Young’s proposal, 
Qatar would have Khor al-Udaid but Saudi Arabia would gain access to the Gulf east of 
Qatar. Saudi Arabia would also acquire the Liwa oasis and the Dhahran district, 
including Buraimi oasis. The Al-Bu Falah Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi would retain their role 
in Buraimi oasis but would not exercise sovereignty there. As for petroleum operations, 
Saudi Arabia would split the territory between Aramco and Petroleum Development 
Trucial Coast, a subsidiary of the British Iraq Petroleum Company. Saudi Arabia would 
also split the oil revenues 50/50 with the oil companies and then share the Saudi 
government’s half on a 50/50 basis with the seven Trucial States. In fact, Young’s 
proposal was never officially put forward, but Wilkinson notes that, except for Abu 
Dhabi, the Trucial States would have favoured Young’s proposal.203  
3.3.5 Summary of Events from 1949-55 
One theme that emerged was that Aramco and the US government played a large role in 
shaping the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations. Aramco executives and lawyers 
prepared Saudi Arabia’s historical argument, the 1955 Saudi Memorial and Aramco 
Reports, in support of the 1949 expansion of the Saudi territorial claims that were to be 
submitted to international arbitration.  At the same time, the British Government, on 
behalf of Abu Dhabi, prepared the British Memorial of 1955 to support Abu Dhabi’s 
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territorial claim over the disputed areas. In this context, the US and the British 
governments had conflicting strategic interests in the disputed areas and that conflict 
intensified when Aramco supported the Saudi territorial claims east of the Blue and 
Violet lines. The American policy of supporting the Saudi territorial claims east of the 
Blue Line (where the Al-Ain/Buraimi region is located) suggests that Aramco had 
emerged as a competitor to the interests of the British companies in the Arabian Gulf. 
Therefore it can be argued that the contest over the disputed areas was between Abu 
Dhabi and the Saudis and most importantly, between the British and American oil 
companies. Although the Americans and the British had been allies during World War 
II, tensions developed between them for one or two particular reasons. The British 
believed that the Americans were focused more or less exclusively on countering 
Communism and that this had a significantly negative impact on US foreign policy. 
Since the British believed that neither foreign nor local Communists were a threat in the 
Gulf, they distrusted the Americans’ stated concerns.204   
A second theme that emerged was mutual accusations of non-compliance with various 
agreements, from those reached in London and Dammam to the standstill and 
Arbitration agreements. Most of the complaints fell into the category of unfairly 
attempting to influence the outcome of the disputed areas. Taryam notes that soon after 
the Saudi occupation of Hamasa, there were rumours that Ibn Utayshan, the Saudi 
official in charge of the occupation of Hamasa, had been giving gifts and money to local 
residents and hosting daily parties for them.205 These complaints continued even after 
Britain and Saudi Arabia had agreed to take the disputed case to international arbitration 
in Geneva. It was reported that the Saudis used many methods to influence the decision 
of the International Arbitration Tribunal. Certainly the Saudis distributed large gifts of 
money to Buraimi’s tribal leaders and arranged trips to Riyadh for some of them. They 
also offered jobs and Saudi citizenship to Buraimi natives. As for Abu Dhabi, Shaikh 
Zayid, brother of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, persuaded leaders of the Al-Bu Shamsi tribe 
to give their allegiance to the Sultan of Muscat. According to Wilkinson, Shaikh 
Zayid’s efforts on behalf of Oman and Abu Dhabi were an inadequate defence against 
the evidence “which the Saudis were similarly manufacturing”206 throughout Dhahran, 
the district around Buraimi. At the end, both sides had produced evidence in support of 
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their territorial claims, even if that had meant manufacturing evidence in their attempts 
to influence the arbitration results. 
Despite the arguments of scholars who maintain that both sides engaged in “dirty tricks” 
at Buraimi oasis, the official British position was that only the Saudis had violated the 
standstill agreement of October 1952. On 2 April 1953, Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office, announced in the House of Commons that Great Britain 
was abrogating the standstill agreement because of Saudi bribery and incursions into 
Abu Dhabi territory. The British then established a blockade of Buraimi, maintained by 
the Trucial Oman Levies, to restrict the flow of supplies that the Saudis might use to 
influence the inhabitants of Buraimi oasis unfairly. The blockade also provided the 
British themselves with opportunities to influence the local Buraimi residents.207  
3.4 After 1955 and up to the Early 1970s 
3.4.1 Anglo-Saudi Relations 1956-63 
Regional events were moving against the reopening and resolving of the Anglo-Saudi 
territorial negotiations. To counter Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, Britain, 
France, and Israel invaded the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt in November 1956. Saudi 
Arabia immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in protest at the 
invasion. The British had wrongly believed that the Americans would support the 
invasion. The United Nations voted to condemn the invasion, while the United States 
imposed economic sanctions on its former ally and withheld Middle East oil shipments 
to Europe until Britain had agreed to quit Suez. As a development of the status quo in 
the Middle East, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and US President 
Eisenhower met for talks in March 1957. Following that meeting, the British 
acknowledged US supremacy over the entire Middle East, in exchange for continued 
British dominance of the Gulf.208 
In term of that context, the British government had an opportunity to exercise its 
dominance in the Gulf in October 1958, when Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi sent a 
large contingent of officials to Khor al-Udaid to establish a police post for the 
supervision of fishing and to enforce Abu Dhabi’s navigation regulations at Khor al-
Udaid. Despite the British Political Resident in Bahrain affirming that Khor al-Udaid 
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was “indisputably Abu Dhabi territory”, he also stated that “it would be unfortunate if 
there were a clash between a Saudi force and Shakhbut’s police, particularly as the latter 
would run away and leave the Saudi force in possession of [Khor al-Udaid].”209 
Saudi Arabia reacted to Shaikh Shakhbut’s activities by sending a note of protest to the 
British and filing a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. The Saudi 
letter to the Security Council described Shaikh Shakhbut’s policemen as a force of 
several hundred Arab soldiers led by British officers, and also stated the following:  
The Saudi Arabian Government concludes that the United 
Kingdom’s armed aggression in Khor al-Udaid was designed to 
provoke Saudi Arabia into an armed conflict in that area, with a 
view to disturbing the peace in the region and foster British 
colonialism in the Arabian Peninsula…The military aggression 
by the British colonial forces in Khor-al Udaid is attended with 
several preparatory arrangements of a military nature calculated 
to expand militarily British colonial policy within and around 
Saudi Arabian territory.210 
The accusations of the Saudis against Great Britain obviously misrepresented Shaikh 
Shakhbut’s attempts to exercise his sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid. On 17 July 1959, 
the Foreign Office wrote in a memorandum:  
We have recognised the [Khor al-Udaid] for about eighty years 
as belonging to Abu Dhabi it would have been difficult for us to 
prevent him from establishing a post, if we had known 
beforehand, and it would be extremely difficult for us to 
persuade him to withdraw his post now that it is there… the 
[Khor al-Udaid] problem has now joined the Buraimi problem as 
a hindrance to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia.211  
In response to a question about the controversy over Shaikh Shakhbut’s activities at 
Khor al-Udaid and the reactions of the British, Ivor Lucas argues that the Buraimi Crisis 
(1952-55) the Suez Crisis (1956), and the resulting break in Anglo-Saudi diplomatic 
relations (1956-63) could be seen as cumulative reasons why, in 1958, British officials 
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wished to avoid upsetting the Saudis over Shaikh Shakhbut’s exercise of sovereignty at 
Khor al-Udaid, so that the British preferred to look at the other side. 212 
3.4.2 The Context of Anglo-Saudi Territorial Negotiations 1960-70 
By 1960, the Saudis had made the resolving of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi territorial dispute a 
prerequisite for restoring normal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Great 
Britain, and the two countries eventually resumed relations in 1963. In August 1964, the 
British proposed the “establishment of a joint oil exploration area along the southern 
boundary of Abu Dhabi and granting of access from the neighbouring areas of Saudi 
Arabia to the Abu Dhabi coast for oil pipelines and roads.”213 With this proposal, they 
addressed Saudi Arabia’s longstanding desire to gain access to the Gulf east of Qatar, 
namely Khor al-Udaid.  
In addition the British, for the first time, proposed a joint exploitation in any discovered 
oil field in south of Abu Dhabi by making it available for both American and British oil 
companies to explore so that Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia would share the revenues. 
However, the Saudis rejected this suggestion and insisted instead on unilateral 
sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid and the Liwa oasis. It is important to note that the 
Zararah oil field was discovered in 1968, the same year in which the British had 
declared their withdrawal. The Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company drilled many wells at 
Zararah, south of Abu Dhabi, but due to the field’s sensitive location between the Abu 
Dhabi-Saudi borders, drilling activities were frequently stopped and resumed, especially 
during the 1970s. After the discovery of oil in Zararah, some very secretive drilling 
activities were carried out by Aramco on the Saudi side.214  
In that context, discovery of the Zararah oil field played an important role in prolonging 
the history of the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. The discovery of oil 
gave more value to the land south of Liwa compared with the Buraimi oasis. Wilkinson 
argues that Aramco had mistakenly thought that Buraimi oasis was a “prime petroleum 
prospecting [area].”215 Similarly, Tore Petersen shows that when it was proved that no 
oil had been discovered in Buraimi, it was shortly after dropped from the Saudi 
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agenda;216 certainly from the 1960s the Buraimi oasis no longer appeared in Saudi 
calculations.  
Saudi Arabia also changed its priority in terms of territorial claims to include both Khor 
al-Udaid, and the Liwa oasis. In fact, no public statement was made that explicitly 
indicated that Saudi Arabia had dropped its claim to Buraimi oasis. The Buraimi issue 
remained dormant until 1968 when the British announced their anticipated military 
withdrawal from the Gulf by 1971. However, the Saudis would later use the Buraimi 
issue as a “bargaining chip” for territorial settlement, indicating that they would drop 
the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region in exchange for Khor al-Udaid and part of the Liwa 
oasis, including areas that had been found to contain oil.217   
Despite the resumption of relations between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, William E. 
Milligan, coordinator of Aramco’s Arabian Affairs Division stated that: “no substantive 
steps to resolve the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are known 
to have been taken over years.”218 This study speculates that the two most important 
reasons why the dispute had not been resolved were Britain’s short-term strategy, 
especially after 1968, and the uncompromising position of the Saudis during the Anglo-
Saudi territorial negotiations.219 
In the context of finalizing borders, the settling of Saudi Arabia’s common borders with 
Qatar had proceeded successfully,220 with Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreeing to a line 
proposed by the British on behalf of Qatar at the Dammam Conference in 1952. 
According to William E. Milligan, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar had reached an agreement 
in principle on their common land boundary and that it comprised the 1952 claim 
advanced by Great Britain on behalf of Qatar [at the Dammam Conference].”221  
In December 1965, Saudi Arabia and Qatar reached a territorial agreement over their 
boundary to the west of Qatar. Even though Qatar was a British protected state, it signed 
an agreement with Saudi Arabia without any consultion with Britain. As a result, the 
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British government sent a letter of protest to the Saudi government expressing its 
position on the agreement, that it conflicted with Abu Dhabi’s claim to Khor al-
Udaid.222 However, according to Schofield, Britain did not accept the Saudi claims on 
Khor al-Udaid as suggested by the Saudi-Qatari agreement,223 and the British Political 
Resident informed the Deputy Ruler of Qatar about the 1965 agreement in the following 
terms: 
…the conclusion of this border agreement had caused HMG 
much embarrassment. It had been necessary for HMG to send a 
protest both to the Ruler of Qatar and to the Saudi Arabian 
Government in order to safeguard the position of Abu Dhabi east 
of Sauda Nathil. It seemed that Qatar did not realise how serious 
it was for her to have become involved in an agreement with 
Saudi Arabia, which concerned not only the border between 
those two countries but also the border between Qatar and Abu 
Dhabi, over which Saudi Arabia had no legal say whatsoever.224 
According to an article in Al-Hawadith, the Beirut weekly magazine, the Saudi 
government maintained that Khor al-Udaid did not belong to Abu Dhabi but did belong 
to Saudi Arabia, as had been acknowledged decades earlier by the Al-Thani ruler of 
Qatar in a letter to Ibn Saud in the 1930s.225 The article also quoted an unnamed Saudi 
official as saying: 
The problem between us and Abu Dhabi is not one of land, for 
we have a lot of land. Nor is it about oil fields, for (our) oil is 
plentiful. The problem is one of honour. We do not need a 
mediator between us and [Shaikh] Zayid, ruler of Abu Dhabi, if 
[Shaikh] Zayid really wishes to solve this problem.226  
On the other hand, the British continued to push Qatar to conclude an agreement with 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi as a way of replacing the Saudi-Qatari agreement of 
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December 1965,227 and on 20 March 1969, Abu Dhabi and Qatar agreed to end a 
dispute over the Bunduq oil field near Halul Island, according to which Abu Dhabi 
would administer the oil field, but would divide the revenues equally with Qatar.228 The 
Qatari-Abu Dhabi agreement did, though, complicate the question of the maritime 
boundary.229  It is important to indicate that Saudi Arabia does not recognise the 
existence of this treaty, just as the British did not recognise the legality of the Saudi-
Qatari agreement of 1965. 
3.4.3 Effect of Britain’s 1968 Announcement of Withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 
According to Cordesman, the British issued a formal warning to Saudi Arabia in 1966 
stating their intention to defend Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims. However, this warning 
was severely undercut in January 1968, when Britain announced its intention to 
withdraw its military forces from the Gulf by 1971.230  The announcement encouraged 
Saudi Arabia to press its claims to the South and West of Abu Dhabi’s mainland, the 
Saudi position towards Abu Dhabi’s territory having hardened when it was found 
during the 1960s that Abu Dhabi had large reserves of oil in those areas. Abu Dhabi’s 
major fields were discovered by the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC): the first 
oil field was Bab in 1960; followed by Bu Hasa in 1962; Asab in 1965; Zakum in 1967; 
Zararah (the disputed oilfield) in 1968; and Sahil in 1972.231  
Britain’s announcement of its imminent departure marked a transition point in the 
history of the Gulf region; the news also had an impact on American policy towards the 
Gulf region, on the future of the British protected states, and on the Saudi position 
towards Abu Dhabi and its territorial claims.  
Arthur Allen, the Consul General at the American Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 
wrote to the State Department in Washington DC in February 1968: 
With the British decision to withdraw their military forces by 
1971, it is important to increase our direct contact with the Gulf 
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States by having officers resident in key locations who can report 
more currently and fully and establish local contacts more 
effectively than is possible on the basis of periodic visits. At the 
same time, rivalries between the states themselves and the 
problems caused by the Iranian claim to the islands and the Saudi 
Arabia-Abu Dhabi dispute over Buraimi make it desirable that 
the United States attempt to avoid actions which will damage our 
relations with either Iran or Saudi Arabia.232 
The Americans duly responded to the announced British withdrawal with a plan that 
called for increasing the US presence in the Gulf, but at the same time made specific 
mention of the disputed areas in the context of the Americans not wishing to do 
anything to damage US relations with either Iran or Saudi Arabia.233 It is of great 
importance to state that, under America’s Twin Pillar policy following Britain’s military 
withdrawal from the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran were expected to assume Britain’s 
historical role of maintaining Gulf security. In addition to US-Saudi interests, the US 
government committed itself to protecting Saudi Arabia from external aggression, since, 
according to a US Government assessment of relations between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia, 
US-Saudi relations have been traditionally and uniformly close 
since World War II. The main ingredients of this relationship are 
mutuality of basic interest –– the uninterrupted flow of oil and 
preservation of Saudi Arabia from communist or radical 
nationalist influence –– and Saudi respect for US military power 
and American expertise in a variety of technical fields. US 
interests in Saudi Arabia also include access to Dhahran 
International Airfield for unarmed military aircraft, and 
bunkering facilities for US naval units.234 
The future of the smaller Gulf States was uncertain in terms of the British military 
withdrawal. In fact, following the withdrawal announcement in 1968, the emirates came 
to realise that they would not easily be able to control their own destinies.235 The Ruler 
of Abu Dhabi received the British announcement of withdrawal from the Gulf with 
great concern. Importantly, Shaikh Zayid even offered the British government a 
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substantial payment of £12 million from his oil revenues to retain Britain’s military 
presence in the Gulf. The Times also reported an interview with Shaikh Rashid, ruler of 
Dubai, about his reaction to the news of the British withdrawal:  
Who asked them to leave?...Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, and in fact 
the whole coast, people and rulers, would all support the 
retention of British forces in the Gulf, even though they may not 
give a direct answer out of respect for the general Arab view.236 
In term of the unresolved Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute, Shaikh Zayid criticised the 
British for being unable to reach a settlement of the disputed areas. For example, Mr 
Jim Treadwell, a Political Resident in Abu Dhabi, reported to London that Shaikh Zayid 
“tried, though rather half-heartedly, to blame the British for his present predicament, 
claiming that we ought not to have confronted him with the decision to withdrew our 
troops while the Saudi claim was unresolved”237 Furthermore, Abu Dhabi faced a future 
in which Britain would no longer formally assume responsibility for Abu Dhabi’s 
security. In an exchange of views between officials in London and Washington, a 
British government official said:  
[The] UK would provide such security expertise as rulers want 
for internal and local defense. The UK is also disposed to 
continue such technical and limited economic assistance as 
might be required. But any question of British involvement in 
protection of Gulf states against external aggression by Iranians, 
Saudis, or powers outside Gulf is another matter entirely.238  
In 1966 analysis by the US State Department had portrayed the Trucial States as 
extremely vulnerable to Saudi aggression, had offered the following prediction:  
Saudi Arabia would probably not hesitate to occupy the Trucial 
Coast by force. It is unlikely that Iraq or Iranian threats to 
intervene would deter the Saudis in this move, nor would the 
1,000 British-officered Trucial Oman Levies pose much of an 
obstacle.239  
As for the Saudis, as the time for British withdrawal approached, the Saudis pressed 
their territorial claims against Abu Dhabi even further, especially during 1970-71. It is 
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of great importance to state that the announcement of the British departure left Saudi 
Arabia with the upper hand and free to control the negotiation process. Abu Dhabi-
Saudi territorial negotiations entered a new phase on 5 May 1970, and from that date 
until the British completed their withdrawal from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia would impose 
its own agenda on Abu Dhabi as is shown in Chapters 5 and 6.  
3.5 Conclusion 
During the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations from 1935 to 1955, the British claim 
was based on the dubious legal argument that Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the 
Ottoman Empire and was thus bound by the Anglo-Ottoman territorial Conventions of 
1913-14. The proposed Saudi lines of 1935 and 1949 both represented a rejection of the 
British argument. Since 1935, Saudi Arabia had pressed its territorial claims against 
Abu Dhabi to include Khor al-Udaid and had affirmed that nomadic tribes, such as Al-
Murrah and Mansir, who lived in settlements in Khor al-Udaid, had regularly paid zaket 
and had sworn allegiance to Ibn Saud. Saudi Arabia documented its claims over Khor 
al-Udaid from the 1930s and insisted that no proposed lines would be accepted without 
Khor al-Udaid being included. Individuals interviewed by me indicate two major 
reasons behind the Saudi claim to Khor al-Udaid; first that Khor al-Udaid might contain 
large reserves of oil, and secondly that the Saudis wanted to have a maritime outlet to 
the Gulf.  
As was explained, during the 1950s the dispute were characterised by escalating 
hostility between the British and the Saudis, and the severe tensions on both sides ended 
in Anglo-Saudi diplomatic relations being broken off. The sharp deterioration in Anglo-
Saudi relations was prompted by several critical events that included; the Saudi 
occupation of Hamasa village, the collapse of arbitration, Britain’s unilateral declaration 
of the Saudi frontier lines in 1955 and most importantly, expulsion of the Saudi soldiers 
from Hamasa by the Trucial Oman Scouts.240  
The chapter showed that after the 1930s, the British position towards Abu Dhabi’s 
territories continued to raise more questions than answers. For instance, on the one hand 
there was Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid, which had been recognized by 
the British since 1871. In 1958, on the other hand, the British were discouraging the 
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rulers of Abu Dhabi from exercising that sovereignty. The British also used Khor al-
Udaid as a bargaining chip in 1938, and 1964 proposed it as a concession to Saudi 
Arabia that might lead to settling the disputed areas.  
In 1968 when Britain officially announced its military withdrawal from the Gulf in late 
1971, the future of Abu Dhabi, as a result, looked weak and uncertain. For one thing, 
despite the fact that the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 between Great Britain and Abu 
Dhabi remained in effect, Britain’s post-withdrawal policy would no longer include 
British military protection of Abu Dhabi against foreign invasion. Significantly, the 
Americans considered that Saudi Arabia would probably use military force to occupy 
the Trucial Coast. With the announcement of Britain’s withdrawal, America’s Twin 
Pillar policy would have to depend heavily on Saudi Arabia and Iran, who would 
become the main guardians of the interests of the West in the Gulf region.  The chapter 
showed that Abu Dhabi could no longer count on support from Great Britain, even in 
the event of a foreign invasion of the entire Trucial Coast.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A Framework For UAE-Saudi Negotiation Behaviour:  
A Case Study of the UAE-Saudi Border Disputes, 1970-74 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analytical framework for the Saudi Arabia-UAE border dispute 
of 1970-74 that concerned natural resources as well as issues of national sovereignty. It 
focuses in particular on the negotiating strategies employed by the two parties in their 
attempts to find a peaceful settlement to their conflict between 1970 and 1974.  The 
generalised negotiating strategies and tactics employed by those who negotiate disputes 
are examined in Chapter 4, while Chapters 5 and 6 scrutinise the strategies and tactics 
that were used specifically by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in resolving their border 
conflicts, and that led ultimately to the signing of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1974.  
A successful negotiation requires a clear strategy and a choice of appropriate tactics to 
implement it. When the strategy and/or tactics are inadequate, a negotiation is unlikely 
to achieve its stated goals. In the Saudi-UAE case it also became necessary to take the 
cultural aspects of negotiation into account since Arab cultural norms were likely to 
have played a part in the 1970-74 negotiations that followed the official British 
withdrawal from the Gulf region in December 1971. Certainly it is an important 
consideration, since Arab scholars have characterised the outcome of the negotiations 
that led to the Treaty of Jeddah as an example of “Arab solutions” that were facilitated 
when Britain simultaneously withdrew Abu Dhabi’s former protected status. 
Another significant aspect of negotiation is third-party intervention, i.e., the role of the 
mediator between the disputing negotiators. The chapter focuses on the characteristics 
of an effective mediator who can bring resources to bear in order to ‘resolve’ rather than 
‘manage’ the dispute. Since the British had involved in the territorial dispute that 
occurred in the period 1935-55, some assumptions are drawn here about the anticipated 
role of the British from 1970 to 1971, when Britain still had a treaty obligation to 
defend Abu Dhabi. In order to clarify this context, the chapter discusses the various 
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roles that a mediator can play. The appropriate role is then applied, in Chapters 5 and 6, 
to the case of Britain’s mediation during the 1970s.  
Chapter 4 also examines other factors that affected UAE-Saudi negotiations during 
1970-74. From the results of the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations of 1935-55, it 
could be seen that past history and the power imbalances between Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia influenced the UAE-Saudi negotiations in the 1970s. 
4.2 Definitions of Conflict241 
According to Adair and Brett, “negotiation is a communication process by which two or 
more interdependent parties resolve some matter over which they are in conflict.”242 
Before discussing the negotiation approach it is useful to consider how parties in dispute 
have arrived at a state of conflict and how conflict has been defined in the literature. 
There are three general theoretical approaches that address the origins of violence. The 
most popular theory, derived from psychology, maintains that frustration is the root of 
violence. The second, based on biology, holds that humans are inherently violent. A 
third, derived from socio-biology, takes a middle position, claiming that the biological 
inclination to be violent requires a psychological trigger to activate actual violence. 
Rangarajan claims that all three theoretical perspectives are inadequate and suggests 
two “sequences” that lead to violence: 
• Dissatisfaction=>Frustration=>Desperation=>Violence 
• Dependence=>Vulnerability=>Fear=>Violence 243 
Rangarajan admits that his first sequence is based on the behavioural or psychological 
theory of violence. He maintains that people are more likely to feel dissatisfaction than 
they perceive utility, because “dissatisfaction persists in the memory and affects future 
courses of action.”244 This characterisation of dissatisfaction appears to be consistent 
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with events both preceding and following the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah between the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia, although over time the focus of dissatisfaction shifted.  It is 
reasonable to suggest that from 1955, when the British unilaterally announced Saudi 
Arabia’s eastern and southern frontiers, to just before the Treaty of Jeddah was signed 
in 1974, the Saudis constituted the dissatisfied party. From 1974 onwards, Abu Dhabi 
became the dissatisfied party.  
Furthermore, Rangarajan defines conflict without reference to violence: “A conflict has 
its origins when an individual, group or nation, having felt a dissatisfaction or 
vulnerability, perceives that there are others in the environment who can act to reduce 
the dissatisfaction or decrease the vulnerability.”245 Thus, Rangarajan’s developmental 
sequences can be reformulated to reflect the interchangeability of “conflict” and 
“dispute” while de-emphasizing violence:  
• Dissatisfaction=>Frustration=>Desperation=>Conflict (or dispute) 
• Dependence=>Vulnerability=>Fear=>Conflict (or dispute) 
This reformulation, combined with definitions of conflict that do not automatically 
imply violence, forms the basis of the framework of analysis used in Chapters 5 and 6. 
As noted, the first sequence, beginning with dissatisfaction, may describe Saudi 
Arabia’s position in the disputed areas up to 1974.  As for the second sequence, during 
the period that Britain dominated the Gulf, Abu Dhabi was largely dependent on Great 
Britain, particularly under the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 and up to Britain’s formal 
withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971.  
Meanwhile, Rabie states that conflicts can be interest-related and/or value-related. 
Interest-related conflicts include disputes over territory and natural resources, while 
value-related conflicts include disputes over national sovereignty.246 On the whole, most 
international conflicts are both interest-related and value-related. This chapter claims 
that the territorial dispute between the UAE and Saudi Arabia were related to interests 
as well as to values. Thus, the nature of the case study is categorised as a conflict over 
natural resources (Zararah/Shaybah oilfield) and national sovereignty (Khor al-Udaid 
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and the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis).247 Generally speaking, according to Rabie, the analysis 
of conflicts indicates that “international conflicts related to territorial and resource 
disputes appeared to be more amenable to peaceful resolution.”248 Thus, as the second 
part of the framework of analysis, this study considers the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute 
to be both interest-related and value-related, yet capable of resolution through 
negotiation. 
Concerning the third part of this analytical framework, this study recognises that 
conflict behaviour can be direct or indirect. Direct conflict behaviour is aimed at an 
opposing party, along with its resources, interests, or group members.  Indirect conflict 
behaviour, on the other hand, aims to “affect some third party in such a way that it acts, 
in turn, upon the opposing party, the ultimate target.”249  This analysis would assume 
that Abu Dhabi might have aimed indirect conflict behaviour at Great Britain, because 
the British had supported Abu Dhabi’s position in the Anglo-Saudi phases of the 
territorial dispute from 1935 to 1955. It would also be expected that Saudi Arabia might 
have aimed indirect conflict behaviour at the United States, because American oilmen, 
especially through Aramco, had supported the territorial claims of the Saudis during the 
Anglo-Saudi phases of the dispute from 1935 to1955.  
This study made a distinction between the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict 
management. According to Rabie: “conflict management and conflict resolution are two 
different concepts. Conflict management is a process to bring conflict under control, 
while conflict resolution is a process to end it.”250 On the basis of these definitions the 
British, the UAE and/or Saudi Arabia would have had the goal of resolving, as opposed 
to managing the territorial dispute.251 
Here the question becomes; does the UAE-Saudi border dispute turn out to be a crisis 
that will threaten the international system?  Wilkenfeld et al. state that  
An international crisis is identified when it meets two criteria: 
(1) A change has occurred of the type, and/or an increase in the 
intensity, of disruptive (hostile verbal or physical) interactions 
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between two or more states, with a heightened probability of 
military hostilities, (2) These changes, in turn, destabilize the 
states’ relationship and challenge the structure of the 
international system.252  
It is clearly safe to assume that the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute did not affect “the 
structure of the international system”. However, the structure of the regional system 
might very well have been in play, so this then introduces the fourth element of the 
framework of analysis –– the potential for the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute to involve 
regional actors other than the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  
4.3 Methods for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
4.3.1 Negotiation Approach  
Methods for peaceful settlement fall into two sections. First are the diplomatic means, 
consisting of negotiation, mediation, conciliation and inquiry; secondly are the legal 
means, including arbitration and adjudication. In this thesis the case study concentrates 
on the diplomatic means of negotiation and mediation. According to Baguley, 
negotiation is a “process by which people identify mutually acceptable decisions and 
agree outcomes that define the nature of future interactions.”253 Alternatively, Pruitt and 
Carnavale offer an alternative to the effect that negotiation “can be defined as a 
discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving incompatible goals.”254 
Rabie states that “Negotiation is a peaceful political process to end conflict.”255 
The definitions by Rabie and by Pruitt and Carnavale confirm that the aim of 
negotiation is to bring about a settlement and, by so doing, to end the dispute, while 
Rabie’s definition of negotiation as a political process is consistent with developments 
in the later history of the territorial dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. 
Beginning in 1935, the British approached the dispute on the basis of political terms 
constructed on bilateral negotiations with Saudi Arabia, until the dispute took a different 
form. Then, it was seen as preferable to settle matters on the basis of legalistic terms, a 
trend the persisted until the British unilaterally declared Saudi Arabia’s frontier lines in 
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1955.  By the 1970s, it was widely understood that resolution of the dispute would, if 
possible, entail a political rather than a legalistic process (because the legalistic process 
through international arbitration had failed to find a settlement to the disputed areas in 
1954).  As the fifth element of the analytical framework, this chapter defines negotiation 
as a peaceful political process aimed at a mutual resolution of a conflict involving two 
or more parties. 
Ramundo claims that “the main purposes of effective negotiation are consensus-
oriented: to conclude a transaction; settle a controversy; or reach agreement on an 
individual, organizational, or international position, policy, scheme, or regime.”256  
Pruitt and Carnevale find that negotiation leads to one of four outcomes –– victory, 
compromise, a win-win agreement, or failure to reach agreement (in which case 
negotiators may chose the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” or BATNA).257 
Thus, for example, Britain’s decision in 1955 unilaterally to declare Saudi Arabia’s 
frontier lines might be seen as a BATNA. Significantly, Rangarajan claims that 
negotiations leave all parties with “a residue of dissatisfaction, even it the solution 
arrived at was the best possible under the circumstances.”258 This comment would seem 
to be applicable to the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah, since, as previously noted, 
“residual dissatisfaction” with the Treaty grew in the UAE in the years after 1974. In 
addition, as discussed in Chapter 7, not only was the UAE dissatisfied with some of the 
Treaty Articles, but Saudi Arabia also was dissatisfied with the alleged failure of the 
UAE to act after 1974 on the Treaty’s requirement to delimit the maritime boundary. 
Despite a pronounced tendency in the negotiation literature to emphasize a two-person, 
two-sided model of negotiation, Fisher and Ury warn that “in almost every negotiation 
each side will have many interests, not just one.”259  For example, each side is likely to 
represent a diverse constituency with multiple interests, such as a division in the 
negotiators’ camps between “hawks” and “doves”, a factor that frequently characterises 
international negotiations. This brings it in as the sixth element of the framework. In the 
case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute, the chapter assumes the presence of divergent 
interests within each country’s royal family, Saudi Arabia and among the member states 
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of the UAE, and in the oil companies (Aramco in the case of Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi Petroleum Company in the case of Abu Dhabi); this then suggests the further 
possibility of the divergent interests of the United States and Great Britain. 
Most negotiations involve both substantive goals and relational goals, or what Adair and 
Brett call “both a task focus and a relationship focus.”260 Alternatively, this can be 
expressed as negotiation being a “mixed-motive” endeavour that involves both 
competition and cooperation. According to Dean G. Pruitt and Peter J. Carnevale, the 
mixed-motive nature of negotiation “creates a dilemma for negotiators [because the] 
competitive motive encourages them to be contentious and try to push the other party 
while defending themselves. But the cooperative motive encourages them to make 
concessions and engage in problem solving.”261 This chapter introduces the seventh 
element of the analytical framework, which is the assumption that the UAE-Saudi 
territorial dispute would produce a mixed-motive negotiation (for example, competition 
with respect to sovereignty over disputed areas), and cooperation with regard to being 
neighbouring Arab countries.  
4.3.2 General Negotiation Strategies 
In discussing negotiation strategies, it is important to distinguish between strategy and 
tactics. Strategy is concerned with large-scale issues and final outcomes. Tactics are 
concerned with small-scale and short-term issues.262 According to Raymond Saner,  
Strategy is the overall guideline, indicating the direction we 
need to take from our wishes and needs to our objectives. If, 
given a set of specific interests and objectives, we choose the 
wrong strategy, we will be setting a wrong course from the very 
start…Tactics, on the other hand, always follow after strategy, 
fleshing it out with a concrete line of action. If strategy is the 
thought, then tactics are its formulation.263 
Negotiation tactics are discussed below in greater detail (section 4.3.3). Here the focus 
is on negotiation strategies. Rabie identifies four strategic approaches: 
• Control: one party uses power to dominate another. 
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• Step-by-step: partial solutions are incrementally applied in “practical and 
realistic arrangements to contain conflict and eliminate some of its most 
apparent symptoms and emotional causes.264 
• Comprehensive: this is a distributive strategy in which parties seek 
compromise so that inquires one party to accept less than had expected and 
allow another party to get more than it had desired. 
• Integrative: offers solutions that meet the needs of all disputants without 
sacrificing their basic demands, and involves building cooperative 
relationships.  
Meanwhile Saner lists five general types of negotiating strategies:  
1)  Competition: one party pushes hard in order to gain what he wants effectively 
but not in cooperative way.   
2) Collaboration: an integrative strategy that seeks a solution which will satisfy 
both parties.  
3) Compromise: aimed at achieving a solution that is partially satisfactory to each 
of the parties. 
4) Avoidance: the negotiator withdraws from the conflict and forgoes an agreement   
5) Accommodation: the negotiator attempts to satisfy his opponent by sacrificing 
his own interests. 265 
This chapter suggests that Saner’s accommodation strategy, in which one side abandons 
its interests and gives its opponents everything they want, is really a version of Rabie’s 
control strategy; except that, whereas Rabie’s control strategy is presented from the 
winner’s perspective, Saner’s accommodation strategy is presented from the loser’s 
perspective. If one accepts this study’s definition of negotiation as a peaceful political 
process aimed at a mutual resolution of a conflict involving two or more parties, then 
the control and accommodation strategies cannot truly be said to be negotiation 
strategies.  For example, Britain’s unilateral declaration of Saudi Arabia’s frontier lines 
in 1955 might be representative of Rabie’s control strategy; however the Saudis 
certainly did not consider it to be a legitimate result of negotiation. 
However, Rabie’s comprehensive strategy seems compatible with Saner’s competition 
strategy, especially as Rabie also uses the term “distributive” in describing the 
comprehensive strategy. In the literature, competitive strategies (in which opposing 
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parties compete for resources) are also most frequently described as “distributive.” At 
the same time, in the context of mixed-motive negotiations, Rabie’s comprehensive 
strategy is compatible with Saner’s compromise strategy, in which negotiations, to some 
extent, cooperate by trading gains and losses in the interests of reaching an agreement to 
resolve the conflict.  
Rabie’s integrative strategy is effectively the same as Saner’s collaboration strategy in 
which negotiators cooperate to solve problems and create solutions that are adequate for 
meeting the goals of all parties. The strategies suggested by Rabie and Saner will be 
applied to the analysis of the UAE-Saudi negotiations from 1970 to 1974. The eighth 
element of the analytical framework is the assumption that the negotiation strategies of 
interest in the context of resolving conflict are either distributive (both competition and 
compromise) or integrative. But accommodation and control cannot truly be said to aim 
at mutual agreement to resolve conflict. 
In negotiation literature, distributive strategy (also called competitive, zero sum, or win-
lose) is most often defined through contrasting it with integrative strategy (also called 
cooperative, collaborative, or win-win). For example, whereas distributive strategy 
emphasises competition for resources, integrative strategy emphasises solving 
problems, in “an effort to find a mutually acceptable agreement –– a win-win 
solution.”266 
4.3.3 General Negotiation Tactics 
There seems to be a widespread belief in the literature in general that distributive and 
integrative negotiation strategies are strictly associated with different types of tactics –– 
respectively contention and problem solving. For example, according to Pruitt and 
Carnevale: 
Contending is any effort to persuade the other party to concede. 
It involves –– among other tactics –– threats, harassment, 
positional commitments, and persuasive arguments that buttress 
negotiator positions. Problem solving is any effort to find a win-
win solution. To understand problem solving, we must grasp the 
three ways in which win-win solutions are constructed: 
expanding the pie, exchanging concessions on different issues, 
and solving underlying concerns.267 
                                                
266 Pruitt and Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict,  p. 36. 
267 Ibid.,  p. 47. 
85 
 
Negotiators use contentious tactics in an effort to gain their demands at the expense of 
the other negotiator: “what’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is mine.”268 Associating 
the contentious tactic of using ultimatums seems straightforward enough when 
compared with threats. According to Churchman: 
Threats or ultimatums suggest undesirable consequences or 
penalties if a proposal is not accepted. The ultimatum is the 
stronger form. Traditionally, it specifies what the recipient must 
do, a deadline, and specific consequences for failure to comply. 
An ultimatum without a time limit permits the maker to back off 
without loss of face, while preparing to carry it out keeps 
pressure on opponents. A threat is vaguer than an ultimatum 
about what the recipient must do, when, or what the 
consequences will be.269 
Harassment involves actions designed to annoy the other negotiating party in order to 
gain compliance with demands.270 Positional commitments are statements of a 
determination to hold firm to a particular offer –– i.e., to make no further concessions–– 
and are often combined with a threat to break off negotiation if the other party does not 
accept a specific offer.271 Positional commitment includes refusal to negotiate, extreme 
demands, escalating demands, bluffing, and a ‘take it or leave it’ approach to the other 
party.272 Contentious tactics also include “dirty tricks”, such as deliberate deception and 
psychological warfare. Deliberate deception includes the use of phony facts for 
conducting the negotiation and misrepresentation of intentions. Psychological warfare 
includes stressful situations, personal attacks and threats.273 
With respect to emotional clashes, both real and pretended anger is sometimes an issue, 
and can signal unwillingness to make further concessions.274 Another tactic is time 
pressure, announced by one of the negotiating parties or introduced through third-party 
intervention, which significantly affects demands and concessions. Time pressure may 
produce an uncertain set of agendas, faster concessions, and faster agreement.275 For 
example, the announcement in 1968 of the British withdrawal in late 1971 could be 
expected to place pressure on both the UAE and Saudi Arabia to speed up the pace of 
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negotiations to find a solution before Britain’s departure. On the other hand, problem 
solving involves a joint effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. It can involve 
exchanges of concessions on different issues, emphasis on underlying concerns, and 
expanding the pie by using yield tactics, so that the parties can construct a win-win 
agreement.276 
The literature on negotiation is somewhat more helpful when dealing with negotiation 
strategy in a mixed-motive way, i.e., a negotiation that contains both cooperative and 
competitive components. For example, according to Pruitt and Carnevale, “A tit-for-tat 
tactic is often quite effective in mixed-motive settings. This involves matching both 
cooperation and non-cooperation from the other party.”277 Retaliation against 
competitive behaviour and reward for cooperative behaviour is supposed to steer the 
opponent towards consistent cooperative behaviour and thus to an integrative solution 
approach. Unfortunately, the success of a tit-for-tat tactic depends on a negotiator 
having enough power to retaliate when the other side refuses to cooperate. For example, 
Saudi Arabia would have sufficient power to use a tit-for-tat tactic, but it is less clear 
whether the Emirate of Abu Dhabi could retaliate effectively against Saudi Arabia. 
In discussing different types of tactics –– contention and problem solving, this study 
aims to show that during the two phases of the UAE-Saudi negotiation process (1970-
71: up to the British withdrawal; and 2 December 1971-autumn 1974), the Saudis would 
use contentious tactics in order to move the UAE towards make a deal on Saudi terms. 
On the other hand, this study aims to show that Abu Dhabi was prepared to yield, in 
order to move Saudi Arabia towards mutual concessions. 
4.3.4 Arab Cultural Aspects of Negotiation 
Arab scholars have argued that the outcome of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of 
Jeddah was an example of Arab negotiating style and that the withdrawal of British 
officials facilitated a final solution. This section focuses on an Arab negotiating style. 
As Scott points out: “people from different countries have different values, different 
attitudes, and different experience. They have different strengths from one another and 
different weaknesses.”278 In this context, culture affects negotiation in various 
significant ways.  For instance, people from different cultures interpret negotiation 
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concepts such as concession, compromise, and mediation differently, and such 
disparities in interpretation can have a negative impact on the negotiation process and 
make resolving a conflict difficult or even impossible.279  
In Middle Eastern cultures specifically, the term ‘concession’ means “more an 
abandonment of principles and less an acknowledgment of reality that includes 
recognition of the legitimate claims of the adversary.”280 Unless understood in the 
context of mutual concessions, ‘concession’ (tanazol in Arabic) implies defeat, 
humiliation, and abandoning one’s position.281 Thus, it might seem that merely 
mentioning concepts such as ‘concession’ to Arabs in a negotiation would threaten the 
negotiation process. To remove this negative connotation, one has to use the term, 
‘mutual concession’ (musawama in Arabic) which implies the process of reaching a 
mutual solution or meeting halfway.282 However, these differences in interpretation of 
negotiation concepts do not mean that disputatious Arab parties never negotiate, make 
concessions, or compromise. 
There are other factors that distinguish Middle Eastern negotiation from Western 
negotiation. For example, in contrast to individuals from the United States or the United 
Kingdom, where communication is conducted primarily in writing, Arabs (especially 
the Bedouin) tend to communicate verbally.283 However, Arab emphasis on verbal 
communication does not mean that written documents are unimportant. In terms of Arab 
negotiating style, this study assumes verbal communication occurred in the last phase of 
the negotiation process during the 1974 but was not reflected in the Articles of the 
Treaty of Jeddah’s Aricles. 
4.4 Third-Party Intervention 
Third-party intervention represents another negotiation strategy but is treated separately 
here because of the volume of literature devoted to it, in particular to mediation. When 
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the disputants become deadlocked, a third party enters the negotiation process as a 
mediator between the disputed parties. According to Pruitt and Carnevale,  
in mediation, the negotiation continues but is helped along by 
the third party. Mediation can be distinguished from arbitration, 
where the third party makes a binding decision about the issues 
in dispute. Mediation preserves the voluntary, joint-decision 
features of negotiation –– the disputants retain the right to 
accept or reject any suggestion made by the mediator.284 
Another third-party intervention is conciliation, usually an informal procedure in which 
the disputants speak for themselves. Mediation, however, has advantages over both 
arbitration and conciliation. It is less time-consuming than arbitration, and in addition, 
according to Rangajarn, “unlike a conciliator, a mediator need not do all his work with 
both parties present; he can act as a communicator, meet the disputants individually and 
put forward different proposals.”285 
4.4.1 Mediation 
Parties choose mediation in negotiation for a number of reasons. Their negotiating 
positions may be hardened and irreconcilable. The parties may feel they lack the 
negotiating skills to resolve the conflict successfully. Alternatively, they may believe 
that mutual cooperation is necessary to achieve their respective goals.286 A party may 
seek mediation to end a conflict. A mediator is also sought in the hope the mediator will 
serve as the guarantor of an agreement that is reached through negotiation.287 
In addition, Ramundo argues that  
mediation can be useful to bridge a personality or emotional 
clash between the sides or their negotiators. It can also be 
helpful when there is a disparity of power between the sides; 
that is, it can be used by the weaker side to protect its position 
against the stronger side. The stronger side may be willing to 
accept the mediator’s participation because it will have a basis 
(and a witness) for claiming that there was no duress in reaching 
consensus.288  
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With respect to Ramundo’s comments on the effect of unequal power on willingness to 
accept mediation, this chapter argues that the UAE might seek mediation to offset Saudi 
Arabia’s superior power, and that Saudi Arabia might accept mediation as a way to give 
legitimacy to an agreement that results from negotiation. 
A mediator’s role may be passive or active.289 Passive mediation involves the mediator 
serving as a communication channel between or among the parties to a negotiation. The 
mediator as facilitator makes no real contribution to the negotiation process. However, 
the active mediator goes beyond the monitoring role and becomes involved in the 
negotiation process. Active mediation includes two main roles: formulation and 
manipulation. Formulation involves developing and proposing tentative solutions to the 
conflict, whereas manipulation involves both formulation and the application of 
resources to force parties towards an agreement.290 In addition to performing the roles 
of facilitator, formulator, and manipulator, mediators will occasionally “attempt to 
remedy power imbalances.”291 Given the imbalance of power between Saudi Arabia and 
Abu Dhabi, it would be reasonable to assume that Abu Dhabi and (after 1971) the UAE, 
would seek mediation to offset Saudi power, an assumption that is the tenth element of 
this analytical framework. The choice of mediator from 1970 to 1 December 1971 
would probably be Great Britain, a further assumption based on Abu Dhabi’s historical 
dependence on Britain. It also assumes that Arab mediators might play a role and be 
involved in the UAE-Saudi case after Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf. 
In the literature of negotiation that is discussed in depth, the idea of the “neutral 
mediator” suggests that the ideal negotiator should be perfectly impartial with respect to 
the disputants involved in a conflict. Researchers have challenged the assumption of 
impartiality. For example, Carnevale and Arad comment that “some conflicts, especially 
international ones, involve not only the partisans but others who are not directly 
involved but who have interests that derive from human welfare concerns or from 
strategic, political, and economic factors.”292 In a further elaboration of the argument 
against the ideal of impartiality, Princen writes that  
Differences in interests and capabilities distinguish two kinds of 
intermediaries. The principal [emphasis added] mediator has 
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interests in the disputed issues and can bring resources to bear; 
the neutral [emphasis added] has neither but can offer a low-risk 
environment. The distinction is important for dispute resolution, 
however, only insofar as it shows how the disputants and, in 
particular, their interaction, are affected by the intervention. 
Thus, it is the target of the intervention that is critical for 
understanding not only differences among intermediaries but 
how their interventions serve to overcome impediments to 
reaching agreement.293 
If Princen’s distinction between principal and neutral mediators is applied to the case of 
the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute, Great Britain, as a former disputant in the Anglo-
Saudi phases of the dispute during 1935-55 would, because of British oil companies’ 
interests and its treaty relationship with Abu Dhabi, be a principal mediator. If Saudi 
Arabia brought in the United States to perform mediation, the US would also be a 
principal mediator, due to its Aramco Company’s interests in Saudi Arabia. Both Great 
Britain and the United States would be principal mediators because of the direct 
involvement of British and American oil companies in the disputed territories, and 
would have resources to influence the outcome of the negotiations.  
By contrast, if the Arab League entered the negotiations hoping, for example, to 
promote Arab solidarity, it would be a neutral mediator with no interest in the dispute. 
As a neutral mediator, the Arab League would not be perceived as biasing the 
negotiation process in favour of either the UAE or Saudi Arabia. Based on Abu Dhabi’s 
historical dependence on Britain and British representation of Abu Dhabi during the 
Anglo-Saudi phases of the dispute from 1935 to1955, it assumes that the British would 
play a role of “principal mediator” to the case study of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border 
dispute. 
Princen also comments that it is extremely important to understand that “all third-party 
interveners –– disputants, principal mediators, neutral mediators –– are self-interested. 
They may seek concrete gains for themselves or simply the satisfaction of settling a 
dispute, but they have interests. Most importantly, the specific nature of those interests 
will determine the kind of intervention and its effectiveness.”294 Thus, if Great Britain 
were to intervene in UAE-Saudi territorial negotiations, Britain would be a principal 
mediator with direct interests in the outcome of the negotiations, because British oil 
companies, primarily the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company, were involved in the 
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disputed areas. It would be reasonable to assume that Britain would play the principal 
mediator to the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute.  
Menawhile, Rangarajan states that: “in any bargaining situation with more than two 
[negotiators], there is a phase of coalition-formation.”295 It seems reasonable to suggest 
that Great Britain, as a principal mediator, could (due to its interests) also be drawn into 
a coalition.  Pruitt and Rubin propose a situation in which 
there is a bond between parties A and X and antagonism 
between parties B and X. In this case, we can predict the 
development of antagonism and consequential escalation in the 
A-B relationship. This is partly because A and B perceive 
dissimilarity in their attitudes toward X. It is also partly because 
X will often try to recruit A into the campaign against B. In 
other words, A’s bonds with X are likely to draw A into a 
coalition against B.296 
In the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute, let us suppose that X is Abu Dhabi, A 
is Great Britain, and B is Saudi Arabia. Whereas Abu Dhabi and Britain had a 
longstanding positive relationship, historically Great Britain and Saudi Arabia had been 
opponents. The model proposed by Pruitt and Rubin suggests why Saudi Arabia would 
have good reason to resist mediation by Great Britain. 
4.5 Factors Affect the UAE-Saudi Negotiation Process (1970-74) 
4.5.1 Power 
Scott argues that “Power is not usually a desirable quality for a negotiator to 
establish…Normally, if his case is naturally strong, he does not need power.”297 
However, it could be argued that if a negotiator’s case is naturally weak, he will use 
power if he has it. Thus, during the first and second phases of the Anglo-Saudi 
territorial negotiations, Britain, on Abu Dhabi’s behalf, certainly used its power to deny 
Saudi Arabia’s territorial claims from 1935 to 1955.  During the second phase of the 
Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations from 1949 to 1955, Saudi Arabia resorted to 
violence outside the negotiation process (the Buraimi crisis in 1952). As this chapter 
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claims, Shaikh Zayid had reason to seek some method for offsetting Saudi power before 
actual negotiation with Saudi Arabia. 
As the previous discussion has suggested, power –– that of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, 
Great Britain, and the United States –– is an important concept when considering the 
UAE-Saudi territorial dispute. But what exactly is power? Pruitt and Carnevale describe 
power as a party’s use of resources. Power can be relative or absolute. Relative power 
simply reflects the fact that one party is more powerful in negotiations than the others. 
Of course, the more powerful negotiator is expected to gain more from his opponent, 
and in return the less powerful negotiator will fight for equal treatment. However, 
absolute power refers to the control that parties exercise over each other.298 
However, Habeeb objects to ideas such as relative and absolute power. In his view, 
Power is the result of having resources. But resources alone do 
not cause outcomes, they are merely used to create them. Power, 
thus, lies between its source (resources) and its result 
(outcomes) [so] power is the way in which actor A uses its 
resources in a process with actor B so as to bring about changes 
that cause preferred outcomes in its relationship with actor B.299  
By this definition, power is both a causal and an intentional force by which more 
powerful actors achieve desired outcomes. My analysis of the UAE-Saudi territorial 
negotiations after 1971 reflects this definition of national power. Since the UAE-Saudi 
Arabia border dispute were not settled during the British presence, it assumes that Saudi 
Arabia would use its power to create preferred outcomes. 
4.5.2 Communication 
There is also the matter of how communication is transmitted during the negotiation 
process. In the preparatory stages of the negotiation, this is conventionally managed 
through diplomatic means. According to Cohen “Diplomacy, the peaceful management 
of relations between states, would not be possible without the existence of an elaborate 
formal and informal code of communication and conduct.”300 Rabie notes that: “in 
managing international relations and conducting interstate negotiations, diplomatic 
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messages form the primary means of communication. Messages, written or oral, direct 
and indirect, are means to send information, convey new ideas, express changed 
attitudes, and suggest new ways of looking at shared concern.”301  
The use of back channels is also common in international negotiations. According to 
Churchman, “back channels are off-the-record, often secret, discussions outside the 
formal negotiating process.”302 The one who would benefit from the back channels is 
the third party if it plays a principal mediator role in the disputed case, or is engaged 
between the disputed parties, especially if the disputed parties depend on the third 
party’s communication to transfer the messages. 
It would be reasonable to assume that in addition to formal diplomatic communication, 
informal back channel communication probably occurred in the UAE-Saudi territorial 
negotiations.  This assumption is based on evidence provided in Chapter 3 that shows 
clearly how the British negotiated on Abu Dhabi’s behalf in the Anglo-Saudi 
negotiations phase from 1935-55 since, under the Exclusive Agreement, Abu Dhabi had 
no right to have bilateral/direct negotiations with Saudi Arabia without first consulting 
the British.303 It could be assumed that in the two final years before its military 
withdrawal, Britain would have communicated individually with both Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia. Individual communication can lead to back channel communication and 
could also be used to the advantage of a third party. Obviously, Britain, as a mediator, 
might have played a role in both formal and informal communications during the 1970s.  
It is important to point out that, although the literature of negotiation routinely 
emphasises the importance of effective communication, there are difficulties in 
achieving effective communication under a variety of circumstances. Communication 
may fail because of a lack of clear objectives; faulty transmission of information; 
perceptions and attitudes of the recipients of communication; or environmental factors 
that disrupt or distort information.304 In analysing the UAE-Saudi negotiation process, 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine both the formal and informal communication roles that might 
be played by a mediator. 
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4.5.3 Past History  
It is important to point out that a new negotiation is affected by Rangarajan’s notion of 
“past history” and some residual dissatisfaction. In each phase, in fact, “there is a past 
history which affects perceptions and judgment of the negotiations.”305 Events in 1955, 
including the expulsion of the Saudis from Hamasa and the unilateral declaration by the 
British of the frontier lines that were duly imposed on Saudi Arabia, remained present in 
Saudi memory throughout the negotiation process in the 1970s as examples of how 
Saudi Arabia had been unfairly treated by the British. It is important to recall that 
“dissatisfaction persists in the memory and affects future courses of action.”306  
Past history affects many aspects of negotiation, especially credibility and trust. What is 
trust? According to Pruitt and Carnevale it is “the expectation that the other party will 
cooperate in the future.”307 Without trust “every action by a negotiant is viewed with 
deep suspicion and a search for malign motives.”308 Thus, perceptions and judgments 
are affected by the total memory composed of the immediate past experience of 
negotiation and accumulated past history related to a dispute. Rangarajan argues that 
negotiation does not occur in a vacuum with respect to time and memory, and that past 
history affects what happens at each stage of negotiation.309  
Furthermore, memory of past experiences is cumulative before negotiation begins. This 
brings it to the eleventh element of the framework; the assumption is that memories of 
the earlier Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations from 1935 to 1955 would affect the 
negotiation process between the UAE and Saudi Arabia between 1970 and 1974. On the 
Saudi side, it would be reasonable to expect resentment of the British role, especially 
due to Britain’s unilateral declaration of Saudi Arabia’s frontiers. On the UAE side, it 
would be equally reasonable to expect trust of the British, especially since Britain had 
historically supported Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In closing this chapter it is useful to summarize the eleven elements of the analytical 
framework that will be used by me in subsequent chapters, along with additional key 
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assumptions in order to analyse the topic in depth.  First, it was necessary to reformulate 
Rangarajan’s sequence of elements leading to conflict:  
Dissatisfaction=>Frustration=>Desperation=>Conflict (or dispute) 
Dependence=>Vulnerability=>Fear=>Conflict (or dispute) 
It was argued that the first sequence could be applied to Saudi Arabia and the second to 
Abu Dhabi.  
Secondly this analysis assumes that the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute were both 
interest-related and value-related, yet capable of resolution through negotiation. Third, 
the analysis accepts that conflict behaviour can be direct or indirect. In the specific case 
considered, my expectation was to see indirect conflict behaviour aimed at third parties, 
in particular by the UAE at Britain and by Saudi Arabia at the US.  
Fourth, the dispute could potentially involve other countries, who had interests in the 
dispute, and the analysis assumed that the British, the UAE and/or Saudi Arabia would 
want to resolve rather than manage the dispute. Fifth, this study defines negotiation as a 
peaceful process aimed at a mutual resolution of a conflict involving two or more 
parties. Sixth, the analytical framework adopted here states that the memories of the 
earlier Anglo-Saudi territorial dispute from 1935 to 1955 had an impact on the 
negotiation process between the UAE and Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 1974. 
Specifically, Saudi Arabia would have resented the historical role played by Great 
Britain, while the UAE would trust Britain because of the role played by the British in 
supporting Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims from 1935 to 1955. 
Seventh, this study assumes that the UAE and Saudi Arabia would enter into a mixed-
motive strategy, with competition with regard to territory and sovereignty, and 
cooperation by the fact of being neighbouring Arab countries. In particular, the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia would adopt either an integrative negotiation strategy or a distributive 
negotiation strategy associated with different types of tactics –– contention and problem 
solving.  Eighth, the chapter assumes that Great Britain would play the principal 
mediator role in the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute. Ninth, in case the UAE-
Saudi Arabia border dispute did not settle during the British presence, Saudi Arabia 
would use its power to create preferred outcomes 
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Tenth, this study assumes the existence of divergent interests within each country’s 
royal family (Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia) and the oil companies, which further 
suggests the possibility of divergent interests of the United States and Great Britain in 
respect of the disputed areas. Finally, I assume that the UAE would attempt to counter 
Saudi Arabia’s greater power by including a mediator in the negotiation. The UAE’s 
first choice would probably be Great Britain because of the latter’s position as protector 
in the protector-protégé relationship with the Emirates.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Anglo-Saudi Negotiations (1970-71)  
and the End of Britain’s Dominance in the Gulf 
 
5.1 Introduction 
On 4 May 1970 King Faisal offered to solve the issue of the disputed areas with Abu 
Dhabi by proposing a referendum on Al-Ain/Buraimi region in exchange for having 
sovereignty in South Liwa and Khor-al Udaid.310 In the negotiations concerning 
territorial dispute between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, this was a crucial date, since the 
King’s offer would remain Saudi Arabia’s firm negotiating position until the signing of 
the Saudi-UAE Treaty of Jeddah on 21 August 1974. 
This chapter examines Shaikh Zayid’s resistance to the Saudi proposal, and the role 
played by Britain in the two years leading up to its military withdrawal from the Gulf in 
1971. At a meeting with British officials at Al-Ain in April 1971, Treadwell, the 
Political Resident of Abu Dhabi reported that “[Shaikh Zayid Al-Nahayan ruler of Abu 
Dhabi], said and repeated several times that the people of Abu Dhabi now and history 
itself would blame him if he gave away too much [of Abu Dhabi’s territories].”311 By 
the time of this comment, the British had spent almost two years trying to convince 
Shaikh Zayid to accept Saudi Arabia’s territorial demands before their withdrawal from 
the Arabian Gulf. 
However, despite Saudi pressure and British persuasion, Shaikh Zayid resisted, and 
when Britain did finally withdraw on 1 December 1971, the dispute between Abu Dhabi 
and Saudi Arabia remained unsettled. Shortly before the end of the British military 
presence in the Gulf, the British Political Resident in the Gulf wrote that they had done 
their best “to persuade [Shaikh Zayid] that in the interest of reaching a settlement he 
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should come further towards meeting [King] Faisal’s proposal and we are disappointed 
that we have not succeeded.”312 
The chapter demonstrates how both Shaikh Zayid and the British responded to King 
Faisal’s proposal of May 1970. While King Faisal’s offer to drop Buraimi was seen by 
the Saudi side as representing a significant concession and could be perceived as such 
by British officials, Shaikh Zayid did not consider it a substantial offer at all.  It also 
discusses some factors involved within the context of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border 
dispute that complicated the boundary question, and negotiations to take matters 
forward, such as the question of UAE federation and the rise of the Twin Pillar policy in 
the late 1970s. It analyses in detail the negotiating strategies and tactics of both Saudi 
Arabia and Abu Dhabi and the position of their respective constituents towards the 
disputed areas.  
Britain’s failure to settle the border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia 
during its last two years in the Gulf is also examined, focusing on its “honest broker” 
role and simultaneously its role as Abu Dhabi’s protector. It is argued that British 
involvement in the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute changed dramatically during 1970-
71, and in explaining this shift, this two-year period illustrates aspects of the ending of 
Britain’s dominant role in the Gulf. In practice the role of honest broker was an unlikely 
one for Britain to play, because the British had direct and substantial interests in the 
disputed areas, namely the Zararah oilfield in Liwa oasis. Their passive role reflects an 
intention to avoid their obligations to Abu Dhabi under the Exclusive Agreement of 
1892, which would remain in effect until 30 November 1971.  
It can be argued that right up to the time of their departure, the British role towards both 
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi was definitely passive,313 due to the fact that the British 
were careful to avoid positioning themselves towards either of the disputing parties in 
case their relations with either the Saudis or the Emiratis were damaged. When the 
British withdrew officially the disputed areas remained unsettled because the gap 
between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia remained as wide as ever.  
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5.2 Britain’s Mediation 
The Foreign Office attempted to persuade Shaikh Zayid that, since Abu Dhabi was soon 
to become an independent state and because he was unlikely to get a more favourable 
deal after British withdrawal from the Gulf, the disputed areas should be settled while 
Britain was still present in the region. To that end, Britain’s appropriate course of action 
in the future would be consistent with its chosen role as an “honest broker”314  in dealing 
with Abu Dhabi-Saudi dispute. 
In the official British archives it is not uncommon to find references to the British role 
as an “honest broker” in the first and second phases of the Anglo-Saudi territorial 
negotiations from 1935 to 1955, and the self-description persisted until Britain 
withdrew from the Gulf in December 1971. A Foreign Office official speculated that, in 
response to British oil company activity in the disputed Zararah/Shaybah region, Saudi 
Arabia would be “likely as a result of these drillings, [to] call off the current attempts, in 
which we are acting as ‘honest broker’ between the two sides, to negotiate a frontier 
settlement.”315  
The “honest broker” role suggests that there were at least some British officials who 
saw Britain as a neutral mediator in dealing with Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute. 
However, this study reveals that the honest broker role was declared as a way of 
protecting the company’s interests in the disputed areas: “we have an interest in seeing 
that profitability of this British company [ADPC] is not adversely affected by political 
difficulties over the boundary.”316  
Following Saudi Arabia’s settlement offer on 4 May 1970, British officials discussed 
Britain’s role as mediator in the territorial dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia. For example, in June 1970 Sir Stewart Crawford, the Political Resident in 
Bahrain, argued:  
We ought not to be involved in details of possible territorial 
concessions, but I doubt where we can stay out of this 
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subject…it is true that the more involved we are the more we 
may be criticized for our role in the conclusion of any 
compromise settlement which [Zayid] may later regret, but I 
doubt whether this could be as damaging for British interests as 
a dispute between two Arab states.317  
In the context of the British role as “honest broker”, if Thomas Princen’s typology of 
the mediation role318 is applied in the British case, it could be said that Britain acted as a 
“principal mediator” in the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute because of its direct 
interests and involvement in the disputed areas –– such as the Abu Dhabi Petroleum 
Company in Zararah. 
Some British officials could not agree about their support for the “honest broker” role. 
For example, Sir Francis Vallat, a former Foreign Office legal adviser, stated: “to some 
extent HMG was in an ambiguous position in that it was on the one hand responsible for 
the conduct of [Shaikh Zayid’s] foreign affairs and on the other was seeking to act as a 
mediator between the Ruler [Shaikh Zayid] and King Faisal.”319  And in June 1970, the 
British Ambassador in Jeddah wrote an assessment of Britain’s historical role in the 
Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute: “we are basing ourselves only on our own view of the 
legal justification for our action in 1955, which has never been accepted by the 
Saudis.”320  
As noted in Chapter 4, past history and memory played a role that impacted on the 
development of current negotiations. As for the Saudis, they might not have trusted an 
honest broker at this stage, due to past history related to the Anglo-Saudi negotiations 
that had led British unilaterally to enforce the Saudi frontier in 1955. Notwithstanding 
Saudi expectations of an honest broker, there were in practice two reasons why it would 
have been difficult for the British to apply an “honest broker” approach. First, a British 
oil company was drilling in the area affected by King Faisal’s proposal, and secondly, 
the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 remained in effect and the British still had an 
obligation to protect Abu Dhabi’s interests.  
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An important question is what support Shaikh Zayid expected to receive from the 
British role in 1970 and 1971?  According to a UAE diplomat, Shaikh Zayid had not 
expected that the issue of the disputed areas would remain unresolved by the time 
Britain withdrew from the Gulf in late 1971.321 As Crawford wrote to the FCO in May 
1970, Shaikh Zayid was certain that “no solution could come to this problem simply 
from Abu Dhabi/Saudi negotiations and that HMG would in fact have to play a big 
role”322 in settling the dispute. 
5.3 King Faisal's Proposal and Shaikh Zayid’s Reaction 
When it occurred to Shaikh Zayid that Britain was not prepared to take an active part in 
finding a settlement for the disputed areas, he tried to arrange for regional mediators,323 
and during the negotiation process from 1970 to 1971 attempted to enlist various states 
to intervene, especially after it was conceded that the British mediation was not 
effective. As his scheduled meeting with King Faisal on 6 May 1970 approached, 
Shaikh Zayid, without consulting the British, tried to recruit Kuwaiti officials as 
mediators to smooth things over with King Faisal. However, his first attempt was not 
successful. When Kuwaiti officials told King Faisal that Shaikh Zayid would use the 
meeting to discuss the disputed areas, King Faisal indicated that he was prepared to 
listen to Shaikh Zayid’s views on his proposal.324  However, before Shaikh Zayid 
travelled to Jeddah, the British learnt about the Kuwaiti mediator through the British 
Ambassador in Kuwait, and Shaikh Zayid was told not to discuss the dispute but instead 
to use the meeting to talk about the proposed federation of nine emirates.325 As a result, 
when Shaikh Zayid met King Faisal on 6 May 1970 and acted as the British had advised 
him, the talks promptly broke down, because King Faisal said that he would not support 
any federation without first settling the disputed areas.326  
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Unfortunately, the conversation between King Faisal and Shaikh Zayid at the meeting 
on 6 May 1970 is redacted from the FCO document cited in the Arabian Boundaries 
documents.  However, King Faisal’s brother, Prince Fahd Al Saud, confirmed King 
Faisal proposals when he stated that: “the boundary problem can be compromised by a 
package that I would regard as saleable on our side; abandonment (with suitable face-
saving) of territorial claims on the whole Buraimi oasis in return for concessions on the 
western and southern boundary [of Abu Dhabi] which could take account of established 
oil company interests.”327 Basically this represented King Faisal’s proposal of 1970. At 
the meeting, King Faisal also demanded that drilling by ADPC should be suspended 
until a settlement for the disputed areas had been found.  
In this context, when the outcome of the meeting did not meet King Faisal's 
expectations, Kamal Adham, Saudi consultant to King Faisal, declared that King Faisal, 
who was critical of Shaikh Zayid for not discussing the border dispute as the Kuwaitis 
had said he would, might resort to using force against Abu Dhabi.328  On 19 May the 
British Embassy in Kuwait reported that, according to the local Kuwaiti press: “Saudi 
Arabia is planning to take back the Buraimi oasis after British withdrawal in 1971.”329 
The report seemed credible to the Foreign Office because, after King Faisal and Shaikh 
Zayid had met, Ambassador Morris reported King Faisal’s comment that: “one way or 
another [the disputed areas] must be settled before the British left, and if not by 
negotiation then by other means.”330  
Shaikh Zayid was well aware of the much greater power of Saudi Arabia compared with 
Abu Dhabi, but was determined to resist Saudi territorial claims against Abu Dhabi.  A 
British telegram of 31 May 1970 recorded Shaikh Zayid’s view of King Faisal’s 
proposal in the Indian newspaper Blitz; Shaikh Zayid said: “we are weak and they are 
strong but if they push us this will create resistance.”331 
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Furthermore, when ADPC continued its drilling operations after Shaikh Zayid’s visit to 
Jeddah, King Faisal declared “if drilling was not stopped the Saudis might use force to 
remove the company’s equipment. The ruler [Shaikh Zayid] was given until the end of 
June to reply to these demands.”332 (See Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1. Location of Wells in Zararah Oilfield, South of Abu Dhabi 
 
Source: Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company map showing location of oil field at Zararah in relation 
to Saudi claims of 1970. FCO/8 1338, in Arabian Boundaries, vol.11, 1970. p. 498. 
Bahrain was the second mediator, but its role was not successful either. Shaikh Isa bin 
Khalifa, the Ruler of Bahrain, expressed his anxiety about the instability that the Abu 
Dhabi-Saudi territorial dispute could bring to the Gulf. He proposed to tell King Faisal 
that: “his attitude to Abu Dhabi could ruin the [Federation]”333  In May 1970, King 
Faisal informed a delegation of Bahraini officials who visited the King on behalf of 
Shaikh Zayid, that the British had agreed to a boundary that would make Khor al-Udaid 
Saudi territory. Responding to King Faisal’s claims that the British had acknowledged 
Saudi sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid, Ambassador Morris sent a telegram to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 12 June 1970: 
The basis for [the] Saudi claim to [Khor al-Udaid] seems to be 
our willingness in 1956 to include Saudi access to the sea at the 
khor in the agenda for Anglo-Saudi discussions, and our 
statement during the ribbing exercise that we neither affirmed 
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nor excluded the possibility of discussion of [Khor al-Udaid] at 
some stage.334  
British government officials strongly opposed the involvement of both Kuwait and 
Bahrain335 in the negotiation process between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.336 In fact, 
although the British had failed to advocate on Shaikh Zayid’s behalf under the 
Exclusive Agreement of 1892 against Saudi demands, they wanted to control the 
involvement of mediators, and interfered with Shaikh Zayid’s attempts to arrange for 
mediators under the Exclusive Agreement. In addition, on 19 June 1970, the Foreign 
Office sent a telegram to the Political Residency in Bahrain:  
We are glad that [the Political Agent in] Abu Dhabi has 
persuaded [Shaikh Zayid] not to approach the [US] state 
department at this stage. We must certainly consider carefully 
what role the Americans could play, but it should be for us on 
[Shaikh Zayid’s] behalf and not [Shaikh Zayid] himself to bring 
them in as regards enlisting the services of intermediaries from 
the Gulf area [...] we doubt whether such intermediaries could 
play a particularly significant role at present.337 
The British had informed the Americans that they should keep out of the boundary 
question since the British were having a hard time dealing with King Faisal.338  Here it 
is unclear why Shaikh Zayid would have considered asking the Americans to mediate in 
the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute. The FCO documents cited in Arabian Boundaries 
are not helpful in this regard, so one can only speculate based on the available evidence. 
Certainly the United States had direct interests in aiding Aramco and protecting 
American military contracts with Saudi Arabia, and as partners with Saudi Arabia, the 
Americans could push the Saudis to make a reasonable concession. 
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5.4 The British Reaction toward King Faisal's Proposal 
In response to King Faisal’s demands for ADPC drilling at Zararah to stop, the British 
took security measures in the Batin region, where the oil operations were located, to 
discourage any possible Saudi aggression south of Liwa.339 Shaikh Zayid also suggested 
relocating a squadron of the Abu Dhabi Defence Force from Al-Ain/Buraimi to the 
Umm al-Zamul area.340 In this context, the Saudi use of force might be not directed 
against all of Abu Dhabi’s territories, but against ADPCs drilling operations in the south 
of Abu Dhabi only. 
At the same time, British officials had drafted a suggested response for Shaikh Zayid to 
King Faisal’s demand, which stated the following: 
I believe that there must have been a misunderstanding between 
us about the outcome of our discussion in Riyadh. When we 
discussed drilling in the Batin, I had intended that my 
undertaking to your majesty should be confined to well one at 
Zararah only. In accordance with that undertaking, I gave 
instructions that drilling there should be halted…As your 
majesty will be aware, the oil company concerned is engaged in 
an extensive and important programme of exploration which it 
would be unreasonable to delay in view of the heavy 
expenditure which the company has already incurred. I have 
every hope that this programme will help in due course not only 
bring much needed development to the area but also to prom e 
stability there.341  
The draft reflects how British interests would be affected should ADPC have to suspend 
its activities and remove its equipment, which would cause considerable losses for the 
company. In fact, drilling was temporarily suspended on Zararah well no.1 but was 
shifted for drilling to continue on Zararah well no.3. When King Faisal learnt about the 
continuation of drilling, he demanded that it must stop in all the territory in question.342 
Despite King Faisal’s possible use of force to remove the company’s equipment,343 an 
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executive of the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company wrote to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office requesting the British government to take steps to ensure the 
continuation of the ADPC’s concession rights.344 
British officials also promoted the settlement of the dispute as being both financially 
important for British oil companies and socially important for the people living in the 
areas. Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Abu Dhabi Petroleum 
Company suggests that King Faisal’s demands that ADPC’s activities should be stopped 
meant that ADPC’s interests were at stake, as the following telegram suggests:  
As the Saudi government will be aware, the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company has for some time been engaged in a 
programme of exploration for oil resources, including drilling 
test wells, in what H.M Government and His Highness the ruler 
of [Abu Dhabi] regard as the southern part of Abu Dhabi 
territory. Some of these operations are in an area which his 
Majesty King Faisal has proposed should be regarded as Saudi 
territory in the proposals which he made to His Highness Shaikh 
[Zayid] on 4 May, 1970. Shortly after that date certain of the 
company’s operation were temporarily suspended while his 
Majesty’s proposals were being examined. However, the 
successful discovery and exploitation of the oil resources of the 
territory would contribute substantially to the development and 
welfare of the area as a whole. Any delay in operations to 
explore and exploit such resources not only involves the 
company in considerable financial loss but, more important, 
postpones the day when the people of the area can benefit from 
these resources.345  
This letter was written in July 1970, two months after King Faisal had demanded an end 
to ADPC drilling at the Zararah-Shaybah oilfield. It is interesting because it aligns 
British interests with the economic development of the area while attempting to limit 
ADPC’s potential financial losses. However, King Faisal continued to pressure Shaikh 
Zayid and the British, beginning with a demand that drilling should stop at Zararah 
no.1. Shaikh Zayid had agreed to King Faisal’s first demand at their previous meeting 
on 6 May 1970, but King Faisal later told the British that his demand had also included 
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Zararah wells nos. 2, 3 and 4.346  Drilling operations had been continuing sporadically 
since May 1970 at a time when King Faisal’s anger was escalating. The FCO reported 
that:  
King [Faisal] accused Shaikh [Zayid] of allowing the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company (ADPC) to drill in [Zararah] area just north 
of the modified Riyadh Line…which was regarded as Abu 
Dhabi territory but which, under the King’s proposals, would 
become part of Saudi Arabia. He asked Shaikh Zayid to order 
ADPC to suspend drilling forthwith and threatened to remove 
their rig by force if this was not done.347 
In light of this report, it is obvious that the major impediment to negotiations moving 
forward was that the Saudis and the British had different perspectives of the frontier 
lines on which their negotiations were based. The Saudis wanted drilling activities to be 
suspended in term of King Faisal’s 1970 proposal. However, the limit of the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company’s concessions was drilling within the modified Riyadh line, which 
the Saudis had never recognised in the first phase of the Anglo-Saudi negotiations from 
1935 to 1949. 
5.5 The Dammam Conference  
By the summer of 1970, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi had tentatively agreed to meet to 
look for a potential settlement at a conference in Dammam, an event suggested by the 
British that would be postponed several times before being abandoned altogether in 
September. The British helped Shaikh Zayid to prepare for the conference by, among 
other things furnishing Abu Dhabi with the services of Francis Vallat,348 since they 
were anxious to make the Saudis believe that Abu Dhabi was ready for “serious 
negotiations”.349 From the British perspective, preparation for serious negotiations 
meant that Shaikh Zayid had to commit himself to a final settlement of the territorial 
dispute under the conditions imposed by the Saudis. In July 1970 King Faisal wrote a 
letter addressed to Shaikh Zayid, a transcript of which was forwarded by the Political 
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Residency in Abu Dhabi to the Political Residency in Bahrain. In the letter, King Faisal 
said:  
Your Highness referred to the recent proposals which we put to 
your Highness on 4 May 1970 during your visit to the 
Kingdom…to remind you of what I stated clearly when I put 
forward the proposal during our meeting in Riyadh. Namely, 
that what I would be proposing would be finally to solve the 
problem of the border between our two countries, and that I was 
of the firm belief that it was a generous suggestion [Al-
Ain/Buraimi offer] which your Highness would agree upon 
without hesitation because it annexed to Abu Dhabi extensive 
territory which had been subject to dispute and debate for tens of 
years and guaranteed vital interests to Abu Dhabi…I took on my 
shoulders personally any repercussions which these proposals 
might cause within my Government intending to find a lasting 
solution to the problem between brothers in the Arabian Gulf.350  
Britain’s mediation role was remarkable in that the British not only communicated 
individually with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, but that they also had access to direct 
information between the parties to the dispute. In light of this transcript, reveals 
Britain’s role in mediating in the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute.  
In one sense, British officials could have discussed the letter with King Faisal before he 
forwarded it to Shaikh Zayid, but the role of manipulator, in which a third party uses its 
resources to force parties toward a settlement351 was not the one assumed by British 
officials. However, this incident does define Britain’s role in the mediation: rather than 
an overt attempt to manipulate the negotiation process, the British seem to have chosen 
simply to facilitate communications between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. By leaving 
King Faisal’s claims unchallenged, the British also let it seem as though Saudi Arabia’s 
Al-Ain/Buraimi offer was a substantial territorial concession and that Shaikh Zayid 
should move to resolve the dispute.  
Regarding the proposed meeting in Dammam, King Faisal expected that Shaikh Zayid 
would agree to his proposal without counter- or negotiable proposals. In August 1970, 
Ambassador Morris reported to the Foreign Office about a conversation he had held 
with King Faisal: 
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The king made it clear that his proposals to Shaikh [Zayid] of 
last May were as far as he could possibly go and in any case 
represented a very great concession on his part. If [Zayid] was 
not prepared to accept these proposals in principle there was no 
point in having any meeting at Dammam either on 6 September 
or any  her time; and in that case the king would withdraw his 
proposals and revert to the 1949 claim [Al-Ain/Buraimi, Liwa 
and Khor al-Udaid]. Both sides could then produce all the 
lawyers and historians they liked and of course no solution 
would be reached. This was not what he wanted nor he assumed 
did H.M.G.352  
The British had concluded that King Faisal would stand by his offer of 4 May 1970. 
According to the FCO, “[Shaikh] Zayid should be prepared to make further substantial 
concessions with a view to achieving by the end of the negotiations a final settlement 
involving for example a joint production zone in the disputed area in the south, plus 
some boundary adjustments in the west: possibly also giving the Saudis some access to 
the sea in the Khor al-Udaid area [emphasis added by the researcher].”353 As for the 
British, Shaikh Zayid would have to accept losing his territory in the South and West of 
Abu Dhabi. It was also very important that, if possible, Shaikh Zayid would commit 
himself to settling the disputed areas “before the British military withdrawal even if this 
meant sacrifices.”354 However, because of the divergent views between Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia, the meeting was not held.  
5.6 Britain’s Interests in the Disputed Areas   
In addition to protecting ADPC’s interests as mentioned earlier, a proposal by William 
Luce included the creation of blocked accounts. Profits from oil production would be 
put into these blocked accounts and none of the money would be paid out “until Saudi 
Arabia and Abu Dhabi agreed to reach an agreement. Even if the sovereignty of Zararah 
is transformed [to Saudi Arabia] at any time in the future would not be impacted on 
[company’s] right as a concessionaire.”355 King Faisal and Shaikh Zayid both rejected 
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Luce’s proposal, and not long afterwards, C. J. Treadwell, the Political Resident, 
informed the Foreign Office that: “[Shaikh Zayid] thought that our advice to him on 
settling [south of Liwa] was coloured by our wish to protect our own political as well as 
British commercial interests.”356 The Foreign Office acknowledged: “that [Luce’s] 
proposal would not be in the interest of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia even if they could 
be persuaded to accept it and that it might cast doubt in [Zayid’s] mind on HMG’s 
motives.”357  
It is very important to note that Saudi Arabia’s attempt to draw the British to its side by 
promising to protect the sovereignty rights of the ADPC’s concessions over the disputed 
areas would be transferred to Saudi Arabia. Documented evidence in Arabian 
Boundaries strongly suggests that the British worked hard to protect the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company and to satisfy the Saudis. According to a Foreign Office minute 
from October 1972, British officials secretly received assurances on at least three 
occasions that Saudi Arabia would honour the British oil company’s concessions in the 
disputed areas. The correspondence between the British and the Saudis was dated May 
1970, and Kamal Adham, King Faisal’s advisor, also gave these assurances in June and 
in August.  
For example, on 22 August 1970, King Faisal told Sir William Luce: “the rights of 
existing oil concessionaries onshore and offshore would be preserved in any territory 
ceded by Abu Dhabi to Saudi Arabia”, while Kamal Adham confirmed that British 
companies would keep the concession rights in their areas and would not be affected by 
any Abu Dhabi-Saudi Arabia border changes.358  In that context, the British were being 
prepared for a change in sovereignty over the disputed areas, namely Zararah. Of 
course, these assurances encouraged the British to persuade Shaikh Zayid to agree to 
King Faisal’s proposal. As discussed in Chapter 4, informal communication (back 
channel) is off-record, and frequently involves secret discussions outside the formal 
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negotiating process.359 The back channel was introduced to the case of the South of 
Liwa area (Zararah). 
5.7 The Abu Dhabi-Saudi Border Disputes in Context of the Federation 
Question  
The initial plan for a federation of nine Gulf States360 failed for a number of reasons, 
most notably the conflicting interests of the states themselves, along with Saudi 
Arabia’s refusal to take a position on supporting a federation of nine states until the 
disputed areas with Abu Dhabi had been resolved. Later, seven states would unify as the 
United Arab Emirates. In term of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute the British were 
concerned about the future of a federation of the emirates, and in April 1971, the 
Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, C. J. Treadwell, wrote to the Political Resident in 
Bahrain: 
There is a little hope for a union of nine. One unknown factor is 
the attitude of Saudi Arabia towards a federation of seven states 
including Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia’s claim against Abu Dhabi 
territory might cause [Saudi Arabia] to hesitate before agreeing 
to recognise any federation of seven.361 
Saudi Arabia’s linking of dispute resolution to recognition of the UAE placed Shaikh 
Zayid in an extremely stressful position. In July 1971, the British Embassy in Jeddah 
suggested to the Foreign Office that “if it becomes clear that King Faisal will continue 
to oppose a Union until the boundary question is solved, it might be possible to 
persuade [Shaikh Zayid] that it would be worth making further territorial 
concessions.”362 By linking its support for a federation to the resolution of the disputed 
areas, Saudi Arabia simply complicated the question of the boundary. Ali Ahmed, head 
of the Gulf Affairs Center in Washington DC, has commented that by linking the 
settlement of territorial dispute to diplomatic recognition of the future new federation, 
King Faisal wanted to weaken Abu Dhabi’s negotiating position by making the matter 
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into a heavy burden.363  In doing this, Saudi Arabia employed tactics of psychological 
warfare. According to Fisher and Ury, psychological warfare puts the threatened party 
under stress and thereby produces a subconscious desire to end the dispute by accepting 
the other party’s demands.364  
5.8 Abu Dhabi-Saudi Border Disputes in the Context of the US Twin Pillar 
Policy  
As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the future United Arab Emirates was 
obliged to establish good relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to ensure its own 
survival. In June 1970, the British Foreign Office declared: 
We fully recognise Saudi Arabia's interest in the political 
stability of the Gulf. We recognise that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
will be the natural guardians of that stability after our military 
withdrawal. Whatever success the Gulf Rulers may have in 
organising themselves, [they] cannot create a structure with 
much chance of surviving unless they get their relations with 
their two big neighbours right; and it is necessary that all three 
parties [the Emirate Rulers, the Saudis, and the Iranians] should 
agree among themselves. All this we say to the rulers, the Saudis 
and the Iranians, in the belief that this is also the best way of 
looking after our own considerable interests after 1971.365 
Saudi Arabia’s position was strengthened in terms of the American Twin Pillar policy, 
even though that policy remained problematic in terms of Abu Dhabi’s future relations 
with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi had an outstanding territorial dispute with 
the Saudis, and at the same time, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah had territorial disputes 
with the Iranians over three islands in the Strait of Hormuz.  Based on the analytical 
framework proposed in Chapter 4, it seemed likely in this regard that Abu Dhabi and 
Great Britain would form a coalition against Saudi Arabia during the negotiations. What 
actually happened was that Britain, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran formed a 
coalition that was not sensitive either to Abu Dhabi’s interests or to the future of the 
proposed federation. It was a coalition aimed at implementing America’s Twin Pillar 
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policy, which would depend on Saudi Arabia and Iran to provide Gulf security 
following Britain’s military withdrawal from the region.366 
In addition to Saudi and British pressure to accept King Faisal’s proposals, Shaikh 
Zayid also faced pressure from Iran. For example, Iran’s ambassador to Great Britain 
announced in London that Iran would not recognize or cooperate with a federation 
unless Iran was recognized as having sovereignty over the three islands claimed by 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. According to US government analysis of the Gulf region 
in August 1970: 
We look to the littoral powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
to cooperate in the regulation of their own affairs, once the 
British are gone. While the Federation of Arab [emirates] is still 
struggling to be born, we see no realistic alternative to some sort 
of federation to assure stability in the lower Gulf. We have 
encouraged the UK to help the local states to resolve existing 
disputes over boundaries and concession rights before the end of 
1971. Principal disputes are the Iranian claim to Abu Musa and 
the Tunbs and the Saudi/Abu Dhabi dispute over boundaries and 
the Buraimi oasis.367 
This demonstrated that the American Twin Pillar policy depended on Saudi Arabia and 
Iran to provide security for the Gulf. Like Great Britain with the Abu Dhabi-Saudi 
border dispute, the US was similarly positioned, and in significant ways was 
subordinated to its Twin Pillar policy. Like the British, the Americans had accepted loss 
of territory by some emirates to Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the Americans blamed 
the British for not pushing Shaikh Zayid hard enough towards a settlement and for not 
having played an effective mediation role in the early stages of negotiations. According 
to a State Department memorandum dated 27 September 1970:  
The British have not been putting any serious pressure on 
[Shaikh Zayid] of Abu Dhabi to resolve his boundary dispute 
with the Saudis even though [King] Faisal for the last year has 
seemed unusually amenable to a settlement. The British do not 
believe this problem will prevent the formation of the proposed 
Trucial States Federation. We are not so confident; we doubt 
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Faisal will recognize the federation so long as the boundary 
problem is unresolved.368 
5.9 Saudi Negotiation Strategy and Tactics  
From a close reading of the relevant documents in Arabian Boundaries, it is clear that in 
negotiating, the Saudis used a control strategy in which one party uses its power to 
dominate another negotiator.369 In theoretical terms, ‘control strategy’ is described from 
the winner’s perspective as opposed to ‘accommodation strategy’, which is described 
from the perspective of the loser.370 This section shows that the Saudis successfully 
applied a control strategy using contentious tactics, and this strategy, which was 
employed by Saudi Arabia throughout the negotiation process, appears to have been 
characterized by “dirty tricks”. As discussed in Chapter 4, dirty tricks include ‘take it or 
leave it’, refusal to negotiate, extreme demands, overt anger, harassment, fixed 
positional commitments, and threats (including threats of use of force).371 Dirty tricks 
do not allow negotiations to proceed peacefully towards outcomes associated with 
mutual concessions.  
The British archival records make it obvious that in implementing a control negotiation 
strategy the most significant and aggressive tactics used by the Saudis were ‘take it or 
leave it’ and refusal to negotiate over King Faisal’s proposal of May 1970. Jim 
Treadwell states: “any attempt to re-negotiate on the basis of Faisal’s Take it or leave it 
would be quite useless.”372 The Saudis made Shaikh Zayid’s acceptance of King 
Faisal’s terms a precondition for negotiations to proceed. For example, in August 1970, 
months before the plan for a conference in Dammam was dropped, Ambassador Morris 
reported to the Foreign Office about a conversation he had had with King Faisal, in 
which the King confirmed that there was no point in continuing the negotiation process 
unless Shaikh Zayid accepted his proposal. 373  
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King Faisal also warned that if Shaikh Zayid did not accept the Saudi offer, he would 
retract it and return to Saudi Arabia’s 1949 claim to 80 percent of Abu Dhabi’s territory, 
including the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region.374 Furthermore, he threatened to resolve the 
disputed areas with or without negotiations. In addition there are many reports that hint 
at the possible use of force by the Saudis if the disputed areas were not resolved on 
King Faisal’s terms and prior to completion of the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 
late 1971. 
Interestingly, not all the Saudi pressure on Shaikh Zayid came from King Faisal and the 
Saudi central government. Late in June 1970 the governor of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Province wrote to Shaikh Zayid, complaining that:  
We have been informed by our patrols that patrols belonging to 
your government have entered Saudi territory on a number of 
occasions and have stationed themselves at water wells, which 
have been dug by ARAMCO. In particular there was a patrol in 
the early part of this months commanded by an English 
captain.375 
The governor’s letter represents the tactic of harassment, which involves actions 
designed to annoy the other negotiating party to gain compliance with demands.376 In 
response to that particular instance of harassment, Abu Dhabi denied the Saudi claim 
and apparently nothing further came of it; however, the incident illustrates Saudi efforts 
to keep direct pressure on Shaikh Zayid. By mentioning that a British officer was in 
command of an Abu Dhabi patrol, the Saudis also indirectly pressured the British.  
An informant in Beirut also told the British that King Faisal had lost his temper with 
Shaikh Zayid for failing to accept his proposal.377 It is not known whether King Faisal’s 
anger, as a contentious negotiation tactic, was real or pretended. Importantly, anger can 
signal a negotiator’s unwillingness to move from a positional commitment,378 and 
suggests that from May 1970 onwards this might have been King Faisal’s aim. 
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I could not find any statements or even a hint in the documents cited in Arabian 
Boundaries that the Saudi tactic of ‘take it or leave it’ and/or the Saudi refusal to 
negotiate over King Faisal’s proposal were in any way responsible for hindering 
progress on the negotiations. The Saudis insisted that Saudi sovereignty over the 
disputed areas claimed by King Faisal was non-negotiable. However, their contentious 
tactics produced mixed results. On the one hand, Shaikh Zayid met many of King 
Faisal’s demands,379 but resisted making territorial concessions on the basis of the Saudi 
offer of 4 May 1970. On the other hand, the desire not to upset King Faisal gave the 
British another reason to push for a quick settlement, regardless of possible negative 
outcomes for Shaikh Zayid.  
Given Saudi Arabia’s strength in comparison with Abu Dhabi, and Britain’s belief that 
the dispute should be settled quickly as King Faisal wished, it is not surprising that the 
Saudis never dropped their control negotiation strategy or the contentious tactics that 
supported it. Due to Saudi Arabia’s power advantage, Shaikh Zayid did not have the 
necessary resources to punish Saudi Arabia effectively for its use of dirty tricks; nor did 
the British provide Abu Dhabi with those resources. Instead, they advised Shaikh Zayid 
to accommodate Faisal’s demands.  
5.9.1 Playing the Al-Ain/Buraimi Card 
Historically both Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia had attached great importance to AL-
Ain/Buraimi region, as John Duke Anthony discussed in 1975: 
For Zayid, Buraimi has always been a very special oasis…in the 
center of the emirate’s Eastern Province where, at Al-Ain, he 
spent most of his formative years prior to becoming Ruler. Until 
quite recently [Al-Ain/Buraimi] was also a major source, even 
though 90 miles away, of much of [Abu Dhabi’s] water supply. 
For Faisal equally, the dispute over Buraimi was of special 
significance. To him, it was an issue of pride and honor, a 
reminder of past Wahhabi glories, and more recently, of a 
humiliating defeat inflicted by Zayid and the British when the 
Trucial Oman Scouts drove Saudi forces from the area in 
1955.380 
On 15 May 1970, the British Foreign Office reviewed a report on the status of claims on 
Buraimi oasis made by Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Office noted that 
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Saudi Arabia had never dropped its claim to the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region. 
Furthermore, according to Foreign Office minutes, “[King Faisal] feels that his own 
personal honour and the prestige of Saudi Arabia are deeply involved and can only be 
satisfied by Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate's acceptance of the Saudi claim."381  
Although the Foreign Office continued to receive reports of King Faisal’s extreme 
anger over the failure to settle the dispute, by August, Dr Rashad Pharon, a senior Saudi 
official, had told Morris that: “if [Shaikh Zayid] would accept the Saudi proposals for 
the southern and western boundaries as they stand, then he thought that [King Faisal] 
would accept this as a settlement of the ‘Buraimi problem’ and drop his claims to the 
oasis without referendum or ascertainment.”382  In a subsequent telegram to the Foreign 
Office, Morris recommended that: “we should immediately use all our powers of 
persuasion to get [Shaikh Zayid] to tell us he would acquiesce in the deal proposed by 
Dr. Pharon.”383  
In view of Saudi resentment at Britain's past history of humiliating Saudi Arabia and 
expelling Saudi forces from Buraimi in 1955, the offer which they were now making to 
drop their claim to Buraimi was clearly seen by them as a major concession. The move 
was also interpreted by the British a significant concession. Thus, the British urged 
Shaikh Zayid to accept King Faisal's terms. 
The view from Abu Dhabi and Oman, however, was different.  The Ruler of Abu Dhabi 
and the Sultan of Oman had been jointly administering the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region 
since 1869, after they had expelled Saudi forces. Their sovereignty over the region was 
temporarily disrupted in 1952, when Saudi Arabia occupied Hamasa. In addition, the 
British had played an active role in discouraging Saudi claims during the second phase 
of the Anglo-Saudi negotiations (1949-55) until they were able to expel the Saudis from 
Buraimi. It could in fact be argued that, by playing the Al-Ain/Buraimi card through 
publicly maintaining a claim on the oasis during the 1970s and onwards, and informing 
the British of the possibility of dropping the claim, the Saudis were perhaps responding 
to the political reality of Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Al-Ain/Buraimi. As early as 3 
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June 1970, C. J. Treadwell, Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, reported that: “the Saudis 
should be discouraged from thinking that the oasis might be negotiable. Political and 
strategic considerations aside, [Shaikh Zayid] would encounter the strong opposition of 
his family if he admitted that the Saudis had a right to be heard on this issue.”384 As is 
discussed below (in subsection 5.10.1) there were also “hawks” in Shaikh Zayid’s 
government who strongly opposed both major territorial concessions by Abu Dhabi, and 
disagreed with Britain’s advice to Shaikh Zayid about settling the dispute.385   In the 
UAE perspective, the Saudi offer to drop the Al-Ain/Buraimi claim was more a 
recognition of reality than a significant concession. 
This study concludes that playing the Al-Ain/Buraimi card was a Saudi attempt to 
appear reasonable and legitimate. Playing the Al-Ain/Buraimi card could be interpreted 
as a negotiating tactic aimed at creating the impression that the Saudis were engaged in 
making mutual concessions in the negotiation process. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
compromise and concession, according to Cohen, are dishonourable in Arab culture 
unless compromise and concession are mutual. Thus, using the Al-Ain/Buraimi card in 
the negotiation process may have given an impression that the disputing parties were 
actually involved in a mutual process to resolve their dispute peacefully. 
The House of Saud’s Views on the Disputed Lands386   
Since the Saudis were offering only Al-Ain/Buraimi to Shaikh Zayid –– which Shaikh 
Zayid and the Sultan of Muscat already possessed –– while requiring the Shaikh to 
surrender Abu Dhabi’s territory in the south and west, it is useful to re-examine the 
position of the ruling family towards a territorial settlement. 
Regarding Khor al-Udaid, it had been claimed by Saudi Arabia since 1935. The British 
had considered proposals to let Saudi Arabia have Khor al-Udaid in 1938, 1964, and 
again in the 1970s. On the basis of discussions on 6 October 1970 with Prince Nawwaf 
ibn Abdulaziz, King Faisal's special adviser for Gulf affairs from 1968 to 1975, Sir 
William Luce wrote to the Foreign Office:   
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Nawwaf emphasised that it was difficult to describe the 
pressures from within Saudi Arabia which King [Faisal] had 
resisted in putting forward his May proposals. It was absolutely 
essential that Saudi Arabia should have a ‘base’ on the Gulf, 
meaning in the [Khor al-Udaid] area; if the King was going to 
give up Buraimi [oasis] then he must have something substantial 
in return, to satisfy his people.387 
By “his people,” Nawwaf apparently meant the ‘hawks’ in King Faisal’s government or 
within the royal family who opposed the negotiations over King Faisal’s proposal of 
1970. Kamal Adham, King Faisal’s adviser, had also told Luce that Saudi Arabia 
needed a commercial outlet to the Gulf at Khor al-Udaid, and that the Saudis were 
interested in a military presence to enable them to intervene in a seriously deteriorating 
internal security situation.388  It is also important to point out the role of Aramco in this 
regard.  Mike Ameen, an Aramco representative in Riyadh, informed the Saudis that the 
territories in the west of Abu Dhabi, namely Khor al-Udaid might be prospective oil-
bearing areas.389  
Regarding the area south of Liwa, it too had been claimed by Saudi Arabia from 1935 
onwards and the Saudis had reaffirmed their claim in 1968 when Zararah oil was 
discovered. In July 1970, Edward F. Henderson, the British Political Agent in Doha, 
suggested that  
A map should be prepared showing the population’s 
characteristics and movement patterns [This] strikes us as 
interesting and possibly useful. It would provide a graphic 
illustration of the validity of the Abu Dhabi position and 
demonstrate that the underlying purpose of the Saudi claim is 
not sovereignty but (as we have all along suspected) oil. 390  
Henderson argued that the significance of the Saudi proposal of 1970 was that it 
excluded populated areas, and concluded that the Saudis simply wanted the oil south of 
Liwa. 
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5.10 Abu Dhabi’s Negotiation Strategy and Tactics 
During the negotiation process Shaikh Zayid, who wished to keep Abu Dhabi territory 
in the West and South, had no clear negotiating strategy, largely because he had 
depended on British mediation as a factor that would improve Abu Dhabi’s position. 
Instead, the British pushed him to settle the dispute on King Faisal’s terms with the 
result that he found himself almost exclusively on the defensive against Saudi “take it or 
leave it” tactic and British persuasion. Abu Dhabi was too weak to make effective use 
of any “tit-for-tat”391 tactics to reward cooperative Saudi behaviour or punish 
competitive Saudi behaviour, and because he was discouraged by the British from 
making any counter-offers, Shaikh Zayid initially began to yield to Saudi demands.  
Regarding the “tit-for-tat” strategy, Pruitt and Carnevale note that when one party to a 
dispute does not cooperate in negotiations, the other party is perceived as forceful. As a 
result, the first party may decide to choose collaboration over non-cooperation, with the 
possible risk that the second party might exploit the first party’s collaboration, although 
it is felt that the second party is unlikely to try to take an advantage of the first party.392 
Unfortunately, this explanation overlooks the central role of power in the “tit-for-tat” 
strategic model, since for such a strategy to succeed, the party that employs it must have 
enough power to punish or reward the other party’s actions.  
In the context of the “tit-for-tat” model proposed by Pruitt and Carnevale, Shaikh Zayid 
could have expected cooperative behaviour from King Faisal. However, Saudi Arabia 
consistently exploited Abu Dhabi’s collaborative behaviour and took advantage of 
Shaikh Zayid’s positive response. For example, following King Faisal’s May 1970 
proposal, Shaikh Zayid gave the impression that he “would not reject the Saudi proposal 
out of hand.”393  As noted previously, King Faisal requested Shaikh Zayid to stop 
drilling at Zararah, and on 18 May Shaikh Zayid sent a letter to King Faisal reporting 
that: “following my discussion with your Majesty on the 4th of May, I wish to inform 
your Majesty that there is now no drilling at [Zararah well] no. 1 and that I and my 
advisors are giving careful consideration to your Majesty’s proposals.”394 In this 
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context, Shaikh Zayid’s actions were consistent with a negotiator who was eager to 
establish a cooperative negotiation process.  
However, on 25 May, Ambassador Morris in Jeddah informed the Foreign Office that 
Aramco had sent two aerial photography missions to verify Shaikh Zayid’s claim that 
drilling had indeed stopped at Zararah well no.1. This mission had verified Shaikh 
Zayid’s claim, but had also brought back aerial photographs of rigs going up at Zararah 
well no.3. Aramco officials then “directed King Faisal to issue the policy of 
[sus]pending drilling in the whole [Zararah] area not only on well no. one.”395 Thus, the 
Saudis responded to Shaikh Zayid’s cooperative gestures by escalating demands for a 
halt to ADPC’s activities in the whole area.  
As defined by Pruitt and Carnevale, trust, as an “expectation that the other party will 
cooperate in the future”396 was missing right from the beginning of the negotiation 
process. The Saudis did not trust Shaikh Zayid’s word about stopping drilling at Zararah 
well no.1 and relied on Aramco to verify that the Shaikh had told King Faisal the truth. 
After the Saudis shifted their focus from one oil well to all ADPC activity in the 
Zararah area, Shaikh Zayid had less reason to trust the Saudis as well. By September 
1970 Mr. Coles, Political Agent at Dubai, was reporting to the Foreign Office that 
Shaikh Zayid believed “if [King Faisal] was given an inch he would want an ell[397] and 
it was therefore better to begin by offering very little.”398   
Churchman states that negotiators who do not want a reputation for making negotiable 
offers will make small concessions, often at no cost to themselves.399 In this context, 
and according to Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, UAE Oil Minister, Shaikh Zayid’s offer 
suggested that he did not trust the Saudis and had begun by making only small 
concessions, since he had not developed a dominant consensus within Abu Dhabi that 
favoured conceding substantial territory to the Saudis.400 In an attempt to block the 
opposing party’s stated position, Shaikh Zayid had then tried another tactic, a counter-
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proposal for a meeting of representatives of both Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia at 
Dammam in 1970.  Raymond Saner points out that a negotiation tactic “among the less 
experienced negotiators is the counter-proposal.”401 Saudi Arabia wanted territory under 
Saudi terms; however, Abu Dhabi wanted to discuss Shaikh Zayid’s offers. As noted, 
the Saudis and the British would both identify Shaikh Zayid as a user of delaying 
tactics, which Churchman describes as based on the belief that delay can force 
opponents to consider their position.402 
By April 1971, Shaikh Zayid had offered to concede access rights to Khor al- Udaid to 
the Saudis.403 Mana Saeed Otaiba told the Political Agent in Abu Dhabi that Shaikh 
Zayid had been eager to make the Saudis an offer but had not yet convinced all the other 
shaikhs in Abu Dhabi to agree to territorial concessions in either the west or the 
south.404  But on 28 October 1971, Sir William Luce wrote to I. S. Winchester in Jeddah 
to say that Shaikh Zayid had told him that: “the most he was prepared to offer the 
Saudis was an oil profit sharing zone, with joint sovereignty, and a strip of his southern 
border twenty kilometres wide at its widest point.”405 By this time, the British were 
aware that King Faisal had absolutely rejected any settlement involving shared revenues 
or joint sovereignty. 
Regarding the issue of a neutral zone, a senior Saudi official explained that the Saudi 
experience of a neutral zone with Kuwait had created problems. When the Saudis 
rejected proposals that included joint sovereignty or the creation of a neutral zone, 
official analysis by the British supported the Saudi case. For example, creating a neutral 
zone was thought to be a problematic issue that concerned the rights of American and 
British oil companies with existing concessions, and the different perspectives of the 
British and the Saudis towards the definition of the south eastern frontier lines.406  
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The Saudis had previously experienced problems of this kind in the administration of 
the neutral zone with Kuwait, and in November 1970, the Foreign Office had told the 
Bahrain Political Residency that: “the Saudis were not prepared for such problems to be 
raised again in the Abu Dhabi/Saudi Arabia context.”407 However, as a result of Saudi 
inflexibility the British now had to focus on Abu Dhabi’s approach to negotiating the 
dispute. 
5.10.1 The Al-Bu Falah’s Views on the Disputed Lands 
As a ruler Shaikh Zayid did not have complete freedom of action in dealing with the 
disputed areas, since the varying levels of influence among his ruling family affected 
the way he responded to King Faisal’s May 1970 offer. As early as 3 June 1970, C. J. 
Treadwell, Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, had informed the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office that: “the general problem is not for [Shaikh Zayid] alone. His family’s wishes 
and public opinion may well be important factors guiding him. He is unlikely to make 
any concessions.”408  By “public opinion”, Treadwell apparently meant, “hawks” in the 
Abu Dhabi government or within the royal family itself. On 16 June 1970, Treadwell 
again reported on the “hawks” among Shaikh Zayid’s officials who questioned British 
advice to Shaikh Zayid and might try to persuade him to ignore it. He also confirmed 
that he had been told by the Ruler that “public opinion” in Abu Dhabi might not 
approve if large concessions were made to the Saudis.409  
In early September 1970 Mr. Coles, the Political Agent in Dubai, informed the Foreign 
Office that if Shaikh Zayid gave Abu Dhabi territory to Saudi Arabia: “it would be 
regarded as a disgrace by his people and by his fellow Arabs in the Gulf. [Shaikh Zayid] 
said that King Faisal liked to speak very strongly on this subject but in his view was not 
really so uncompromising as he sounded.”410  Treadwell’s view was that Shaikh Zayid 
was using his family’s refusal to co-operate as an excuse to delay the process of settling 
the dispute. On 23 November 1971, a week before British withdrawal from the Gulf, 
Treadwell sent a telegram to the Bahrain Political Residency:  
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Shaikh Zayid has not made ‘no effort’, but his effort has not 
been serious. While our mediation has been part stalling and part 
serious, [Shaikh Zayid] has been playing for time all the way… 
I am content that Zayid should be left to go on stringing King 
Faisal along as he judges best on the clear understanding that he 
is now on his own but I am opposed to causing further damage 
to our interests by saying anything to King Faisal bluntly on the 
subject.411  
Treadwell’s comments of November 1971 seem inconsistent. After all, it was Treadwell 
who had warned in June 1970 of “hawks” among Shaikh Zayid’s officials who opposed 
making substantial territorial concessions to the Saudis. Treadwell’s assessment of 
British mediation as “part stalling and part serious” also seems curious, since the British 
had been pushing for some kind of settlement to be based on Shaikh Zayid making 
substantial concessions almost from the time King Faisal made his offer in May 1970.  
5.11 Britain’s Military Withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 December 1971 
According to a Foreign Office minutes written on 23 April 1971, Ambassador Morris in 
Jeddah had told the Foreign Office that: “our difficulty has always been to persuade 
[Shaikh Zayid] to meet [King Faisal’s] demands in the south and west.”412 The 
Ambassador’s remark reflected a consensus that had developed among British officials 
by 1971 that Shaikh Zayid was the major obstacle to the settlement of the disputed 
areas.  A few days before Britain’s scheduled withdrawal from the Gulf, the Foreign 
Office was informing Ambassador Morris in Jeddah that substantial British interests 
were at stake and that, if Britain failed to persuade Shaikh Zayid to meet King Faisal’s 
demands, Shaikh Zayid “can damage our interests in Saudi Arabia, which remain 
considerable, if [King Faisal] feels ignored or slighted.”413  
As British withdrawal from the Gulf approached, no settlement has been found to the 
disputed areas. In October 1971, the Foreign Office instructed Morris to tell King Faisal 
that the British had done their best toward resolving the disputed areas.414 The unsettled 
boundary question had also put Shaikh Zayid in stressful position. After a meeting with 
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British officials at Al Ain in April 1971, C. J. Treadwell reported that: “[Shaikh Zayid] 
was in an emotional state throughout and criticized HMG, though more in sorrow than 
anger, for giving notice of withdrawal of their protection when the difficult boundary 
question was still on his hands, also, as he put it, for failing to push the Saudis as well to 
make sacrifices.”415  Shaikh Zayid knew that he would soon be completely on his own 
in dealing with the Saudis, and that mediation by a party other than the British was his 
only hope of offsetting Saudi power in order to convince King Faisal to offer more 
reasonable concessions than those proposed in May 1970. 
5.12 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes that the British mediation role in the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border 
dispute changed dramatically from 1970 to the latter part of 1971. In the early 1970s, 
official British policy declared Britain’s new role of “honest broker” or neutral mediator 
in dealing with the dispute. From the beginning, it was, in practice, an unlikely role for 
Britain to play since the British had substantial direct interests in the disputed areas, 
specifically in Zararah with respect to the activities of the ADPC. The involvement of 
British interests in the disputed areas restricted the role of the British to managing the 
dispute and carrying messages from Saudi Arabia to Abu Dhabi, which did not help to 
move the negotiation process forward.  
The records for 1970-71 included in Arabian Boundaries make it clear that the Saudis 
expected the British to pressure Abu Dhabi into accepting Saudi Arabia’s terms, and 
that the British attempts to influence Shaikh Zayid to accept King Faisal’s proposals 
failed. It was a significant failure, since a high priority for Britain had been either a 
temporary settlement, or, if possible, any solution at all to the matter of disputed areas, 
prior to British withdrawal from the Gulf in late 1971. The reason underlying Britain’s 
reduced involvement in the dispute was due to its refusal to make any serious 
commitment to its obligations to Abu Dhabi under the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 
that might damage its relations with either Abu Dhabi or Saudi Arabia.   
Saudi Arabia entered negotiations with the fixed strategic goal, presented in King 
Faisal’s proposal of 1970, of obtaining recognition of claims to territory in the southern 
and western areas of Abu Dhabi. To implement that goal, the Saudi government used 
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control strategy, and employed inflexible positions and a range of negotiation tactics 
that fall into the ‘contentious tactics” and “dirty tricks” categories discussed on page 85. 
The only concession beyond King Faisal’s May 1970 proposal was the dropping of the 
claim to the Al-Ain/Buraimi region. It can be concluded, however, that this can hardly 
be seen as a significant concession as the Saudi claim to Buraimi was itself weak. In 
practice, Saudi Arabia was using the Buraimi card to deceive the UAE into believing 
that both parties were engaged in mutual concessions. In the negotiation process, Saudi 
Arabia was clearly more powerful than either Abu Dhabi or the British. 
In contrast, Shaikh Zayid’s position and Abu Dhabi’s negotiating strategy and tactics 
seem to have become somewhat confused due to the limited role of the British. By 
1970-71, the British were attempting to persuade Shaikh Zayid to settle the dispute on 
King Faisal’s terms, with the result that Shaikh Zayid found himself on the defensive 
against Saudi Arabia’s control strategy and British persuasiveness. Realising that he 
could no longer rely on British support under the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 to offset 
Saudi power, Shaikh Zayid attempted instead to recruit regional Arab states, such as 
Kuwait and Bahrain, as mediators. However, since the British insisted on approving any 
third-party mediation arrangements, Shaikh Zayid’s attempts to offset Saudi power 
failed. As the British withdrawal date approached, it became apparent that a resolution 
of the disputed areas on Saudi terms was inevitable, and that after Britain’s withdrawal, 
Shaikh Zayid would be on his own against the much more powerful states of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
UAE Independence and Progress Towards A Settlement: 
From 2 December 1971 to the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the wake of Britain’s military withdrawal from the Gulf, it adopted new role in the 
negotiations. This chapter examines how Britain’s proclaimed role changed from that of 
an ‘honest broker’ to that of a ‘disinterested party’ in mediating the UAE-Saudi dispute, 
and how the latter role was challenged by Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of whom wanted 
Great Britain to use its power against Shaikh Zayid to reach an outcome favouring 
them.  Although Britain continued actively to support the US Twin Pillar policy, 
through which Saudi Arabia and Iran would guarantee Gulf security, British 
involvement in the border issue effectively disappeared after 1971. In terms of the Twin 
Pillar policy, Shaikh Zayid faced British pressure to establish relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Iran.  On 23 December 1972416 Britain succeeded in pushing Shaikh Zayid 
to establish relations with Iran (albeit without addressing the islands issue). However, it 
failed in the case of Saudi Arabia since it was determined not to become involved in the 
boundary question or to take a position with either of the parties concerned.  
This chapter also analyses the factors that strengthened Saudi Arabia’s negotiating 
position, including its role as a ‘disinterested party’ (through disengagement in the 
disputed areas), the Twin Pillar policy, and its economic relations with Britain and the 
US. Saudi Arabia’s close relations with Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Dubai also 
played a major role in moving the negotiation process in Saudi Arabia’s favour. At the 
same time, other factors were contributing to the weakening of the UAE’s negotiating 
position and to pushing Shaikh Zayid toward an agreement with the Saudis. The UAE’s 
position was compromised not only by Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf and Iran’s 
occupation of the islands belonging to Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, but also by a lack 
of solidarity among its fellow emirates, the lack of previous political experience, and a 
potential Saudi military threat against the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  
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This chapter also follows the development of the last phase of the negotiation process 
from 29 July to 21 August 1974.  The British Archives records and American reports on 
this period are not comprehensive, and there are many gaps in the historical record.417 I 
found difficulties in analysing the verbal agreement reached by the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia in July 1974 since there is no written record available. Further, based on 
statements made by Shaikh Zayid, Ahmed Suwaidi, the former UAE foreign Minister, 
and Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, former UAE oil minister, there is also significant 
circumstantial evidence that parts of the July 1974 verbal agreement did not appear in 
the provisions of the Treaty of Jeddah. This would explain why Emirati dissatisfaction 
with the Treaty of Jeddah began to be expressed immediately after the signing of the 
document.   
Importantly, due to Britain’s military withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 December 1971, 
the balance of power in the Gulf region changed considerably between 1971 and 1974. 
This had a noticeable impact on the negotiations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
with the Saudis offering to drop their claim to Al-Ain/Buraimi region. This was 
portrayed as a major concession to Shaikh Zayid.  On the other hand, if one accepts that 
the UAE did not consider Al-Ain/Buraimi region as a major concession, this would 
mean that the Saudis were unilaterally imposing the frontier lines on the UAE. It is 
argued that during the period 1971-74 there was no approach to negotiation that would 
have suggested any interest in a mutually integrative solution between the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia after Britain had withdrawn. Instead, the chapter shows that the Saudis 
used a skilful negotiation strategy aimed at controlling the negotiation process and 
giving Abu Dhabi no choice other than to accommodate Saudi Arabia’s terms.418  Thus, 
this study claims that the frontier line was unilaterally imposed on the UAE by the 
Saudis.  
6.2 The Role of Great Britain 
6.2.1 British Disengagement after Formation of the UAE 
Shortly before the formation of the United Arab Emirates on 2 December 1971, Willie 
Morris, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, discussed the impact of the British 
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withdrawal on the UAE with King Faisal. Morris explained that Britain’s treaty 
obligations to the emirates would end on 1 December. The Trucial Oman Scouts would 
be transferred to the UAE government, and a new treaty would provide “for 
consultation in case of need, but there would be no commitment to defend the union.”419 
Shaikh Zayid, who would now become the head of the UAE, could count on the British 
for more advice, but the British would not provide military support to sustain the new 
federation of emirates. 
Three days after the formation of the UAE, Morris told the Foreign Office: “we were 
responsible for Abu Dhabi’s defence and foreign relations; we had not been in a 
position to act convincingly as a disinterested party. Now, we were really in a position 
to mediate.”420As discussed in Chapter 5, Great Britain had portrayed itself as an 
“honest broker” in order to protect its interests, as represented in the ADPC which was 
operating in the disputed areas. Foreign Office minutes from April 1972 state: “we had 
spent fifty years trying to solve the dispute without success. We now had no 
responsibility for it and we did not wish to do anything to encourage King Faisal in the 
view that we were still involved.”421  This position was also stated in a Foreign Office 
telegram from August 1972:  
So far as Abu Dhabi/Saudi relations are concerned, having failed 
to persuade [Shaikh Zayid] to come to an agreement with the 
Saudis while we were still responsible for his foreign relations, 
we have no illusions that we can influence him to do so now. 
We naturally welcome any efforts which others are prepared to 
take and wish them better luck than we have had ourselves.422 
This attitude can be found in the same sources: for example, as the British Ambassador 
in Kuwait wrote to the Foreign Office in February 1973: “we had tried for years and had 
not succeeded. We wondered whether Abu Dhabi’s Arab friends might be better at 
persuading Shaikh [Zayid] then we had been.”423  Yet only six days later, the British 
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Ambassador in Jeddah informed the Foreign Office that: “we can expect the Saudis to 
see any Abu Dhabi initiative as stemming from us and our silence here might confirm 
them in their view.”424 
In this context, British policy on the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute appears to have been 
to avoid responsibility while carefully managing Saudi perceptions of Britain’s role. In 
terms of mediation, the British government was not willing to continue as an actual 
mediator, preferring an Arab state to play this role. After Britain withdrew from the 
Gulf and from its attempt to play the role of “disinterested party” in the dispute, the 
British were very careful to avoid actions that might damage relations with either Saudi 
Arabia or the UAE. 
6.2.2 Anglo-Saudi Relations 
On 28 February 1972, Ambassador Morris had reported to the Foreign Office a 
conversation with Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia: “our failure to arrange a settlement of 
the Abu Dhabi border problem remains the real bone in the throat of Anglo-Saudi 
relations.”425 By November 1972, the Foreign Office was acknowledging Saudi 
resentment of Britain’s historical role in the Anglo-Saudi territorial dispute, noting that: 
“our involvement in the boundary dispute was never strictly as a neutral go-between, 
but as a protecting power, responsible for the conduct of Abu Dhabi’s external 
affairs.”426 
According to the Foreign Office, it should have been expected that the Saudis would 
blame the British when Shaikh Zayid refused to concede to King Faisal’s territorial 
demands before the British withdrawal. This bias was even more pronounced at the 
British Embassy in Jeddah, which in August 1972 had informed the Foreign Office that: 
“we think that we might however be able to do something indirectly to mitigate the 
consequential damage to Anglo-Saudi relations. To this end we would if possible like to 
avoid deepening the Saudi impression that we do not really care about the dispute.”427 
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6.3 Diplomatic Relations with the UAE: Saudi Arabia and Iran 
On 1 December 1971, one day after the completion of the British withdrawal from the 
Gulf, the Financial Times reported that the survival of the future federation of the UAE 
would depend on the federation’s establishment of relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
According to the article: “it was thought that religious and traditionalist affinities would 
hold Saudi Arabia and Iran together as a natural alliance against President Nasser’s 
Socialist revolutionary forces”, since the Twin Pillar policy remained viable as long as 
the smaller Gulf States played a cooperative and subordinate role.428 It also correctly 
assessed the weaknesses of the new federation, following its formation on 2 December 
1971 as an independent state; the UAE lacked the capacity to conduct an effective 
foreign policy.  
Rangarajan argues that, as discussed in Chapter 4, “any nation dependent on another for 
financial assistance, political support or military hardware suffers a reduction in its 
[negotiating] power and capacity for independent action.”429 After all, the British had 
handled Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy since the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 and had 
vigorously defended Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims from 1935 to 1955. Until the end of 
the 1970s, Abu Dhabi’s national interests were subordinated to the Twin Pillar policy 
supported by Great Britain. Under those conditions, Shaikh Zayid was forced to 
establish diplomatic relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran to ensure the survival of 
the UAE. Although the British urged Shaikh Zayid to establish diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran as part of the Twin Pillar policy, Shaikh Zayid had problems of 
his own with Iran and Saudi Arabia over the disputed areas. In addition, Shaikh Zayid, 
as president of the UAE, had also to represent Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah in territorial 
disputes with Iran over the occupied Islands in the Strait of Hormuz. 
It is very important to note that Sharjah claimed sovereignty over the island of Abu 
Musa, while Ras al-Khaimah claimed the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands. Britain had 
begun extensive negotiations with Iran over Iranian claims on the three islands in March 
1971, and Sir William Luce had arranged the division of Abu Musa into two zones, a 
southern zone to be administered by Sharjah and a northern zone to be administered by 
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Iran.430 As a result of his ceding the northern zone of Abu Musa, Shaikh Khalid al-
Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah, was assassinated.431 The ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, by 
contrast, had refused to negotiate any deal with Iran with respect to the Greater Tunb 
and Lesser Tunb, with the result that Iran had landed troops on the two islands and 
seized them on 30 November 1971, one day before the Britain’s military withdrawal 
from the Gulf, and two days before the formation of the UAE. Although Sharjah was a 
member of the UAE from its formation on 2 December 1971, Ras al-Khaimah did not 
join the federation until February 1972, in protest against the occupation of its 
islands.432  
The situation was further complicated when Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defence Minister, 
declared that: “sooner or later, if things don’t get sorted out, we might have to impose a 
Saudi solution; we know from the Iranian experience on the Islands that no one will do 
anything to stop us.”433 Although the Saudis still refused to recognize the UAE, they did 
established relations individually with Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Dubai. Since the 
federal government of the UAE had assumed responsibility for disputed areas involving 
member states, Shaikh Zayid had a formal duty to uphold the interests of Sharjah and 
Ras al-Khaimah.  
The British attitude toward the islands is well summarized by this dispatch from the 
British Embassy in Tehran:  
Concerning the restoration to Iran of the Tunbs and Abu Musa. 
Sir W Luce, the British Foreign Secretary’s special envoy, came 
several times to Iran and held discussions with the appropriate 
Iranian authorities on this subject. On the departure of the 
British Forces from the Persian Gulf, Iranian forces established 
themselves on the islands, which had been the subject of 
discussion on 30 November 1971[emphasis added].434 
In light of this report, British officials in Iran at the very least considered the islands as 
belonging to Iran.  Just as the British had defended Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims for 
much of the twentieth century and had moved to Saudi Arabia’s side as the British 
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withdrawal approached, they had upheld Sharjah’s claim to Abu Musa and Ras al-
Khaimah’s claim to the Tunbs and then appeared to have shifted to supporting claims 
by Iran. This statement from the British Government of India, in Lorimer’s Gazetteer of 
the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia (1915) is worth considering: 
The title of the Shaikh of Sharjah to the possession of the island 
[Abu Musa] was indubitable. Nevertheless it was feared that 
actual and prospective loss of trade, if not further-reaching 
political considerations, might tempt the Persian Government to 
some act of annexation; and the attention of the [British] 
Government of India was drawn in this connection not only to 
the island of [Abu] Musa but also to that of Tunb, of which the 
status was precisely similar.435 
According to Anthony Cordesman, “Britain, which saw the shah as the principal future 
source of stability in the Gulf issues, was not prepared to make an issue of [the islands] 
and made an arrangement with Iran that allowed it to occupy the islands immediately 
after British departure.”436 
Shaikh Zayid had to proceed cautiously on the issue of establishing diplomatic relations 
with Iran. If he went ahead with full diplomatic relations, he risked alienating Sharjah, 
Ras al-Khaimah, and their allies within the UAE. At the same time, the Iranians were 
not pleased with Shaikh Zayid’s slow pace with respect to UAE-Iran diplomatic 
relations. In August 1972, the Shah of Iran met King Hussein of Jordan who reported 
their conversation to the British ambassador in Amman. The Shah, said the king, had 
criticized Shaikh Zayid and threatened to withdraw recognition of the UAE437 if Shaikh 
Zayid did not establish diplomatic relations with Iran. Although King Hussein had 
advised moderation to both the Shah and Shaikh Zayid, he told the British “that only 
maximum pressure on [Zayid] by HMG could save the situation.”438 General Omer 
Khammash, a political adviser to King Hussein of Jordan, also informed the British that: 
“the Shah had told him that [Iran] would withdraw recognition from the UAE in mid-
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September if no progress had been made by then on the question of [Zayid’s] relations 
with Iran, and had made it clear that he regards the ball as being in HMG’s court.”439 
These communications are significant since they show that the Iranians expected Britain 
to use its power to persuade Shaikh Zayid to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. 
Although the British informed Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in January 1973 of the 
enormous difficulty in persuading Shaikh Zayid, Zayid did eventually establish full 
diplomatic relations with Iran because Iran threatened to withdraw recognition of the 
UAE.440  Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were not pleased at all, since by that time, Iran 
had held the islands in the Strait of Hormuz for over two years. 
On 23 August 1973, Kamal Adham, King Faisal’s consultant and Saudi security chief, 
travelled to Kuwait for the purpose of reaffirming Saudi-Kuwait relations against Arab 
radical movements and their mutual cooperation against the dangers of Communism in 
the Gulf. At the meeting, Stoltzfus, the American Ambassador in Kuwait discussed 
security issues in the Gulf, specifically the Dhofari rebels in Southern of Oman with 
Kamal Adham and Shaikh Al-Sabah, president of Kuwait.  Consistent with the focus on 
Communism that grew with American influence in the Gulf, Stoltzfus characterized the 
insurgency in Dhofar as an ideological threat to the national interests of the U.S. 
Ambassador Stoltzfus strongly urged Adham to inform King Faisal that he should 
reconsider establishing diplomatic relations with the UAE since, in the context of Gulf 
security it was felt that the UAE might be drawn into the communist orbit. According to 
his report to the U.S about the meeting, “UAE held lack of Saudi-UAE relations was 
serious gap [in the Gulf]…Presence of strong Saudi Ambassador in Abu Dhabi could 
also have profound effect on Zayid’s thinking, and I said I believed existence Saudi-
UAE diplomatic relation would enhance rather than weaken prospects for border 
settlement between two.”441 However, it should be pointed out that King Faisal had 
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been admant since 1971 that the Saudi Arabia would not recognise the union of the 
Emirates until the border dispute had first been settled.442  
6.4 Saudi Negotiation Strategy and Tactics 
6.4.1 Continuation of Control Strategy and Contentious Tactics 
Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf and the formation of the UAE did nothing to change 
the Saudis’ negotiation strategy of control implemented through contentious tactics. Ali 
Ahmed of the Gulf Center in Washington DC, argued that as early as 1968, when the 
British announced their 1971 withdrawal, King Faisal had accurately assessed Shaikh 
Zayid’s vulnerable position without British protection. As a result, King Faisal did not 
change his negotiating position and had further burdened Shaikh Zayid by threatening 
to withhold recognition of a federation of emirates.443 
Saudi Arabia had continued to threaten the UAE that it would revert to its original claim 
of 80 percent of Abu Dhabi’s territory, including the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis, if Shaikh 
Zayid did not accept the Saudi terms. For example, on 9 December 1971, Ambassador 
Morris in Jeddah informed the Foreign Office that, “if [Zayid] now accepted King 
Faisal’s offer, well and good, if not [Faisal] would revert to his original claim 
[1949].”444 On 27 February 1972 Morris reported that a Saudi official had told him that 
King Faisal had made a generous offer to Shaikh Zayid, despite the opposition of his 
family to such great concessions. The King was not going to bargain about them and if 
they were not accepted, Saudi Arabia would return to its 1949 claims.445 
This message indicates that apart from dropping their claim on Al-Ain/Buraimi, the 
Saudis were not willing to make any further concessions. Their refusal to negotiate put 
Shaikh Zayid in a difficult position. From the UAE perspective, Saudi Arabia’s 
willingness to drop its Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis claim was not the “generous offer” the 
Saudis portrayed it to be. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Abu Dhabi and Oman had 
administered Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis jointly since 1871, and the Saudis had not had 
effective occupation of Al-Ain/Buraimi region since that date (with the exception of 
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their temporary occupation of Hamasa in 1952). In order to control the negotiation 
process, King Faisal repeatedly claimed that his own constituents (i.e., the royal family 
within the government) were not satisfied with the way he was dealing with the 
situation. For example, at the end of August 1972, the British Embassy in Jeddah 
reported to the Foreign Office the comment by Dr Adnan Pharaon that “No-one should 
take it for granted that King Faisal would forever be willing or able to maintain his 
present patient and peaceful policy. Some of the younger princes around him were 
beginning to argue that the dispute might have to be settled by force.”446 
The Saudis also continued to pressure Shaikh Zayid on other matters. For example, in 
December 1973, the same month that Shaikh Zayid met Shaikh Khalifa Al-Thani to 
discuss the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute; the Saudis were making it extremely difficult 
for Emiratis to obtain visas to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, restrictions that were not 
applied to citizens of Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, or Kuwait. The Saudi policy toward 
Emiratis wishing to make the Hajj placed Shaikh Zayid “in an embarrassing 
position.”447 Shaikh Khalifa then appealed to King Faisal on Shaikh Zayid’s behalf, and 
the Saudis agreed to relax visa restrictions on Emiratis, but only during the Hajj period. 
From the British withdrawal from the Gulf in late 1971 to the Treaty of Jeddah in 
August 1974, circumstances came together to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s negotiating 
position. In addition to its status as the most powerful nation in the Gulf, the official 
British withdrawal, the Twin Pillar policy, and the UAE’s vulnerability as a newly-
formed federation gave the Saudis all the advantages and absolutely no incentives to 
move away from the positional commitments they had established in 1970. King 
Faisal’s ability to influence domestic affairs within individual emirates of the UAE was 
another reminder to Shaikh Zayid of the weakness of his own negotiating position. 
6.4.2 Saudi Attempts at Influence on Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Dubai  
In addition to Saudi Arabia’s continuing position that it would not recognize the UAE 
until the disputed areas issue was resolved, the Saudis interfered in the UAE’s domestic 
affairs in ways that could destabilize it and threaten its survival. Wright indicated that 
“[Shaikh Zayid] may have under-estimated Saudi potentialities for causing trouble in 
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the UAE”,448 an assessment that was especially true with respect to Ras al-Khaimah, a 
poor emirate whose leader must have been extremely unhappy with Shaikh Zayid’s 
decision to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. In the case of Ras al-Khaimah, 
despite the fact that Shaikh Zayid had not settled the disputed areas with King Faisal, 
Saudi Arabia went ahead with aid, including the provision of training and advisers for 
Ras Al-Khaimah’s police and security forces.449 After the Foreign Office had 
questioned the Saudi Ambassador to Great Britain about Saudi influence in Ras al-
Khaimah, their report mentioned that the Saudi Ambassador “was quite categoric in 
saying that the Saudi Government were supporting Shaikh Saqr [ruler of Ras al-
Khaimah] and would continue to do so. The risk that this could lead to the break-up of 
the Union does not appear to worry them at all.”450 
The Saudis had also established relations with Sharjah and Dubai. For example, 
according to Hesam al-Ulama, the Saudi government did not attempt to establish 
relations with the new federal government of UAE, preferring to maintain its relations 
with each emirate individually in order to undermine Abu Dhabi. He also explained that 
Saudi Arabia had longstanding ties with Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Dubai, 
characterized by trade, the employment of Saudi judges in the three emirates, and a 
common involvement in the Saudi centres for Islamic Call and Guidance. Al-Ulama 
believes that the Saudi tactic of interference in the UAE’s domestic affairs might well 
have been designed to push Shaikh Zayid into accepting King Faisal’s proposals.451  
Overall, Shaikh Zayid certainly risked the survival of both the UAE and his own 
leadership. Interference in the affairs of three members of the UAE would put 
tremendous pressure on Abu Dhabi to accept King Faisal’s proposal. This study 
proposes a discussion of interference in an opposing party’s internal affairs as 
amounting to contentious tactics, which must be included in “dirty tricks”.   
6.4.3 Saudi Pressure on the British 
Interestingly, after the British had withdrawn from the Gulf and declared their new 
“disinterested party” role, the Saudis continued to press Britain to stay on the Saudi side 
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of the dispute.  Fisher and Ury define pressure as one side’s structuring of negotiations 
so that the other side can do nothing except make concessions.452  The Saudi National 
Guard contract is an excellent example. The British had a contract with the Saudis to 
provide training and equipment to the Saudi National Guard through a British mission 
in Saudi Arabia. In spring 1972, Saudi Arabia cancelled the arrangement relating to 
military equipment with the British. In explaining this development, Kamal Adham told 
a British official: “you (HMG) mess us about over the Abu Dhabi border, so we mess 
you about over the N.G. contract…this was to show you that you could not have it all 
your own way.”453  From Jeddah, Ambassador Morris wrote that: 
The effect has been a breach of confidence in communicating to 
American firms without consulting us a secret document which 
was our joint property; gross discourtesy in attempting to cancel 
from us the nature of their unfriendly act until they were forced 
to admit it; and great deal of consequent trouble and expense… 
The Saudi Government’s action merits some riposte. An 
appropriate and not excessive one would be the withdrawal of 
the National Guard Mission. The Consequences of this riposte 
would however be much more harmful to us than to the Saudis. 
They could replace the Mission with an American one; we 
would lose whatever benefits in contracts and good will the 
Mission brings; we would lose any part of the National Guard 
re-equipment programme that otherwise might still come our 
way.454 
Three days later, Ambassador Morris sent the Foreign Office a further assessment:  
I think we should do nothing at all for the time being about 
the National Guard Mission, certainly nothing to suggest that 
we are seriously contemplating its removal. Two possibilities 
are:  
(a) The prospect that Prince Abdulla will pursue his stated 
intention to use the Mission as overseers of the American 
programme: i.e., as a stick to beat the Americans with. 
(b) That without asking for its withdrawal, the Saudis will 
“freeze” the Mission out as happened to us in 1951 when the 
US agreed to provide a mission for the Saudi Army.455 
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Despite the fact that the Saudis had turned exclusively to the Americans for support for 
the Saudi army since 1951, the National Guard and Air Force contracts had been 
awarded to the British. However, in April 1972, a Saudi official said that the policy had 
been reconsidered because the British had failed to convince Shaikh Zayid to accept 
King Faisal’s terms of May 1970. According to a British report, the Saudi official had 
said: “the Saudis thought that the economic [card] was the only card they had to play 
against us if we did not satisfy them on our Gulf policy.”456 In September 1972, the 
Foreign Office reported that: 
Omar Saqqaf [Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] called 
on Lord Carrington this morning. He said that the main aim of 
his visit was to improve relations between HMG and Saudi 
Arabia. In his view steps were required (a) HMG should press 
Shaikh [Zayid] to solve this dispute with Saudi Arabia so that 
the Saudis could support the United Arab Emirates (b) A 
solution must be found to the problems of the Saudi Air Defence 
scheme.457 
In fact, the Saudis had already cut British contracts with the Saudi National Guard, and 
six months later the Saudis were still pressuring the British with threats to cut the 
contract for the Saudi Air Defence system as well. This message strongly suggests that 
the Saudis had linked the resolving of the disputed areas to the continuation of Britain’s 
Air Defence contracts with Saudi Arabia. What may be more significant is that in late 
1972, and despite the official British withdrawal from the Gulf, the Saudis still believed 
that Britain could control Shaikh Zayid’s approach in the resolution of the UAE-Saudi 
territorial dispute.  
6.5 UAE Negotiations Strategy and Tactics  
6.5.1 Shaikh Zayid’s Leniency on the Question of Khor al-Udaid 
In 1973 Shaikh Zayid sent a delegation to Dammam in Saudi Arabia with the aim of 
smoothing things over by stressing common interests and finding a formula that would 
lead to the establishing of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  
Under the circumstances, he had little choice but somehow to settle Abu Dhabi’s 
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disputed areas with Saudi Arabia.  Shaikh Zayid contacted King Faisal to arrange a 
meeting between the oil ministers of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Dammam at the end 
of April 1973, and informed the King that he wished to settle the dispute and establish 
relations with Saudi Arabia. On 29 April 1973, Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba headed a UAE 
delegation that arrived in Dammam to discuss the boundary question with the Saudi oil 
minister, Zaki Yamani, who represented the Saudi delegation. The talks apparently 
lasted for three hours;458 however, an American Embassy official reported that the 
results of the talks were not known, and that furthermore, “No other Jidda Newspapers 
reported the talks, nor has embassy heard from other sources any results.”459  In fact, the 
UAE-Saudi talks in Dammam had broken down, and Foreign Office officials concluded 
that “[Shaikh Zayid] has no fresh proposals to offer and does not intend in the 
foreseeable future to table any.”460   
In May 1973 Prince Fahd conveyed a message to the British Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Office that: “the Saudi Government had been more than disappointed at the 
negative attitude adopted by the Abu Dhabi delegation at the recent meetings in 
Dammam.”461  A few days later, Lord Denman reported that: “Prince Fahd specifically 
asked me to tell you and the Prime Minister of his own Government’s disappointment at 
this turn of events and to ask you to use your influence with Shaikh [Zayid] to achieve a 
settlement.”462   
It is clear that as late as May 1973 the Saudis still expected Britain to wield influence on 
Saudi Arabia’s behalf. The reports are also interesting because they indicate that the 
Saudis expected Shaikh Zayid to accept their positional commitment to the Saudi terms 
established in 1970 without any further Saudi negotiations. 
Under the circumstances, King Faisal’s remarks about Shaikh Zayid’s failure to respond 
to the May 1970 proposal could reasonably be interpreted as just one more facet of the 
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Saudi control negotiation strategy implemented by contentious tactics. In addition, King 
Faisal’s accusation that Shaikh Zayid had not responded effectively to King Faisal’s 
proposal is also interesting. According to Churchman: 
Silence can emphasize a point, give opponents time to absorb a 
point or reflect on it, or regain the attention of distracted 
listeners. People are uncomfortable with silence. Failing to 
respond when expected may lead them to keep talking. Even if 
opponents do not take the bait, silence can be used to think 
about what they have said…they must make clear nothing new 
will be said till they get a response to their own statement.463 
Bearing in mind Churchman’s remarks, Shaikh Zayid’s plan of not responding to Saudi 
demands may have been a tactic aimed at continuing negotiations or emphasising his 
own previous counter-proposals, rather than an attempt to avoid negotiations. Perhaps, 
for example, Shaikh Zayid had been trying to get the Saudis to reconsider his previous 
proposals of sharing sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid or sharing oil revenues from the 
Zararah/Shaybah oil field.464  
After the breakdown in the Dammam talks, Shaikh Khalifa Al-Thani, Ruler of Qatar, 
agreed in December 1973 to act as an intermediary between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 
and during that month extensive discussions took place with Shaikh Zayid about King 
Faisal’s proposal (concerning Khor al-Udaid and Zararah). Shaikh Khalifa noted that: 
“the Saudis would not relent on the question of oil fields in the [Zararah] area or any 
others to the south.”465  He also informed Shaikh Zayid that King Faisal’s “take it or 
leave it” negotiating tactic was still in place and that if Shaikh Zayid wanted Saudi 
recognition of the UAE, he would have to agree to the concessions that had been 
demanded by King Faisal in May 1970. The Qatari Ruler played a substantial role in 
convincing Shaikh Zayid to cede the area west of Sabkhat al-Mattai that included Khor 
al-Udaid.466  
It should be remembered that Qatar has common boundaries with both the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia around Khor al-Udaid. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Qatari-Saudi 
agreement of 1965 gave the Saudis the right to control Khor al-Udaid, meaning that the 
UAE had to realise that the Qatari-Saudi agreement of 1965 had formalised the existing 
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Saudi control over Khor al-Udaid. It is also important to recall that the UAE had not 
exercised sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid after 1965, its latest attempt to do so having 
been in 1958.467  In fact the refusal of the UAE and Britain to recognise the 1965 
agreement did not change the reality that Saudi Arabia had obtained Khor al-Udaid 
under that agreement.468 The British Archive records do not provide a detailed account 
of Qatar’s mediation but it may be concluded, based on various circumstances, that 
following Shaikh Khalifa’s mediation, Shaikh Zayid decided to cede Khor al-Udaid in 
1973, possibly as a result of Qatar’s efforts. Arguably, Shaikh Zayid’s ceding of 
territory west of Sabkhat al-Mattai, confirmed Saudi Arabia’s rights under the Qatari-
Saudi agreement of 1965.  
After the failed talks at Dammam, both the Saudis and the British continued by and 
large to portray Shaikh Zayid as an obstacle to a resolution of the dispute, which in turn 
continued to be a biased assessment because Shaikh Zayid had offered a significant 
concession to the Saudis in the west of Abu Dhabi. A more objective assessment would 
be that Shaikh Zayid had attempted a compromise strategy and had suggested a 
mediation tactic to move the negotiations towards a mutual resolution of the dispute. 
This is the kind of situation the literature of negotiation usually describes as producing 
mutual problem-solving and “win-win” negotiated outcomes469 However, the Saudis 
refused to compromise, instead turning to the British to pressure Shaikh Zayid into 
agreeing to King Faisal’s terms. 
6.6 Progress of Negotiations Leading to the Treaty of Jeddah of 1974 
6.6.1 The Meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference at Lahore, 1974 
At Shaikh Zayid’s request, Sultan Qaboos agreed to speak to King Faisal during a 
meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference470 at Lahore, Pakistan in late 
February 1974; Qaboos duly tried to persuade King Faisal to arrange for an exchange of 
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ambassadors between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.471  In April 1974, the Foreign Office 
received a report that King Faisal and Shaikh Zayid had signed a “protocol” in which 
King Faisal agreed to drop Al-Ain/Buraimi and recognise the UAE in exchange for a 
vaguely defined section of territory in the south of Abu Dhabi and a corridor to the Gulf 
near Qatar. What was described as a “protocol” had allegedly been signed, whereby 
King Faisal agreed to recognise the UAE and give up his claim to Buraimi Oasis region 
in return for: 
(a) A triangle of Abu Dhabi territory having for one side the 1955 frontier 
(b) A corridor through Abu Dhabi territory to the sea in the vicinity of the base of 
the Qatar peninsula.	  472  
Of particular significance here was that in 1974, the British and the Americans 
depended exclusively on second-hand information and that, as a result, information 
reported about the outcome of the Treaty of Jeddah was inaccurate. For example, 
Foreign Office officials were unaware of any current Abu Dhabi-Saudi talks. A Foreign 
Office minute concluded: “we know that the question of the frontier was raised between 
King Faisal and Shaikh [Zayid] at Lahore in February and there has been some 
discussion on the subject between HM Ambassador Doha and Saudi Ambassador in 
Beirut since then.”473 The US Secretary of State received a report from Richard J. 
Griffin, about the aftermath of the Lahore conference. When the conference failed to 
achieve a breakthrough over the boundary question, the UAE had requested Qatar to 
mediate on the UAE’s behalf with Saudi Arabia; the UAE’s foreign minister, Ahmed 
Suwaidi, confirmed to Griffin that the UAE was “Now relying primarily on mediation 
efforts of Qataris.”474  
In the middle of July 1974, the Foreign Office received a report from a British official 
in Oman that Ahmed Suwaidi had told Sultan Qaboos that: “the UAE was holding very 
secret negotiations with the Saudis and they appeared to be ‘getting somewhere’.”475 In 
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an alternative version, the US Secretary of State received a report form Michael Sterner, 
US Ambassador in the UAE, that Suwaidi had commented on the current UAE-Saudi 
negotiations efforts to the effect that “They are going well.” But he gave no details of 
the mediators involved, where the negotiations were being held, or details of the 
proposals being discussed by the two sides.476 
6.6.2 Announcement of a UAE-Saudi Agreement 
On 29 July 1974, the Saudi government announced that a meeting would take place in 
Abu Dhabi between Prince Fahd and Shaikh Zayid at the latter’s invitation.477 It is 
important to point out that Shaikh Rashid of Dubai, Omar Saqqf and Kamal Adham 
attended the meeting. The negotiations have been conducted with great secrecy. Shaikh 
Khalifia, the Ruler of Qatar, was instrumental in bringing the two sides together and 
mediated the meeting.478 On the following day, Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued a joint 
communiqué announcing that Prince Fahd and Shaikh Zayid had concluded an 
agreement. In part, the communiqué stated that:  
[Prince Fahd and Shaikh Zayid] had studied the border problem 
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates of [the 
UAE] and reviewed all the proposals which were submitted by a 
joint committee by the two sides. They reached a solution to this 
problem, which is acceptable to both sides and initialed an 
agreement to this effect. The final signing of this agreement will 
take place during the visit which [Shaikh Zayid] will make to 
Saudi Arabia in response to an invitation from his majesty king 
Faisal which was delivered by Prince Fahd.479 
In fact, there is no clear evidence from the British archives to indicate why Shaikh 
Zayid suddenly accepted King Faisal’s terms, and that issue remains confusing to this 
day. However, the British archival evidence does suggest that from 1970 through to 
1974, Shaikh Zayid could not realistically have expected the Saudis to move from their 
positional commitments or to modify King Faisal’s terms. During that time, if Zayid 
offered a counterproposal, the Saudis refused to even consider it. In addition, Saudi 
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interference in the domestic affairs of Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah undermined 
Abu Dhabi and threatened the unity of the new federation.  
Evidence from the British archives and American reports point to the vital role played 
by the Qatari Ruler in persuading Shaikh Zayid in December 1973 and July 1974 to 
accept King Faisal’s terms. By 31 July 1974, the Foreign Office had been informed that, 
in addition to the Ruler of Qatar serving as mediator, Prince Fahd was representing 
Saudi Arabia in the negotiations and Ahmed Suwaidi, Mana Otaiba, and Mehdi Tajir 
were representing the UAE.480 At approximately the same time, Hume Alexander 
Horan, US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, met Prince Fahd following the secret 
negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Horan reported that, according to 
Prince Fahd, 
Saudi Arabia had obtained its objectives with regard to the 
disputed [Zararah] oil field and had obtained also a passageway 
to the Gulf. [Prince] Fahd spoke warmly of the signing 
ceremony. Shaikh Zayid had made it clear the boundary 
demarcation was merely a formality. In fact, there were ‘no such 
things as boundaries on the Arabian Peninsula since all of the 
states were merely branches on the Great tree of their father 
Faisal’.481 
However, on the UAE side, things were not nearly as clear as Prince Fahd may have 
suggested to Ambassador Horan. In particular, there were conflicting reports and claims 
about the disposition of the Zararah oil field. A US document dated 31 July 1974 
confirmed that the UAE had kept most of the Zararah field. When Michael Edmund 
Sterner, US Ambassador to the UAE, spoke to Harbroush, the UAE’s Minister of State 
for Economy and Industry, the latter also confirmed to the ambassador that the UAE 
had not conceded the majority of the oil field to Saudi Arabia.  Harbroush indicated that 
“UAE will give Saudis larger portion of Zararah oilfield, but not all of it… [of] 3 
proven wells in this field presently on Abu Dhabi side, one will now fall in Saudi 
territory, while other two will remain in Abu Dhabi.” But when Ambassador Sterner 
asked if the Saudis had obtained control of Zararah’s production, Harbroush “claimed 
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not repeat not”.482  
In mid-August, however, Abdullah Ismail, Under Secretary at Abu Dhabi’s Department 
of Petroleum and Industry, contradicted Harbroush’s account. Whereas Harbroush 
claimed that Abu Dhabi had received two oil wells, Ismail now said that two of the 
three wells belonged to Saudi Arabia and one to Abu Dhabi. According to his account, 
“... of [Zararah] wells drilled in [Zararah] field, two would go to Saudis and only one to 
Abu Dhabi rather than vice versa as indicated by Habroush.”483 Ismail’s account is 
clearly consistent with Prince Fahd’s statements to Ambassador Horan that “Saudi 
Arabia had obtained its objectives with regard to the disputed [Zararah] oil field”,484  if 
not with the remarks made by Harbroush to Ambassador Sterner. 
6.6.3 British and American Interpretations of the Agreement 
A letter dated 1 August 1974 from the Foreign Office to a British official in Abu Dhabi, 
suggested that the Saudis seemed to have dropped their consistent refusal to share the 
oil at Zararah. The British based their conjecture on the fact that it was rumoured that 
while the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company would lose wells no. 1 and no. 4, it would 
retain wells no. 2 and no. 3.485  However, the British judgment was premature for two 
reasons. First, the British had very little information about the terms of the agreement 
reached by Prince Fahd and Shaikh Zayid. Second, King Faisal and Shaikh Zayid were 
not due to sign the final agreement, the Treaty of Jeddah, for another three weeks. The 
Americans also faced constraints with respect to accurate information. According to 
Ambassador Sterner, reporting from Abu Dhabi on 7 August 1974: 
We have still not seen the map of border changes and therefore 
cannot describe them with any greater precision than general 
description provided reftel. Only further report we have heard 
(as yet unconfirmed) is that agreement provides that off-shore 
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rights along shoreline ceded to Saudi Arabia are “unaffected”, 
perhaps meaning that Abu Dhabi retains them beyond normal 
territorial waters which we suppose would have to be transferred 
to Saudi Arabia along with shoreline.486 
In addition, when William A. Stoltzfus, US Ambassador to Kuwait, asked Shaikh 
Suhaym bin Hamad Al-Thani, Foreign Minister of Qatar, about progress on the UAE-
Saudi negotiations, the foreign minister confirmed it had taken three trips to Riyadh 
during 1974 to reach a settlement in the presence of both King Faisal and Shaikh 
Zayid.487 On 13 August, Brian Pridham (who later became Director of the Centre for 
Arab Gulf Studies) reported to the Foreign Office remarks by Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, 
the UAE Oil Minister, that he had negotiated the preliminary agreement with the 
Saudis. Al-Otaiba said that the Saudis were interested primarily in the oil. According to 
the British report from Abu Dhabi:   
[al-Otaiba] seems to have no doubt however that the final 
agreement will be reached without any problem and indicated 
that from the Abu Dhabi viewpoint there was no objection to the 
lines being moved to give the Saudis all the oil they 
wanted[emphasis added].488 
The Treaty of Jeddah was proclaimed on 21 August 1974, but the British had still not 
fully understood its provisions. For example, officials at the Foreign Office concluded 
that: “there are two particular points of obscurity which we will need to clarify. The first 
relates to the position of the border on the west of Abu Dhabi. The second relates to the 
arrangement for oil sharing.”489   
It is easy to deduce from Foreign Office minutes that the British were not well 
informed. The Treaty of Jeddah did not contain any provision for oil sharing.490 And it 
is also important to point out that Saudi Arabia did not officially register the Treaty of 
Jeddah with the United Nations until 1993.  While it is true that the British were 
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ignorant of the contents of the Treaty in August 1974, the secrecy surrounding the 
agreement for nearly twenty years would make it extremely difficult to understand.  
6.6.4 The Treaty of Jeddah 
The joint UAE-Saudi communiqué on 21 August announcing the Treaty of Jeddah 
stated that the UAE and Saudi Arabia would exchange ambassadors, so it appeared that 
the Saudis had at last agreed to diplomatic recognition of the UAE. The communiqué’s 
emphasis on Arab/Islamic unity clearly reflects a commitment to Gulf security based on 
shared opposition to radical Arab regimes (Arab nationalist movements).491 
Furthermore, its emphasis on common interests and a common cultural background also 
suggested that the negotiation was conducted according to Arab negotiation style. For 
example, during the negotiations at Jeddah in August 1974, King Faisal and Shaikh 
Zayid had exchanged complimentary remarks in which each ruler acknowledged the 
other’s sovereignty over his territory. This is the account of conversation between 
Shaikh Zayid and King Faisal: 
King Faisal: The whole thing to us is a matter of dignity and 
honour. British evicted us by force [from Hamasa] and we won’t 
forget that. Our 1970 proposal for Saudi Arabia’s eastern border 
is quite reasonable.  
Shaikh Zayid: No, Your Majesty. Your eastern boundary should 
be like this [taking a pencil and drawing a line in the middle of 
the Gulf from the Shatt al-Arab to the Strait of Hormuz]. 
King Faisal: Now, we have a solution. We consider your border 
in the heart of the Kingdom. 
Shaikh Zayid: We consider your order to be at the end of the 
Emirates.492 
In response to a question about the supposed conversation between King Faisal and 
Shaikh Zayid, Dr al-Ulama said the conversation would be an example of a mutual 
exchange of “Arab courtesies” or “Arab compliments”.  Although it is consistent with 
Arab culture to be courteous and generous with compliments, according to al-Ulama, it 
is a matter of form and not substance.493 
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translation of Saudi/ Abu Dhabi Joint Communiqué, 21 August 1974, FCO8/2357,TNA, London, in 
Arabian Boundaries, vol. 15, ed. Schofield, p. 248. 
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493 Hesam al-Ulama, Interview, Washington DC, 16 November 2010. 
149 
 
The UAE delegation and Shaikh Zayid himself were embarrassed by the fervent 
welcome from the Saudi side on the day that the Treaty was signed. Some sources 
blamed the UAE side for its failure to prepare the draft without completing surveys or 
seeking the opinions of specialist consultants.494 In addition, the British archives show 
Shaikh Muhammad Nuri Ibrahim, a Saudi official, indicating that “Shaikh Zayid was a 
bit of a fool”. Acknowledging that the negotiation process related to the Treaty of 
Jeddah was rushed, Ibrahim also stated that the Saudis were worried that Shaikh Zayid 
would change his mind if the talks proceeded more slowly.495 
Importantly, it became apparent in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Treaty 
of Jeddah, that the precise boundaries established under the Treaty were not clearly 
comprehended, and that representatives of the UAE understood the terms of the Treaty 
differently. Furthermore, it became known that the UAE had agreed to “secret 
negotiations” with the Saudis in July 1974 with the pre-condition that Shaikh Zayid 
would sign an agreement in August. 
This situation, in fact, raises questions. Does the text of the Treaty of Jeddah accurately 
reflect the “secret negotiations” and the verbal agreement reached at the meeting of 29 
July 1974? If not, what evidence is there that would support a discrepancy between 
verbal and written communication? Without evidence, these questions are difficult to 
answer, but a reasonable person might well wonder whether senior members of the 
UAE government checked the content of the Treaty before it was signed or Shaikh 
Zayid had actually understood the provisions of the Treaty before signing it.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, verbal communication in some matters under negotiation was 
consistent with Arab negotiating style. However, the event relating to the verbal 
agreement or secret negotiations remains ambiguous for two reasons. First, the British 
archival record makes no mention of the meeting and there is no written record of it 
available, so the content of the discussion at the meeting is not known. Second, it is 
widely believed that the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah were based on that discussion. 
As Chapter 4 suggests, Arabs tend to communicate verbally rather than in writing. That 
preference would cause problems in the absence of any written record of the verbal 
communication. 
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6.7 Reactions towards Treaty of Jeddah 
6.7.1 Confusion in Understanding the Treaty of Jeddah’s Provisions  
On 23 August 1974, two days after the Treaty of Jeddah was announced, the Foreign 
Office reported an exchange of communications between Mana Saeed al-Otaiba and 
personnel from British Petroleum. According to the British report, al-Otaiba informed 
BP that according to the UAE-Saudi agreement:  
Where an oil field straddled the boundary further development 
should be left to the state under which the greater part of that 
field fell. Shaikh [Zayid] has however denied to Sir G. Arthur 
that there have been any special arrangements for oil and that 
both states retain full rights and responsibilities for oil 
development and production on their respective sides of the 
border [emphasis added].496  
This telegram was significant because it indicated that after signing the Treaty of 
Jeddah, Shaikh Zayid and al-Otaiba understood the agreement in two quite different 
ways. British officials continued to believe that Abu Dhabi still retained two of the oil 
wells developed in Zararah by the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company. Brian Pridham 
stated that according to "authoritative sources," UAE would receive fifty percent of the 
oil revenues from Zararah.497 Confirming that perception, a report on 25 August from 
the British Residency in Abu Dhabi to the Foreign Office stated: “[Shaikh Zayid may 
not fully understand what he has signed.”498 On 27 of August, Wright reports that 
“several of the implications of the agreement are still unclear. Shaikh Khalifa of Qatar 
has, for example, told Mr Henderson [British ambassador in Qatar] of his concern at 
alleged differences of interpretation between the Saudis and the UAE of where the 
western seacoast border lies. There is also some uncertainty about the implications of 
the agreement for future oil exploration and development on both sides of the 
border.”499   
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During the first week of September 1974, the Foreign Office reported that al-Otaiba had 
informed an executive at ADPC that the agreement regarding the division of oil had 
been verbal and not written down,500 and that ADPC was concerned by the ambiguity of 
al-Otaiba’s explanations of this point. An alternative version of al-Otaiba’s 
interpretation of the Treaty was confirmed by him to Sam Peale, US Chargé d’Affaires 
in Abu Dhabi, to the effect that:  
Marzouk [oil] field in west [of Abu Dhabi] being developed by 
Phillips has been conceded to SAG [Saudi Arabia Government]. 
As for southern border, stating that line intersected with Saudi 
border on [the] east at point some 12 km south of tri-nation 
border intersection. He reiterated that this left most of [Zararah] 
field to Saudi.501  
If neither Shaikh Zayid nor al-Otaiba seemed to understand the provisions of the treaty, 
the same was true for Ahmed Suwaidi. On 30 August 1974, the Foreign Office reported 
a meeting between Suwaidi and the British Minister of State, during which Suwaidi 
declared that Abu Dhabi had retained between 20 and 25 percent of the Zararah oil 
field, but failed to enlighten the British as to the distribution of oil revenues under the 
Jeddah Treaty.502 However, in the case of Suwaidi a conflict would eventually emerge 
between his version and the version that appeared in the Treaty of Jeddah.503 Suwaidi 
appears to have been unaware of the important details covered in the Treaty, and 
specifically its provisions with regard to sovereignty over the Zararah oil field and the 
distribution of oil revenues.  
A more puzzling matter is why Ahmed Suwaidi told British officials and oil company 
executives that, under the Treaty of Jeddah, the UAE retained some of the wells in the 
Zararah oil field and would share oil revenues with Saudi Arabia while al-Otaiba 
confirmed that the Zararah oilfield was ceded to Saudi Arabia. Having studied the 
Treaty, it appears that Suwaidi’s statement was false. Even when Suwaidi was asked 
about the status of the UAE-Saudi maritime boundary, he was vague and did not give an 
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answer to it.504 Obviously, he could not give any explanations to the maritime 
boundaries because these had not been defined yet under Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Jeddah. When the same question was asked to Shaikh Zayid, he informed Sir G. Arthur 
that King Faisal wrote to him a letter disclaiming his rights to sea-bed resources off the 
apart of Abu Dhabi coastline now ceded to Saudi Arabia.505 Article five states the 
following: 
The United Arab Emirates recognises the sovereignty of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over Huwaysat Island, and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises the sovereignty of the 
United Arab Emirates over all the other islands opposite its 
coast on the Arabian Gulf. 
Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall, as soon as 
possible, delimit the offshore boundaries between the territory of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the United 
Arab Emirates and between all of the islands subject to the 
sovereignty of each of them. They shall do so on the basis of 
equity as well ensure free and direct access to the high seas from 
the territorial waters of that part of the territory of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the territory of the United Arab 
Emirates and from the territorial waters of Huwasyat island 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and in such a manner to take 
account of suitability for deep-water navigation between high 
seas and that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia indicated above. The High Contracting Parties shall 
have joint sovereignty over the entire water linking the 
territorial waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high 
seas, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph 
[emphasis added].506  
Although Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah stated that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates would have joint sovereignty over the high seas, the vagueness of this Article 
disturbed both parties to the Treaty. Consequently, King Faisal and Shaikh Zayid agreed 
to exchange letters of clarification that would be appended to the Treaty. According to 
King Faisal’s letter 
“I should like to convey to Your Highness that the 
understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of “joint 
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sovereignty over the entire area linkage the territorial water of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas, in accordance 
with the provisions of this paragraph” does not extend to 
ownership of natural resources to be owned by the United Arab 
Emirates alone as an exception of the rights of joint 
sovereignty.”507 
Shaikh Zayid’s letter in response to King Faisal indicates “…the understanding of the 
United Arab Emirates with regard to the ownership of the natural resources indicated in 
your Majesty’s letter is in accord with the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia”508 Taken together, Article 5 and the letters create an arrangement that bestows 
sovereign powers for both parties. On one hand, the UAE got complete rights to 
maritime natural resources. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was free to use Khor al-
Udaid as a point of access to the high seas. However, according to Schofield, Article 5 
still requires further clarification as to the specifics of the exercise of joint 
sovereignty.509 
6.7.2 Signs of the Dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Jeddah  
Despite the fact that the Saudis had achieved their objectives through the Treaty of 
Jeddah, Mr Helaissi, the Saudi Ambassador to Great Britain, and Prince Fahd declined 
an invitation to join British officials and Shaikh Zayid for dinner on 9 September 1974.  
Helaissi also “added the sour comment that if this invitation was intended as a 
‘celebration’ of the UAE/Saudi border agreement, his view was that this was not 
something which deserved celebration.”510 Mr. Helaissi’s remarks about the Treaty of 
Jeddah’s outcome were mainly directed to criticising the Saudi side. Mr. Helaissi’s 
remarks are significant for several reasons. First, he said, the treaty left the Umm al-
Zamul area, which “included important oilfields”,511 on the Abu Dhabi side. Second, the 
Treaty of Jeddah was largely silent about the Omani border with Abu Dhabi. Zawawi, 
Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, commenting on the status of Umm al-Zamul to 
Stoltzfus, US Ambassador to Kuwait, said that “There is oil structure [in] that vicinity 
being explored both by Abu Dhabi and Oman on their respective sides of border, known 
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as Lekhwair on Omani side but another name on western [Abu Dhabi] side of line.”512 
That explained Helaissi’s sour comment as to why the Treaty did not deserve 
celebration. Quite simply the outcome of the Treaty gave the Saudis no rights over any 
of the oil in the Umm al-Zamul area.  
In addition to the status of Umm al-Zamul, the Saudi Ambassador’s complaint about no 
Omani participation in the negotiations supposedly suggests a focus on the Al-
Ain/Buraimi region. Interestingly, the Saudi complaint about Omani participation seems 
strange, since 1949 Al-Ain/Buraimi had always been an issue between Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia. Although Al-Ain/Buraimi was not mentioned in the Treaty, it was 
understood that the Saudis would drop their claim to Al-Ain Buraimi region in return 
for cession of areas in the south and west of Abu Dhabi. Going strictly by the actual text 
of the Treaty, it seems difficult to understand what the UAE had gained.513  
If the Saudi Ambassador to Great Britain was the first to suggest Saudi dissatisfaction 
with the Treaty, by December 1974, signs of Emirati dissatisfaction with the UAE 
negotiating team had also begun to appear. For example, in a message from Dubai to the 
Foreign Office, a British official reported a conversation with Mehdi Tajir, the UAE 
Ambassador in London. According to the British official’s report, Tajir had said:  
[it was al-Otaiba’s responsibility] to discuss geographical details 
with Yamani [Saudi Oil Minister], but he made a nonsense of it. 
Kicking up a fuss about the areas and in general getting away 
from the spirit of the agreement. Mehdi told me, on 12 
December, that Mana’s demands had so annoyed the Saudis that 
they had dropped discussion of the subject with him. During his 
visit, Mehdi had been asked by [Prince] Fahd to smooth things 
over on the basis of whatever [Zayid] wants we will agree to, as 
long as we are not made fools of.514 
In any event, Tajir’s statements about Otaiba suggest that by December 1974, 
dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Jeddah existed in the UAE and Mehdi Tajir wanted to 
blame someone for an unsatisfactory agreement. It is believed that Mehdi Tajir had a 
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personal grudge against al-Otaiba and Suwaidi; for instance Ivor Lucas thinks that the 
longstanding rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Dubai may well have been reflected in the 
prickly relationship between Tajir and al-Otaiba.515  Such feelings may well have 
extended to their parts in the negotiation process, to relations with the Saudis, and to 
their reports on the provisions of the Treaty of Jeddah. Overall, residual dissatisfaction 
was present throughout the negotiation process from 1935 to 1974, and even in the 
aftermath of the treaty. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The balance of power in the Gulf region changed considerably as a result of Britain’s 
military withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 December 1971. This fact had a strong impact 
on the negotiations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Initially, it was proposed that 
Saudi Arabia and Iran would fill the security vacuum created by the British withdrawal; 
this enabled the Saudi to control the outcomes of the negotiation process. As discussed, 
Britain’s “disinterested role” was challenged by both the Iranians and the Saudis. In the 
case of Iran, the British pushed the UAE to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. In 
the case of Saudi Arabia, the Saudis failed to push Britain to make the UAE accept 
Saudi Arabia’s terms. Even when the Saudis used pressure tactics against Britain by 
cancelling the Saudi National Guard contract and the Air Force Scheme, Britain did not 
act as an active mediator in the negotiations because it did not want to damage its 
interests with either Saudi Arabia or the UAE.  
The chapter concludes that Shaikh Zayid attempted to negotiate in a straightforward 
manner.  Over three years, he attempted to make several counter proposals, all of which 
were consistently rejected by the Saudis. During 1973-74, in response to an unyielding 
Saudi control negotiation strategy, Shaikh Zayid offered more territorial concessions 
such as an area west of Sabkhat al-Mattai that included Khor al-Udaid in the hope that 
the Saudis would reconsider their position over King Fasial’s proposal. Later in 1974, 
Shaikh Zayid seems to have given up his ‘compromise to accommodate’ strategy.  
After the British withdrawal from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s political power increased 
significantly, enough to enable King Faisal to control the negotiation process. The 
Saudis pursued a controlled negotiation strategy from 4 May 1970 until the signing of 
the Treaty of Jeddah on 21 August 1974. Their tactics included a “take it or leave it” 
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negotiating position, the threat of returning to the Saudi claim of 1949, and a refusal to 
negotiate. After the British withdrawal, Saudi Arabia also adopted a more aggressive 
tactic by establishing direct political relations with Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Dubai 
in attempt to undermine Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia’s tactics and strategy were successful 
and, at the end of July 1974, the UAE made a deal over King Faisal’s proposals. 
This study found that it was hard to follow the development of the UAE-Saudi Arabia 
secret negotiations held on 29 July 1974, which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 21 August 
1974. This is because the details of these secret negotiations are not available in the 
British Archives or US reports, and there is therefore no complete picture of the 
negotiations. The records reveal that the UAE negotiating team516 reported a series of 
misleading details about the Treaty to the British and the Americans. I note the 
discrepancies between statements about the Treaty of Jeddah, as reported in the British 
and American records, and the actual text of the Treaty that was made public in 1995. 
From what we do know, it seems that some of the UAE representatives did not act 
responsibly with regard to the Treaty, or did not understand the scope of their assigned 
duties. There are several questions to ask about the UAE negotiation team. Did they 
actually understand the details contained in the Treaty of Jeddah? Were they 
incompetent negotiators? Did the Saudis deceive them by verbally agreeing to terms 
that were not in the Treaty’s written text? The answers to these questions are important 
since they might help in identifying the gaps that occurred in the final phase of the 
negotiation that led to the Treaty of Jeddah.517 As stated on page 149, the thesis has not 
been able to answer a few questions and these are among them.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
UAE-Saudi Territorial Disputes, 1975-2012 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In discussing the revival of the UAE-Saudi Arabia border dispute in 2004, most of the 
pertinent information came from media accounts and academic newsletters, although 
such material tended to lack the substantive background of the case study. Ideally, 
conducting interviews and collecting reports from the UAE and Saudi Arabia Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs would provide the necessary background to put the recent revival of 
the dispute into perspective.  
Chapter 7 traces the development of the boundary question from 1975 up to the status of 
the dispute at the present time. It did, however, encounter some difficulties regarding 
the UAE’s stance on the boundary question between 1979 and 1990, an important 
period during which the political history of the wider Gulf was affected by several 
crucial events. These events are looked at briefly in order to establish why the boundary 
question lay dormant for some years. 518  
In an attempt to answer the question raised by the revival of the UAE’s dispute in 2004, 
under Shaikh Khalifa (current President of the UAE, who has been in office since 
2004), the chapter also tries to distinguish between the two regimes in the UAE that 
were involved with the boundary question, and whether they continued on the same 
path or adopted different negotiating strategies. In other words, did that revival reflect 
continuity with the previous regime? It doing so, it is necessary to overcome the media-
created misconception that the UAE’s revival of the dispute erupted in 2004; instead it 
argues that the UAE’s dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Jeddah was rooted in the 
regime of Shaikh Zayid and not in that of Shaikh Khalifa, and therefore goes back to 
1975. The chapter provides evidence to support that argument and shows that Saudi 
Arabia had been fully aware of the UAE’s dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Jeddah 
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since 1975, which is why the Saudis took steps, through Khor al-Udaid and 
Zararah/Shaybah, to “carry out the August 1974 treaty with the UAE”519, hastened to 
register the Treaty of Jeddah with the United Nations, and published it in 1995.    
This study examines the Treaty of Jeddah, looking in particular at the Articles relevant 
to the revival of the territorial dispute from 2004 onwards in an attempt to establish why 
they are disputed. It considers other issues related to the content of the Treaty, such as 
ratification, use of language, and the Al-Ain/Buraimi region, and also provides an 
analysis of the Articles as a whole, in order to demonstrate that the UAE government 
has not, as suggested by some scholars, 520  rejected all of the Treaty’s Articles out of 
hand.  
7.2 The UAE’s Dissatisfaction with the Treaty Articles since 1975  
From the public point of view, it might appear that UAE dissatisfaction with the Treaty 
of Jeddah emerged suddenly in 2004, especially after Shaikh Zayid’s death,521 but from 
the UAE government’s perspective, the Treaty had been regarded as unfair since 1974. 
Even among scholars, secrecy and misinformation obscured the UAE’s dissatisfaction. 
For example, Al-Akkad portrayed Saudi Arabia’s dropping of its claim to Al-
Ain/Buraimi as a concession made by the Saudis during Shaikh Zayid’s visit to Riyadh 
in July 1974, but he added that it “is not  known exactly what happened”522 and to what 
extent the Emirates were satisfied with the outcome of the meeting. 
In 1975, a year after the Treaty of Jeddah was signed, King Faisal was assassinated by 
Prince Faisal bin Musaid bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud.  Discussing this untoward event, 
Saudi state media emphasised the assassin’s mental illness and drug use as well as the 
corrupting influence of the West, where he had been an undergraduate student. The 
assassination of King Faisal was possibly the first crisis of succession in the history of 
Saudi Arabia. According to Posner, the new king, Khalid bin Abdul al-Aziz, “kept a 
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low profile ... and let his half-brother [Prince] Fahd ibn Abdul al-Aziz, who became 
crown prince, control many of the day-to-day operations of the government. Most of the 
ministers, policies, and programs remained unchanged from Faisal’s tenure.”523 In fact 
Prince Fahd continued as Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler until King Khalid died in 1982, 
at which point he became king of Saudi Arabia.  
Significantly, in the aftermath of the 1975 assassination of King Faisal, Shaikh Zayid 
found himself having to face virtually the same Saudi team that he had dealt with in the 
negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Jeddah. As discussed in Chapter 6, Prince Fahd 
had been categorised at that time as one of the Saudi government “hawks” who was 
strongly opposed to the UAE team negotiating over King Faisal’s proposal.524   
The first official attempt by the UAE to gain clarification of the vague provisions of the 
Treaty of Jeddah occurred six months after King Faisal’s assassination, when the UAE 
foreign minister, Ahmed Al-Suwaidi, visited Riyadh on 28 September 1975. It was 
reported that the purpose of the visit was not publicly known. However, R. O. Miles 
told the Foreign Office that according to Ghazi Abdulla Ashur, a UAE informant, the 
visit was concerned specifically with the problem of free transit along the road between 
Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Miles noted that, in effect, the Saudi response to the UAE 
question amounted to: “our territory is your territory and your territory is ours”, 525 and 
that the Saudi attitude seemed to have been more of a compliment than clarification of 
the situation.  
Up to 1976, the situation regarding free transit was unclear to both the UAE and Qatar, 
so they agreed to establish a new highway to link their territories. However, the road 
building was halted by the Saudis, who claimed that the construction company was 
operating on Saudi territory.526 In fact both the 1975 visit to Jeddah by the UAE, and the 
UAE-Qatari action of 1976, drew Saudi attention to the free transit arrangement that 
existed between Qatar and the UAE, and in 1976, Saudi Arabia duly took action. It was 
reported in the Middle East Economic Digest that a survey team working for the Saudi 
Ports Authority had examined the possibility of building a port at Ras Khumays, located 
                                                
523 Gerald Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-US Connection (New York, 
Random House, 2005), p. 73. 
524 See Chapter 5, The House of Saud’s Views on the Disputed Lands, p. 118.       
525 R. O. Miles (Jeddah), to T. J. Clark (Foreign Office), ‘UAE/ Saudi Frontier’, 4 October 1975, 
FCO8/2422, TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 16, ed. Schofield, p. 391. 
526 Gideon Biger, The Encyclopaedia of International Boundaries, International Boundaries Research 
Unit, University of Durham, England, 1995, p. 462. 
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in UAE territory. The report also indicated that Saudi activity at Ras Khumays centred 
on a 40-man camp for which a Saudi-Irish company had a SR4 million (US$1.2 million) 
contract, and further suggested that when the 1974 agreement had been sealed with 
King Khalid in 1976, this had completed the process of Saudi recognition of the 
UAE!527  
The Saudis had thus succeeded in gaining a “window to the sea” around 15-20 miles 
wide, which included territory east of Ras Khumays; in so doing they secured more 
concessions in the west of Abu Dhabi than what had been gained from the Treaty of 
Jeddah. In return for agreeing to move Abu Dhabi’s border 20 miles in Saudi Arabia’s 
favour, thus enabling the Saudis to complete the Abu Dhabi-Qatar road through the 
Saudi corridor, Shaikh Zayid was given a cheque for DH 127.9 million (US$34.5 
million).528  In an alternative version given by Cordesman: “the Saudi government 
forced Abu Dhabi to move its border 20 miles further east on the Gulf coast, although it 
paid Abu Dhabi’s ruler, Shaikh [Zayid], some 33 million dollars in personal 
compensation.”529  
The development of the western area of Abu Dhabi was finalised in a new agreement, 
concluded in 1977, through which Saudi Arabia, under King Khalid, obtained major 
concessions from 1974-77; it became clear that, under Shaikh Zayid, the UAE had 
completely relinquished Khor al-Udaid. In 1976 the UAE Ministry of Petroleum had 
published a map that reflected the major oil concessions (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2).  The 
Saudi action revealed that the western boundary of Abu Dhabi had not been finally 
settled by the Treaty of Jeddah 1974, and refuted the long-held British belief that, given 
Khor al-Udaid’s physical characteristics, it was unlikely that the Saudis would annex 
this coastal strip, because the water was too shallow for navigation.530  
In questioning the availability of the 1977 Treaty at the United Nations, it appears that 
this agreement has remained unrecognized internationally. All the information that 
could be obtained was that the new treaty’s provisions did not include an Article about 
                                                
527 The issue of complete Saudi recognition of the UAE in 1976 raised some doubts. Saudi Arabia had 
established officially diplomatic relations with the UAE on 9 November 1974, when Abdul Aziz Saif al-
Midfa, was appointed as Chargé d’Affaires to the UAE, and received his credentials from the Saudi 
Embassy in Abu Dhabi, sources from: Saudi Embassy, Abu Dhabi, correspondence, 15 July 2013.  
528 Anon, “Saudi Window in the Gulf”, Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), vol. 24, no 31, 1 August 
1980, p. 31. 
529 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 416. 
530 Foreign Office Minutes by N. J. G. Bowie, ‘The Buraimi Dispute’, 15 December 1975, FCO8/2425, 
TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol.16, ed. Schofield, pp. 392-393. 
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the status of Zararah. According to a UAE diplomat, under Shaikh Zayid’s regime the 
UAE government sent “many unpublished letters”, from 1975 onwards, to King Khalid 
and to King Fahd informing the Saudis that the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah would 
have to be amended since some of the Treaty’s provisions could not be implemented, 
“especially Article 3 related to oil and Article 5 related to the maritime boundary.”531 
In fact, the UAE has continued to send letters to the office of the UN Secretary General 
that are consistent with the diplomat’s statement. For example, a letter from December 
2009 mentions a letter from Mana Saeed al- Otaiba to King Khalid on 16 October 1975 
and two letters from Shaikh Zayid to King Fahd on 3 November 1993 and 7 November 
1998.532 This study assumes that these letters might have requested renegotiation of the 
status of the Zararah/Shaybah oilfield but not the western land of Abu Dhabi. 
Interestingly, according to the UAE’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Saudi 
Arabia has not replied to these letters. But what is most significant is that Saudi Arabia 
has been aware of the UAE’s dissatisfaction with the Treaty since 1975. 
Figure 7.1: The UAE Map of the Ministry of Petroleum (1976) 
 
Sources: Hesam M. J. S. Al-Ulama, The Federal Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 1994, p. 171. 
                                                
531 Anonymous UAE diplomat, Interview, New York, 12 December 2010.  
532 Untitled Note, From United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Office of His 
Excellency UN Secretary General, New York, UN, 27 December 2009. 
Figure 4.12 The United Arab Emirates map of the Ministry of Petroleum (1976).
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Figure 7.2: Map Depicting the Ceded Territories, 1974-77 
 
 Source: UAE University (1993), The National Atlas of the United Arab Emirates Al Ain: 
United Arab Emirates University, p.31. 
7.3 Saudi Arabia’s Position toward the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah  
7.3.1 Khor al-Udaid  
For a few years, the Treaty of Jeddah had little impact on the area of Khor al-Udaid and 
south of Liwa. For example, from 1974 until the 1980s there were no physical Saudi 
checkpoints between Qatar and the UAE, and citizens of both countries moved freely 
back and forth without interference from the Saudi government. Also, and despite 
having gained significant concessions in 1977, the Saudis did not construct the actual 
road until after 1990. According to a source interviewed for this research who regularly 
visited relatives in Qatar up to the 1990s it was clear that no Saudi checkpoint had yet 
been built.533  
However, in June 1990, the direct land road connecting the UAE and Qatar was closed 
for the first time. The Saudis instead opened a new road, Al-Ghuwaifat, connecting 
Saudi Arabian territory with the UAE through Al-Sila and closed the old road at Al-
Sila, connecting Abu Dhabi with the Qatari border through Sodantale (see Figure 7.3). 
This was the first time that the direct land transportation route between Abu Dhabi and 
Qatar had been disrupted. According to a Kuwaiti newspaper, the Saudi actions were 
                                                
533 Abu Khalid, Interview, Abu Dhabi, 11 August 2011. 
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“meant essentially, as it seemed, to carry out the August 1974 treaty with the UAE”,534 
to which the present study adds the Treaty of 1977.  UAE military sources confirmed 
that during the 1990s the Saudi government had taken two steps to emphasise its eastern 
borders. First, the Saudi government paid money to Saudi tribes to relocate near Khor 
al-Udaid and claimed they had been living there for a long time. Second, the Saudis 
built various military infrastructures near the inlet.535   
Figure 7.3: Map Showing Al-Sila’s Connection to Al-Ghuwaifat 
 
Source: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/truck-drivers-endure-hardship-at-uae-saudi-
border-1.29072 (Accessed 27 June 2013) 
7.2.2 South of Liwa (Zararah/Shaybah)  
In 1992, the UAE wished to renegotiate the status of the 20 percent of Zararah that was 
located within Abu Dhabi’s territory. However, Saudi Arabia’s assertion of sovereignty 
over Shaybah continued throughout the 1990s. As reported by the Gulf States 
Newsletter:  
Abu Dhabi officials quietly visited Riyadh in 1992 to discuss the 
possible joint development of Shaybah and a proposed pipeline 
across Emirati borders –– but this apparently met with a 
lukewarm response. A more vivid reminder of this resentment 
was the UAE’s boycott of an oil ministers’ meeting convened by 
the Saudis when they officially inaugurated Shaybah in 1999.536 
                                                
534 Anon, “Al-Riyadh Line Blows up a Past and Never Draws a Future,” Al-Azminah al-Arabiyya 
(Kuwait), issue 239, October 1991, p. 6 (in Arabic). 
535 Captain Waleed Mohammed Al-Shamis, Head Military Attaché, UAE Embassy, Interview, 
Washington 26 November, 2010. 
536 Anon, “Old Enmities Hold Up Progress on Regional Integration,” Gulf States Newsletter, issue 761, 
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It may be worthwhile to emphasize that the Treaty of Jeddah was not publicly available 
until 1995. Once it had been registered during the reign of King Fahd in 1993, drilling 
operations in Shaybah were scheduled to start in the same year but were put back 
several times.537 The major obstacles facing the development of the Shaybah oil field 
were environmental and technological,538 and following Saudi Aramco’s delayed 
explorations at Shaybah in 1993 the scheduled start was moved forward to summer 
1998. The same source indicates that the decision to develop the field was in “part 
politically motivated.”539 
Saudi Arabia’s political motive was to publish the Treaty of Jeddah and to make the 
situation clear that under Article 3, the Shaybah field belonged to Saudi Arabia and that 
the notion of joint development of the oilfield was far-fetched. However, a Saudi source 
confirmed in 2011 that in just two months Shaikh Mohammed Bin Zayid had made 
more than two visits to Saudi Arabia, in March and April 2011 with the intention of 
finding a settlement regarding the 20 percent of Zararah located in Abu Dhabi territory, 
since it was possible that this percentage of Zararah might still be a negotiable issue.540   
It is important to note the significance of this field, which produces around 550,000 
barrels of oil per day.541 Jean-François Seznec of Georgetown University, who visited 
the Shaybah oilfield, confirmed that the Saudis had spent billions of dollars developing 
the Shaybah oilfield and had high quality equipment that could easily extract oil from 
the Zararah side in Abu Dhabi.542  During an interview with an Emirati worker, who had 
worked as an oil surveyor for over 30 years in onshore oilfields, he was asked about the 
current status of the Zararah oil field on the UAE side. He confirmed that UAE oil 
workers had worked on and off on the 20 percent of Zararah in Abu Dhabi territory, but 
that because of current tensions in UAE-Saudi Arabia relations, they had not operated 
there since 2010.543 As indicated, under Article 3 of the Treaty of Jeddah, all oil and 
                                                
537 Julie Springer and Khalid Altowelli, “Shaybah Field –– a History”, Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas 
magazine, issue 14, p. 20, available at 
http://saudiarabiaoilandgas.com/magazines/SAOG_ISSUE_14/saog14.pdf    (Accessed 15 June 2013). 
538 Springer and Altowelli, “Shaybah Field –– a History”, p. 20. 
539 Energy Intelligence Group (1999), Saudi Aramco, published by EIG, January 1999, obtained from 
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540 Saudi Official Source, Exeter, 2 July 2011 
541 William Mark Habeeb, The Middle East in Turmoil: Conflict Revolution and Change, Santa Barbara 
CA: Greenwood, 2012, p. 33. 
542 Jean-François Seznec, Interview, Washington, 21 November  2010. 
543 Anonymous UAE oil worker at Zararah oilfield, Interview, Abu Dhabi, 15 August, 2011. According to 
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natural gas in the field belongs to Saudi Arabia, but the UAE has repeatedly stated that 
the Treaty cannot be implemented and must be amended. The Saudis have continued to 
insist that the provisions of the Treaty are valid.544 It could be argued that the current 
UAE government’s stand with respect to the Zararah oil field represents continuity with 
the approach begun during Shaikh Zayid’s regime in 1975. 
7.4 Reasons behind Shaikh Zayid’s Signing of the Treaty with Saudi Arabia 
In 2004, Marcelle M. Wahba, US Ambassador to the UAE, reported a conversation she 
had had with Rashid Abdullah Al-Nuaimi, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
had explained to her the reasons why the UAE had reached such a conclusion to the 
Treaty with Saudi Arabia: “The newly federated Emirates were in a ‘to-be-or-not-to-be’ 
position and badly needed Saudi recognition. He noted that the period was marked by 
border dispute with all [neighbours] and until an agreement was reached, Saudi Arabia 
had refused to recognize UAE passports.”545  
A consensus has developed among scholars that Shaikh Zayid agreed to the Treaty of 
Jeddah primarily to ensure the survival of the United Arab Emirates. According to John 
Duke Anthony, Shaikh Zayid believed that if he got Saudi Arabia away from the 
members of the federation, it would “free the UAE’s hand internally.”546 As discussed 
in Chapter 6 Saudi interference in the domestic affairs of members of the UAE had 
weakened relations among the Emirates and had affected the unity of the federation. 
Both Anthony and Ali Ahmed (director of the Gulf Institute in Washington, DC), agree 
that in the early 1970s there were many facets of federation, such as the media section, 
military forces, internal boundaries and the Communications Ministry in which the 
UAE was not yet unified. One such example was reported in 1975 by A. D. Harris of 
the Middle East Department to Ivor Lucas: “Sayed Muhammad Al-Mulla, the Federal 
Communications Minister, had come to accept the inevitability of federalising internal 
communication in the UAE and of rationalising external telecommunications too. But, 
                                                
544 United Nations, Treaty Series Vol. 1733, ref. 1-30250: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates: 
Agreement on the Delimitation of Boundaries (With Exchange of Letters and Map), Signed at Jeddah, 
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Shaikh Rashid [ruler of Dubai] had kept silent on this issue which everyone took to 
mean that he would go along with any moves pushed through by Abu Dhabi.”547  
During the 1970s, Shaikh Zayid had also had to confront and deal with an important 
issue that arose in the early days of the federation, that concerned duel identity. For 
example, many Bedouin and tribal leaders identified themselves as Shaikhs of the 
Awamir tribe or Shaikh Mansoori of the Manasir tribe. Additionally, Emiratis from Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai identified themselves respectively as Dhabiani and Dabawi, instead of 
being from the United Arab Emirates and therefore Emirati.548 In response to a question 
about Emiratis having dual identities, one to an individual emirate and one to the UAE, 
Shaikh Zayid said:  
In fact we do not blame citizens if they sometimes misinterpret 
the truth and what I want to assure them is that we are at the 
beginning of the union and our experience is still new as well. 
We have no plan designed by a former generation, but we have 
designed this plan ourselves and we ourselves strove for union 
as a result of our faith in our nation, and for our benefit that 
cannot be obtained without union.549  
Ibrahim Hashim argues that as evidence of Shaikh Zayid’s focus on promoting unity, 
the Shaikh’s early attempts to unify the media occurred at a time when, for instance, 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah had different media channels.550 When Ahmed al-
Suwaidi, the UAE’s Foreign Minister was questioned in an interview about the status of 
the federation, he commented that: “three years have passed since the union of the 
Emirates was established. During this period there have been many achievements both 
internally and externally. However, there are still some obstacles challenging the 
federation for which we are trying to find solutions.”551   
In fact, the major challenge faced during the early years of the federation was the 
unifying of the seven emirates as one United Arab Emirates. In October 1978, Shaikh 
                                                
547 A. D. Harris, (Middle East Department), Ivor Lucas, (FO) Cable and Wireless Earth Station at Jebel 
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Zayid was quoted as saying that putting a federation together took time. Asked 
specifically about a conflict between policing at the individual and federation levels, he 
said: “If security varied in the same state, it would be both flimsy and irresponsible and 
would also change into a security surveillance service. So, we need one security 
organisation that creates confidence and identifies responsibility when someone makes 
mistakes.552  Ibrahim Hashim defends Shaikh Zayid’s promotion of a common Emirati 
identity “as evidence of sound federation policy.”553 Interestingly, Shaikh Zayid 
announced his resignation as president of the UAE after five years in the post because 
of difficulties experienced in trying to unify the seven emirates.554 With this 
background, Shaikh Zayid might have valued the federation issue more than the 
question of the boundary with Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 1974. In other words, his 
worries about the federation issue might have affected the outcomes of the Treaty of 
Jeddah.555   
On the other hand, the annual reviews of UAE affairs for 1974 and 1975 undertaken by 
British officials frequently criticised Shaikh Zayid, portraying him as the one who had 
increased internal tensions, due to his policies towards the federation. It was reported 
that Shaikh Zayid regarded Abu Dhabi as if it were the UAE itself. At the end of 1974, 
D. J. McCarthy, British Ambassador to the UAE complained that Shaikh Zayid was 
spending too much on foreign aid and that Abu Dhabi was exercising hegemony over 
the Emirates.556 The British continued in early 1975 to focus on unstable elements that 
characterised the UAE at that time. The Foreign Office reported that “the President of 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Shaikh [Zayid] of Abu Dhabi, committed the [UAE] 
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to some $900 million of overseas aid from Abu Dhabi’s money, doing so despite 
growing domestic complaints about his priorities.”557  
It was also suspected that as oil revenues grew for Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Qawain, and 
Ras al-Khaimah, the emirates’ loyalty to the UAE would decline.558 A 1975 analysis of 
the relationship between oil development and the UAE’s political stability concluded: 
“each Emirate will have its own oil revenues to be spent in whatever manner.”559 It is 
hard to reconcile Britain’s assessment of Shaikh Zayid’s policy in the 1970s with 
Shaikh Zayid’s efforts to unify the federation.  
Other reports claimed that the British policy of selling weapons to each individual 
emirate was responsible in part for increasing competition among the various emirates 
and stalling the process of integration between their armed forces. Some reports reveal 
that British companies were faced with what was labelled “wild and immoral 
competition” with French and American companies in “an exportation battle” to the 
UAE’s member states.560 A report from Antony D. Harris in the Middle East 
Department to Ivor Lucas, states that  
Mr Bryant and I [A. D. Harris] discussed the question of arms 
sales to the UAE with Mr Jones of MOD Sales on 5 August. 
MOD Sales are concerned that we might cause unnecessary 
blood amongst the Emirates and amongst arms salesmen, were 
we to go straight to Mehdi Tajir [consultant to the Ruler of 
Dubai and UAE ambassador in London] or the UAE Ministry of 
Defence on hearing of the slightest interest shown by any of the 
Emirates in any new equipment. Mr Jones mentioned in 
particular BAC’s efforts to sell “Bee-Swing” to Umm al-
Qawain.561  
Another report (entitled Selling Arms to Different Emirates) from British Ministry of 
Defence officials in Dubai to the British Embassy in Abu Dhabi included the following: 
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“we have been informed by Alvis Ltd that they hope to offer 5CVR(T) Scorpion and 
associated equipment to Umm al-Qawain. Approval has already been given for the 
supply of Scorpion to two other [Emirates] of the UAE, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.”562 The 
business of selling arms to different emirates did not focus on the federation’s military 
forces but added to competitiveness among the emirates. The British had therefore to 
take some responsibility for damaging the concept of federation in the early 1970s. 
7.5 Challenging the Arab Gulf States and Stalemate on the Boundary Issue 
(1979-90) 
This study hypothesises that certain crucial events that occurred in the Arabian Gulf 
region, such as the establishing of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-88) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, might all have accounted for 
why the UAE did not publicly revive the boundary question.  Posner identified three 
key events in 1979 that influenced the course of the Gulf’s political history: 
• establishment of the Shiite Islamic Revolution in Iran and its export to the 
Gulf states 
• the fundamentalist demonstration at Mecca 
• the US-sponsored Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accords at Camp David.563 
 
Basically, Iran’s Islamic Revolution removed the Iranians from the Twin Pillar policy; 
as a result, the policy collapsed. In 1979, the Iranians attacked the US Embassy in 
Tehran and took the employees hostage. From then on, Iran became a major enemy of 
the US. 
Fundamentalist demonstrations in Mecca and an Iranian-inspired uprising among 
Shiites in eastern Saudi Arabia also gave the Saudi leadership two substantial security 
problems to address simultaneously. The conservative shift in Saudi Arabia that had 
begun in the aftermath of King Faisal’s assassination, intensified, and anti-Western, 
anti-American feeling became so strong in the Kingdom that, backed by Crown Prince 
Fahd, King Khalid refused repeated American requests for Saudi Arabia to endorse the 
Camp David Accords.  
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On 22 September 1980, a year after the establishment of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 
Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. The Arab Gulf states supported Iraq financially until, 
after the deaths of a million Iraqis and a million Iranians, the war ended in 1988. 
Meanwhile, and given this background, the Gulf States had agreed on the need to 
establish an organisation to define their common interests and to face the security 
challenges in the Gulf region, and the inaugural meeting of the Gulf countries had been 
held in Abu Dhabi in May 1981. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established 
initially by Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.564    
The situation was further complicated when Iraq, which was supported by the GCC, 
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.  In the same year also, the Saudi government gave 
the US permission to base American troops in Saudi Arabia during the Allied effort to 
expel Iraq from Kuwait. This revealed the GCC’s failure to provide for its members a 
unified defence system without the need for external intervention.565 To put the ability 
of the GCC states to defend themselves in perspective, it should be pointed out that the 
GCC was conceived primarily as a trade bloc, rather than a military alliance. Following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Sultan Qaboos of Oman had advocated the formation of a 
GCC military force of 100,000 troops with the specific purpose of ending dependence 
on foreign military power; however, Saudi Arabia opposed the idea.566    
The GCC member states had duly allied with the United States to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait and continued to rely on the US for regional security. Even after Iraqi troops 
had retreated to Iraq in 1991, some American troops remained in the Gulf region until 
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During those twelve years, Saudi religious conservatives 
regularly criticized the Saudi government for allowing US soldiers to be based in an 
Islamic country. From the perspective of this research, and given this background, the 
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significance of the events noted above might have been that the UAE was forced to 
leave the boundary question dormant.567 
7.6 The Disputed Articles in the Treaty of Jeddah  
7.6.1 Articles 3 & 4 (Zararah oilfield) 
It is worth mentioning that in the course of my fieldwork, I found that some scholars 
had somewhat exaggerated the argument that the UAE rejected the provisions of the 
Treaty of Jeddah. Through the UN, the UAE stated its position as follows:  
The government of the United Arab Emirates had confirmed in 
its previous correspondence that parts [emphasis added] of the 
boundary agreement of 1974 cannot be implemented in their 
present context. Moreover, the Government of United Arab 
Emirates had on more than one occasion expressed its desire for 
the amendment of some parts of the agreement.568  
As a result of the 20 years of secrecy surrounding the Treaty of Jeddah, most early 
interpretations of the Treaty were based on incomplete and sometimes erroneous 
information, as shown in Chapters 1 and 6. In this context, the British received their 
most accurate information about the terms of the Treaty of Jeddah in April 1975, when 
Sultan Qaboos of Oman drew a map on a box of tissues for a British official. Yet the 
Sultan’s drawing indicated that Saudi Arabia, while getting the output of most of the 
Zararah oil field, would still share the oil revenues with the UAE.569  
Foreign Office minutes in December 1975 reflected British opinions on the subject of 
the maritime boundary and Khor al-Udaid: “The extent of any Saudi claims to territorial 
waters is unknown, but the principle of the corridor seems to be of greater importance to 
the Saudis than actually putting it to some use. The coastal waters are very shallow and 
most unlikely to be suitable for shipping or for the continuation of a convenient port.”570 
These old British messages suggest that the issues involved in the current revived of the 
UAE-Saudi territorial dispute are related to Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah. 
                                                
567 During my fieldwork, no documents were found concerning the UAE’s position on the Treaty of 
Jeddah between 1979-1990.  Rather than discussing disputes like those related to the Treaty, the GCC 
states were firmly preoccupied with security issues. 
568 Untitled letter, From United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General, to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; United Nations, New York, dated 8 August 2009.  
569 H. St. J. B. Armitage (Dubai) to I. T. M. Lucas (Foreign Office), ‘UAE-Saudi Arabia,’ 28 April 1975”, 
FCO8/2425, TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol.16, ed. Schofield, p. 387.   
570 Foreign Office Minutes by N. J. G. Bowie, ‘The Buraimi Dispute’,15 December 1975, FCO8/2425, 
TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol.16, ed. Schofield, pp.392-393. 
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In fact, the Sultan (and thus the British) got it wrong about oil-sharing from the Zararah 
(or as the Saudis prefer, Shaybah) oil field. Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of Jeddah are 
both related to the Zararah-Shaybah oilfield; e.g. we find in Article 3 that: 
1. All hydrocarbons in the Shaybah-[Zararah] field shall be 
considered as belonging to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
2. The United Arab Emirates agrees and undertakes not to 
engage in or to permit any exploration or drilling for or 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of Shaybah-[Zararah] 
field lying to the north of the boundary line.  
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or any company or corporation 
operating with its permission may engage in exploration and 
drilling or exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of the 
Shaybah-[Zararah] field lying to the north of the boundary line, 
and the two states shall subsequently reach agreement on the 
manner in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall engage in 
such activities.571 
As it appears here, under the Treaty of Jeddah the UAE received nothing from the 
Zararah-Shaybah oilfield. Yet for many years various UAE officials, miscellaneous 
informants engaged by the British, and a number of scholars expressed the view that the 
Articles of the Treaty provided for oil-sharing between Saudi Arabia and the UAE with 
respect to the Zararah-Shaybah field. Secrecy made such confusion possible. For 
example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Hamadi reported that the Treaty of Jeddah 
provided for oil-sharing from the Zararah-Shaybah oil field between Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE.572 With respect to Article 3 of the Treaty of Jeddah, Schofield has noted that,  
with cross-boundary reserves, it was (and remains) usual 
practice to unitise the resource so that if 80 percent of the field 
lies in one state and the remaining 20 percent in the other, then 
revenue deriving from exploitation will be split correspondingly, 
however joint exploitation of the oilfield structure is specified or 
facilitated.573  
Another restriction on the use of oil reserves was introduced in Article 4: “the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each undertake to refrain from engaging 
in and from permitting the exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of its territory in 
                                                
571 United Nations, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, p.31. 
572  Hamadi, Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Limits, pp.45, 64-67, 80,109. 
573  Richard N. Schofield, “Introduction to 1974,” in Arabian Boundaries, vol.15, ed. Schofield, p. xiii.  
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which the hydrocarbon fields primarily located in the territory of the other state 
extend.”574 As Schofield comments on Articles 3 and 4 together:  
whereas Saudi Arabia seemingly got the rights to all of the 
Shaybah [-Zararah] structure, including its minority portion 
within the UAE, any other trans-boundary fields discovered 
subsequently could/can only be operated by the state in whose 
territory the majority of the structure lay [lies], if this article 
remains in effect. The minority owner in territorial terms 
therefore has no right to develop its share.575   
Al-Shaikh indicates, furthermore, that Article 4 has continued to cause controversy in 
recent years. As an example he notes that the UAE’s oil minister was the only oil 
minister in the GCC who did not attend the inauguration of the Shaybah oilfield in 
March 1999, as a way of signalling the UAE’s long-standing dissatisfaction with the 
Jeddah Treaty’s Articles.576  Given the scholarly material quoted above concerning 
Articles 3 and 4, the UAE’s current position may require some clarification. According 
to Arabic News, 
The UAE news agency quoted the UAE minister of state for 
foreign affairs and chairman of the permanent committee for 
borders between the UAE, Hamdan Bin Zayed al-Nahyan, as 
saying that his country considers that parts of an agreement 
signed in 1974 have become inapplicable, noting that Abu 
Dhabi calls for the introduction of fundamental changes for 
these parts. The agency has not explained the nature of the 
‘fundamental’ changes demanded by the UAE.577 
In term of examining Articles 3 and 4 in the context of the revival of the territorial 
dispute, an anonymous UAE diplomat stated on 15 August 2011 that the UAE wanted 
changes, mainly to Article 3 of the Treaty that would make provision for sharing the oil 
from the Zararah/Shaybah oil field. Noting that Shaikh Zayid had obviously believed in 
August 1974 that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were agreeing to share the oil, but that this 
had not been included in the provisions of the Treaty, the diplomat argued that it was 
within the UAE’s rights to request an amendment to Article 3.578  
                                                
574 United Nations,  Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, p.31. 
575 Schofield, “Introduction to 1974,” p. xiv. 
576  Al-Shaikh, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council Neighbours, p. 120. 
577 Anon, “UAE Demands Fundamental Changes for its Borders with Saudi Arabia”, Arabic News, 20 
June 2005, http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/050620/2005062025 , (Accessed 12 October 
2009). 
578 Anonymous UAE Diplomat, Interview, New York, 15 November 2011. 
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Marcelle Wahba, US Ambassador to the UAE, also reported to the US State Department 
that Abdullah Rashid Al-Nuaimi, Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
had expressed the view that “the UAE thinks it is not fair that [they] cannot utilize [the 
20 percent of the oilfield located in Abu Dhabi].”  The UAE government had described 
its current revival of the dispute or its position toward the Articles of the Treaty as a 
process to formalise the Treaty and not to create a problem with Saudi Arabia. 
However, the Ambassador thought that opening up the question of the 20 percent of the 
Zararah oil field with Saudi Arabia “will be an uphill battle.”579 
7.6.2 Article 5 (The Maritime Boundary) 
In December 1975 the British, in addition to wondering about oil sharing at the Zararah 
oil field, were keen to know how the Treaty of Jeddah affected the maritime boundary 
between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah requires that 
“both parties shall as soon as possible delimit the offshore boundaries between the 
territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the United Arab 
Emirates.”580 For several reasons this never happened. In August 2009, the Saudi 
Foreign Minister stated his government’s call for the UAE to comply with Article 5.581  
UAE had repeatedly failed to participate in delineating the maritime boundaries and 
affirmed Saudi Arabia’s desire to implement Article 5 as soon as possible.582 However, 
the UAE countered that Article 5 could no longer be implemented and repeated the 
UAE’s position to the effect that several Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah, including 
Article 5, required amendment.583  
The UAE’s position regarding Article 5 may require some clarification. First, it is 
important to note that the UAE is not member to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law 
                                                
579 Wahba, US Embassy in UAE  (Abu Dhabi), US State Department (Washington), ‘UAE has Unfinished 
Business over its Border with Saudi Arabia’, 04ABUDHABI1989, Available at 
www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1989_a.html, 16 June 2004, (Accessed 19 June 2013).  
580 Article 5, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974 
581 Untitled Note, From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, New York: United Nations, 9 August 2009  
582 From Saudi Arabia: Note containing a response of Saudi Arabia to the memorandum of the United 
Arab Emirates, concerning the Joint Minutes on the land and maritime boundaries to the Agreement of 4 
December 1965 between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the delimitation of the 
offshore and land boundaries, 5 July 2008, New York: United Nations, 16 November 2009 
583  Untitled Note, United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, undersecretary, To the Secretariat 
of the United Nations, Office of His Excellency the Secretary-General”, New York: United Nations, 17 
November  2011  
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of the Sea (UNCLOS), so the UAE is not obligated to comply with the Saudi claim for 
delimiting the maritime boundaries.584 Second, Article 5 cannot be settled due to 
conflicts with the 1969 territorial agreement between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, as well as 
with the UAE-Qatar Dolphin Pipeline agreement of 2004. The UAE has filed its 
objection with the UN as follows:  
The Joint Minute signed on 5 July 2008 [Saudi-Qatari 
agreement of 1965] is incompatible with the terms of the 
Agreement on the settlement of the maritime boundaries and 
ownership of islands between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Qatar, signed on 20 March 1969 and registered by both parties 
with the General Secretariat of the United Nations on 14 
December 2006. It is also incompatible with the terms of the 
agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the State of 
Qatar regarding the Dolphin Pipeline signed on 25 September 
2004, and registered with the General Secretariat of the United 
Nations on 5 April 2006.585  
It is important to understand why such a position was taken, and whether or not the 
UAE’s current position is related to conflicts or contradictions within the Articles of the 
Treaty of Jeddah, especially Article 5. This study shows that the UAE’s position is 
related to a perceived conflict between the Qatari-Abu Dhabi agreement of 1969 and 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah. Similarly there are internal contradictions in the 
Saudi-Qatari agreement of 1965, which might also clash with Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Jeddah. For example, Article 3 of the Saudi-Qatari agreement of 1965 states that “an 
international survey company shall be commissioned to carry out a survey and establish 
on the ground the boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries in 
accordance with the provisions of this agreement and to prepare a map of the land and 
offshore boundaries between the two countries.”586 However, Article 5 of the Qatari-
UAE agreement of 1969 states that “At the earliest possible opportunity the boundary 
points defining the lines (which refer to the offshore boundary geographic co-ordinates) 
                                                
584 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concluded at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 
December 1982) Ref: MZN 66.2009.LOS (Maritime Zone Notification), Deposit by the United Arab 
Emirates of a list of geographical coordinates of points, pursuant to Article 16, para. 2 of the convention, 
10 March 2009. Available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/mzn66.pdf (Accessed 
15 June 2011) 
585 United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Note concerning the Joint Minutes on the land and 
Maritime boundaries to the Agreement of 4 December 1965 between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia on the delimitation of the offshore and land boundaries on 5 July 2008: New York, 
United Nations 16 June 2009 
586 Article 3, Saudi Arabia-Qatar Agreement, 4 December 1965 
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joining them shall be drawn on an accurate map in two copies and signed by the two 
parties showing the definitive offshore boundary between two countries.”587 
It is important to note that Article 3 of the Saudi-Qatari agreement called for Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar to delimit their offshore boundaries, which was done in 2008 and that 
this delimitation might conflict with Article 5 of the Abu Dhabi-Qatari agreement and 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah which remains unsettled. This is why the UAE’s 
current offshore boundaries with Qatar and Saudi Arabia remain problematic, and why 
it is difficult to settle Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah, which calls for both the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia to delimit their offshore boundaries. This study shows that it was not 
possible for the complexities of the boundaries among the three states to be settled 
individually, and agrees with Schofield’s statement that “the offshore boundaries could 
be worked out trilaterally between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.”588 Saudi 
Arabia’s position regarding the Abu Dhabi-Qatari agreement of 1969 is particularly 
significant, since it further complicated the situation of the offshore boundary. It is 
important to note that Saudi Arabia consistently rejected the legitimacy of that 
agreement, and that the UAE similarly rejected part of the 1965 territorial agreement 
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  One of Saudi Arabia’s letters protesting against the 
1969 Abu Dhabi-Qatari agreement states that:  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not initially recognize the 
original agreement signed between the Principalities of both 
Abu Dhabi and Qatar on 20/3/1969, which claims the 
delimitation of the Kingdom’s maritime area which extends next 
to the coasts of each of the State of Qatar and the State of United 
Arab Emirates. Since 1969, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
continued to communicate its objection to this Convention to 
each of the two countries as well as the previous states; and is 
still rejecting it to this day.589  
In term of examining Article 5 in the context of the revival of the territorial dispute, an 
unusual incident of an armed conflict over the maritime boundary occurred on 13 March 
2010, when UAE patrol boats stopped three small Saudi coastguard vessels opposite 
Khor al-Udaid. The UAE was informed that they had entered the UAE’s territorial 
                                                
587 Article 5, Abu Dhabi-Qatar Agreement, 20 March 1969 
588  Douglas-Home, Foreign Office, to Abu Dhabi, FCO8/1338 11 August 1970, TNA, London, in 
Arabian Boundaries, vol. 11, ed. Schofield, pp. 596-597. 
589 Saudi Arabia: Note containing a response of Saudi Arabia to the memorandum of the United Arab 
Emirates concerning the Joint Minutes on the land and maritime boundaries to the Agreement of 4 
December 1965 between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the delimitation of the 
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waters without permission, and they were immediately asked to leave. However, one 
Saudi boat refused to comply and shots were exchanged.590  
I was curious about why such an event had occurred, and was told by an informant that 
Saudi Arabia hoped, by causing trouble on the UAE’s maritime boundary, to provoke 
the UAE into negotiations related to Article 5.591  According to Pruitt and Carnevale, 
harassment involves actions that are designed to annoy the other party so as to gain 
compliance with demands.592  From the UAE’s perspective, Saudi boats had crossed the 
UAE’s maritime boundary in the hope that the UAE would join Saudi Arabia in 
negotiating or identifying the UAE-Saudi maritime boundaries that had been left 
unsettled under the Treaty of Jeddah. However, the UAE made it clear that there would 
be no settlement related to Article 5 unless the other contentious Articles in the Treaty 
were considered at the same time.  Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE therefore filed their 
objections with the UN, and Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah continue to be 
disputed.593 
7.6.3 Article 6 (The Official Map) 
Article 6 of the Jeddah Treaty indicates that an international company would be 
required to prepare an official map to reflect the current boundaries between the two 
countries; it states: “this map, after signature by the representatives of the High 
Contracting Parties, shall be the official map showing the desired boundaries and shall 
be annexed to this agreement and an integral part thereof”(Figure7.4.).594 
Notwithstanding, no one knows for certain whether Emirati officials understood the 
delineation of the UAE’s boundaries as depicted on the new map, as stipulated in 
Article 6, or the extent to which the UAE was satisfied with the map that accompanied 
the Treaty of Jeddah in 1974. Here there is a question to be asked about the official 
map. Did the UAE participate in preparing the map or it was designed by Saudi Arabia? 
Circumstances perhaps indicate that the official map might have been imposed on the 
UAE.  
I was keen to examine maps of the UAE from its independence in 1971 to the present, 
and found that the UAE is still using an older version of the map that does not conform 
                                                
590 For more information about the Saudi account of this, see Events 2010-2011 p.193 
591 Anonymous UAE, Interview, Abu Dhabi, 15 August 2011. 
592 Pruitt and Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict, p. 32. 
593 For more information about the Saudi account of this, see Events 2010-2011 p.193 
594 Article 6, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974 
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with the map attached to the Jeddah Treaty. Typically, government documents, 
academic studies and textbooks in the UAE continue to feature maps that show Zararah 
and Khor al-Udaid as UAE territories. Thus, maps of the UAE found in primary, 
intermediate and secondary schools, and in academic books at university level included 
both Khor al-Udaid and Zararah. The most important source of maps is The UAE Atlas, 
the only atlas to have been published since 1993. It shows demographic locations, 
locations of gas and oil fields, agricultural areas, etc,595 and also focuses exclusively on 
maps that position both Khor al-Udaid and most of the Zararah oilfield within the UAE 
mainland (Figure 7.5). 
Figure 7.4: Map of the Treaty of Jeddah of 1974 
 
Source: Foreign Office Minute by J. P. Bannerman, “Saudi-Abu Dhabi Frontier Settlement,” 16 
August 1974, enclosing map illustration the cession, FCO8/ 2357, TNA, London, in Arabian 
Boundaries, ed. Schofield, vol. 15, p.234. 
 
 
 
                                                
595 UAE University, The National Atlas of the United Arab Emirates, Al-Ain: UAE University, 1993.  
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Figure 7.5: Map Published in the Atlas of 1993 
 
Source: National Atlas of the United Arab Emirates , Al Ain: UAE University, 1993, p. 6. 
 
However, it is rare to find maps that conform to the boundaries established under the 
Treaty of Jeddah. When asked about the two versions of maps issued, a UAE oilman at 
the ADCO Company said: “the UAE has not yet had formal boundaries with Saudi 
Arabia.”596 As far as examining Article 6 in the context of the revived territorial 
dispute, UAE-Saudi tensions emerged after Abu Dhabi’s Information Ministry 
published the UAE Yearbook for 2006; this included a new map, showing Abu Dhabi’s 
territory extending west to Qatar’s southern border to include Khor al-Udaid, as well as 
south from Liwa to include part of the Zararah/Shaybah oil field (Figure 7.6). 
Interestingly, there has been no map of the UAE published in the UAE Yearbook since 
2006, although various maps were always included in the Yearbook before the public 
revival of the boundary issue in 2004 (Figures 7.7 and 7.8). As noted, UAE maps still 
come in two versions, but most of those published focus exclusively on showing Khor 
al-Udaid and Zararah within Abu Dhabi’s mainland.  
Another matter related to the UAE published map concerns the issuing of identity cards 
to citizens. 
                                                
596 Anonymous UAE oil worker at ADCO, Interview, Abu Dhabi, 15 August  2011. 
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Figure 7.6:  The UAE Yearbook Map of 2006 
 
Source: http://www.uaeyearbook.com/Yearbooks/2006/ENG/ page 6-7 (Accessed 27 June 
2013) 
Figure 7.7: The UAE Yearbook Map of 2004 
 
Source: www.uaeyearbook.com/Yearbooks/2004/eng/?page=28 (Accessed 27 June 2013) pp. 
6-7. 
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Figure 7.8: The UAE Yearbook Map of 2003 
 
Source: www.uaeyearbook.com/Yearbooks/2003/eng/?page=80 pp. 36-37 (Accessed 27 June 
2013) 
In addition to the map published in the UAE Yearbook 2006, the map printed on the 
back of the UAE’s national identity card (ID card) increased tensions between the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia. In 2007, Saudi Arabia had agreed to a Gulf Cooperation Council 
initiative that would permit citizens of GCC member states to travel to other member 
states using their national ID cards rather than passports. However, in August 2009, the 
Saudis refused entry to UAE citizens presenting their ID cards since the map design on 
the reverse of the UAE card did not conform with the boundaries established under the 
Treaty of Jeddah in 1974.597 As a result, Emiratis with ID cards arriving at Saudi 
checkpoints were asked to return to the UAE, although Emiratis travelling with 
passports were permitted to enter.598 
Sezneç has speculated that the UAE deliberately put the maps on the new national ID 
cards in 2009 to provoke the Saudis into further discussion about amending the Jeddah 
                                                
597 Loveday Morris, quoting Dr Ibtisam Al-Kitbi, a professor of Political Science at the UAE University, 
in “ID Dispute Prompts Calls for Better Way of Resolving Gulf Disputes”, The National (Abu Dhabi), 28 
August 2009, available at www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/id-dispute-prompts-calls-for-better-way-of-
resolving-gulf-disputes 
598 Ahmed Al-Mazrouei, Interview, Al-Ain, 15 August 2012.  It is important to note that the UAE 
passport does not have a UAE map printed on it, as the ID card has. 
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Treaty Articles.599 However, this study disagrees with Sezneç’s thinking since, based on 
my fieldwork in the UAE in August 2012, the map printed on ID cards renewed in 2011 
had been modified by the authorities to conform with the boundaries as established 
under the Treaty.600 Al-Kitbi argues that the issue of ID cards was simply an example of 
Saudi Arabia trying to dominate the GCC states as the “big brother” figure.601 
Saudi Arabia did, however, protest to the UN, emphasising that the relevant authorities 
in the UAE should be instructed to make their maps conform to the stipulations of the 
Treaty of Jeddah.602 Significantly, the Saudis only adopted a firm position towards the 
UAE’s published maps after 2006 although, as the revival of the territorial dispute got 
under way, they became quite angry about the UAE’s 2006 map and the national 
identity cards.603  
7.7 Issues Related to the Treaty of Jeddah’s Contents  
7.7.1 Ratification 
There are other issues that are not directly related to the recent revival by the UAE of 
the territorial dispute. However, for two reasons it seems useful to look at them in some 
detail. First, the content of the Articles of the Jeddah Treaty is full of ambiguities. 
Secondly, it will be helpful to examine the UAE’s views on other Articles of the Treaty 
in order to better understand its position towards the whole agreement. This study 
suggests that the first issue is the question of ratification. There have been rumours in 
the media that the Treaty of Jeddah is not binding on the UAE since the UAE has never 
ratified it. For example, Abdul Khaleq Abdullah notes that, “the UAE has not yet 
ratified the Treaty and the Articles are not binding on the UAE”604 Similarly, Habeeb 
claims that since the UAE has not yet ratified the treaty, the border issues with Saudi 
Arabia remain unresolved;605 although this is mistaken thinking on the part of scholars. 
Nothing is stated about ‘ratification’ in the Articles of the Treaty; thus, entering into 
                                                
599 Jean-Francois Sezneç, Interview, Washington, 21 November 2010.  
600 The UAE may have decided to change the ID card in 2011 because they understood that this strategy 
was not working with the Saudis. 
601 Loveday Morris, “ID Dispute Prompts Calls for Better Way of Resolving Gulf Disputes.” The 
National (Abu Dhabi), 28 August 2009.   
602 Untitled Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, New York: United Nations, 7 November 2009. 
603 See section on the chronology of the revival of the dispute since 2004-2012, pp.186-193. 
604 Abdul Khaleq Abdullah, a professor at UAE University, Interview, Cambridge, 15 July 2010 
605 Habeeb, The Middle East in Turmoil, p. 33. 
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force upon ratification is not a precondition. As an example of a Treaty requiring 
ratification, Article 6 of the Saudi-Qatari agreement of 1965 explicitly indicates that: 
“this agreement shall be considered to have entered into force after the exchange of 
instruments of ratification by the two governments.”606 In contrast, Article 9 of the 
Treaty of Jeddah indicates that: “this agreement shall enter into force immediately on 
signature.”607 Based on Article 9, the UAE has been bound by the Treaty’s Articles 
since 21 August 1974. In addition this Article refutes the alleged argument for 
ratification.  
7.7.2 Use of Language   
The language applied in the Treaty of Jeddah also raises some doubts. For example, 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Jeddah, states that “the land boundary between the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates starts from point (a) on the coast of the 
Arabian Gulf at the approximate geographical location [emphasis added].”608 
Regarding Article 2, Schofield has noted that it “leaves little doubt as to where the 
boundary beings.”609 He further maintains that the language applied in the Treaty 
reflects a careless use of concepts, although there is some justification for this as it was 
still an early boundary treaty.610 This study found it interesting to examine the linguistic 
formulations used in earlier treaties signed with Saudi Arabia, such as the 1965 Saudi-
Qatar Agreement. It showed that the same formula was applied in this Agreement’s 
Article 2, which defined the land boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar as “extending thence in a straight line to a point on the shore of Khor al-Udaid at 
the approximate geographical locations.”611  
The language applied in the Treaty of Jeddah also tends to lack a substantive formula to 
indicate consensus.  For example Article 3 states: “The United Arab Emirates agrees 
and undertakes not to engage in or to permit any exploration or drilling for or 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of Shaybah-[Zararah] field lying to the north of 
                                                
606 United Nations, Treaty Series Vol. 1733, ref. I- 30249 Agreement on the delimitation of the offshore 
and land boundaries between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, (registered 
at UN on 9 September 1993) 
607 Article 9, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974 
608 Article 2, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974.  
609 Schofield, “Introduction to 1974”, p. xiv. 
610 Ibid., p. xiv. 
611 Article 2, Saudi-Qatari Agreement, 4 December 1965. 
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the boundary line”,612 while Article 5 states: “The United Arab Emirates agrees to the 
construction by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the islands of Al-Qaffay and Makasib 
of any general installations it may wish to establish thereon.”613 Instead of using phrases 
such as “it has been agreed” or “the two parties have agreed to the following”, the 
content of the Treaty lacks a mutual consensus in its provisions.  
In terms of ambiguity, Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah states “the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia recognises the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over all the islands 
opposite its coast on the Arabian Gulf.” 614 This type of formula opens up the possibility 
of disputes over which islands belong to whom. This vague Article does not indicate the 
names of the islands that are supposed to belong to the UAE; nevertheless the same 
Article explicitly indicates that the UAE recognised Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty over 
Huwaysat Island. 
7.7.3 Al-Ain/Buraimi Issues and Umm al-Zamul   
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the purpose of a series of negotiations from 1970 to 
1974 was to press Saudi Arabia to drop its claims to Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis in exchange 
for giving diplomatic recognition to the UAE federation, for the ceding of areas in the 
west of Abu Dhabi, and for sharing revenues from Zararah in the south.615  But, even 
though the Saudis achieved their aims through the Treaty of Jeddah, the crux of the Al-
Ain/Buraimi issue was not mentioned or even hinted at.616 Instead, the Treaty meant 
that Saudi rights were retained over Zararah/Shaybah (in Articles 3 and 4).  In fact, 
going strictly by the text of the Treaty, it is difficult to understand what the UAE 
actually gained from this Treaty, which Schofield described as “the most bizarre 
international boundary agreement ever signed between two states.”617 It could be argued 
that the Saudis successfully used the Al-Ain/Buraimi card as a bargaining chip to gain 
their aims through the UAE-Saudi negotiations from 1970-74.  
Another issue that remained unclear in the Treaty of Jeddah was the status of the 
territory around Umm al-Zamul, an area located between Oman, UAE and Saudi 
                                                
612 Article 3, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974 
613 Article 5, Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974 
614 Ibid., 
615 As concluded in Chapter 6, Shaikh Zayid, unlike some of his negotiating team, was not aware of 
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Arabia. As far back as 1974 it had been an issue of concern to the Saudi Ambassador in 
London, who thought that the Jeddah Treaty gave the UAE more land around Umm al-
Zamul. In 2004 the US Ambassador confirmed that the UAE government wished to 
negotiate “the delimitation of the convergence point of the tri-border area between the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.” Abdullah Rashid, Under Secretary at the UAE’s 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, told the Ambassador that: “The Emiratis would like there to 
be a trilateral agreement on the points of convergence…the UAE would like to resolve 
the remaining UAE-Saudi border issues…Only the dispute with Iran over the islands 
would [then] remain.”618 
7.7.4 Article 7 
While some Articles were rejected by the UAE, others were accepted and applied, most 
notably Article 7:  
A joint technical commission shall be formed of three members 
from each of the two countries to prepare specifications for the 
work required of the aforesaid company, to establish the 
boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries 
in accordance with the provision of this agreement and to 
supervise the implementation of the work and examine its 
results.619  
The best study to have examined the status of Article 7 is Al-Shaikh’s doctoral thesis. 
During his fieldwork in 1998, the author visited the Saudi-UAE boundary (south and 
west of Abu Dhabi) and noted that: 
… the boundary line of about 500 kilometres was demarcated 
from point A to point E.... the author saw that two types of 
demarcation markers were established. The major boundary 
points from A to point E ... are made of pyramid-shaped 
concrete pillars about one metre above the ground. Beside each 
of these concrete pillars is a witness post ... showing the pillar 
number (A) or (B) as well as the direction of the previous and 
next pillars. A second type of marker intermediates the major 
points A-E. These intermediate markers, each a kilometre apart, 
are concrete pillars set on a round concrete base with a height of 
about one metre above the ground. 
                                                
618 Wahba, US Embassy in UAE, (Abu Dhabi), US State Department, (Washington) “UAE has Unfinished 
Business over its Border with Saudi Arabia”, 04ABUDHABI1989, available at 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1989_a.html, 16 June 2004,  (Accessed 19 June 
2013). 
619 Article 7,  Treaty of Jeddah, 21 August 1974  
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He further indicated that there were “unpublished agreements between the Saudi 
government and the UAE to renew those boundary marks in the near future and replace 
them with more enduring types of pillars and marks.”620  
7.8 Chronology of Revival of the Dispute since 2004 
7.8.1 Events in 2004 
It is important to understand the current UAE government's view of Shaikh Zayid's 
negotiating strategy with Saudi Arabia prior to 2004. As previously discussed, Shaikh 
Zayid had hoped to finalize the question of western Abu Dhabi when he made 
additional concessions in 1976. He also hoped that in response to those concessions the 
Saudis would reconsider sharing revenues from the Zararah oil field. Shaikh Zayid had 
been dissatisfied with Article 3 of the Treaty of Jeddah since 1974 but in his lifetime 
never achieved his goal of 20 percent of Zararah oil revenues. The current UAE 
government has adopted a different negotiating approach in term of the boundary 
question with Saudi Arabia. Following Shaikh Zayid's death in 2004, the UAE 
government changed its negotiation strategy and made the amendment of Article 3 a 
condition for settling maritime boundaries under Article 5.  Also, it has hoped to 
renegotiate Shaikh Zayid’s compromise strategy over the Khor al-Udaid region (25 km 
west of Abu Dhabi) and to continue Shaikh Zayid's negotiating strategy in term of 
finding a settlement in 20% of Zararah lies in Abu Dhabi. Thus, the current UAE's 
negotiating strategy can be seen as an attempt to push Saudi Arabia toward an 
integrative negotiation strategy that could produce a win-win resolution of the boundary 
question for both countries 
In 2004, just a month after the death of Shaikh Zayid, the UAE publicly raised the 
question of the boundary with Saudi Arabia.621 According to Abdullah Rashid, “after 
the two countries had signed a border agreement in 1974, the UAE realized it had 
conceded more than it should have done [emphasis added]…It was a case of ‘force 
majeur’.”622  As a result, Shaikh Khalifa, current President of the UAE, asked for 
amendments to some of the Treaty Articles; however, Saudi Arabia responded that the 
                                                
620 Al-Shaikh (2001), Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-Operation Council Neighbours, pp. 127-130 
621 Shaikh Zayid died on 2 November 2004 
622 Wahba, US Embassy in UAE, (Abu Dhabi), US State Department, (Washington) “UAE has 
Unfinished Business over its Border with Saudi Arabia”, 04ABUDHABI1989, available at: 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1989_a.html, 16 June 2004, (Accessed 19 June 
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boundary question had been closed since 21 August 1974 with the exception of Article 
5 that related to the maritime boundaries. The UAE government then launched a public 
initiative to secure substantial changes to the Articles of the Jeddah Treaty.623  From an 
Emirati perspective, the demand for modification of the Treaty of Jeddah was a 
significant event. According to an article in the June 2005 Gulf States Newsletter, 
Sheikh Khalifa initially raised the border issue when he visited 
Riyadh in December 2004, his first official foreign trip as new 
head of state. The Saudis quietly nudged it aside. But like a long 
hidden rock now exposed by the shifting of the dunes, a 
longstanding Emirati grievance over the circumstances in which 
the frontier was defined 31 years ago will not go away. Early 
this year, Prince Naayef dismissed reports of a row as 
‘baseless’.624 
Saudi officials and the media consistently portrayed border issues as minor, technical, 
and related only to maritime boundaries. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, 
said that “there are no differences with the UAE”, and regretted that the media had 
created stories of differences between two Arab states.625 His statement is interesting; 
having examined the development of the territorial negotiations leading up to the Treaty 
of Jeddah, it would have been fairly obvious that a potential dispute might erupt in the 
future between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  
7.8.2 Events in 2005 
During December 2004, after UAE-Saudi talks related to the Treaty of Jeddah Articles 
had been broken off, Shaikh Khalifa visited Qatar, and the causeway project intended to 
link Doha to Abu Dhabi was announced.626 Receiving the announcement, the Saudis 
expressed their dissatisfaction:  
Riyadh lodged formal protests against plans for a causeway 
linking Qatar with the UAE. Riyadh noted that ‘the causeway is 
impossible because it passes through Saudi territorial waters and 
the Kingdom should have been notified’ –– in a move widely 
seen as a sign of Saudi displeasure at the way bilateral talks had 
                                                
623 The timing of the question of the boundary being raised is crucial since it shows that Shaikh Zayid’s 
sons were not satisfied with the way their father had dealt with Saudis over the question of the boundary. 
624  Anon (2005),“Riyadh Diplomatic as UAE Grievance Resurfaces”, Gulf States Newsletter issue 760, 
24 June. 
625 Anon (2005), “Al-Faisal: Saudi Arabia, UAE Work to Settle Sea Borders, Politics”, Arabic News, 25 
March, at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/050325/2005032519.html, (Accessed 12 
October, 2010)  
626 Duraid Al-Baik, “Causeway to Link UAE and Qatar Announced”, Gulf News, 22 December 2004.  
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developed, and frustration that the Emiratis would not back down 
over the border.627  
Because of the Saudi protest, the UAE and Qatar decided to make some changes to the 
project. The original plan for the UAE-Qatar causeway had been for a 40-kilometre 
link, but the two parties agreed to make some modifications by lengthening it to 65 km 
in order to avoid passing through Saudi Arabian territorial waters.628 Interestingly, the 
Saudis claim that the causeway project passes through Saudi territorial waters although 
a Saudi-UAE maritime boundary has not as yet been delineated. It appears therefore that 
the Saudi government believes it defined its maritime boundary with the UAE based on 
the Saudi-Qatar maritime agreement of 1965. The UAE government claims that this 
agreement has no effect on the UAE’s offshore boundaries. The UAE government has 
adopted the position at the United Nations that the Saudi-Qatar maritime border violates 
the UAE-Qatari offshore agreement of 1969. In response, the Saudi government claims 
that the 1969 UAE-Qatari maritime agreement has no effect on Saudi maritime 
boundary. 
 In fact, the proposed causeway would be longer and cost around US$13 billion. In this 
context, Ali Ahmed claimed in an interview that the UAE would never get Khor al-
Udaid back and that as an alternative, the proposed causeway project was the only 
option to link the UAE with Qatar. He further pointed out that “if the Bahrain-Qatar 
‘Bridge of Love’ causeway is executed, it would be connected with the King Fahd 
causeway which already links Bahrain with Saudi Arabia.”629  If the UAE-Qatar and 
Qatar-Bahrain causeways were to be completed, it would therefore be possible to travel 
around the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia exclusively by causeway. 
Here there is another question as to why the UAE decided to come up with such an 
expensive project. According to Abdullah Rashid “[Emiratis] don't want to be separated 
from the Qataris by a slice of Saudi waters.”630 It seemed that the UAE had planned to 
renegotiate the status of the area west of Khor al-Udaid during Shaikh Khalifa’s visit to 
                                                
627  Anon, “Old Enmities Hold Up Progress on Regional Integration”, Gulf States Newsletter 761 (15 July 
2005). 
628 Anon, “UAE-Qatar causeway to coast $13b,” UAE Interact, 11 February, 2008, (Accessed 16 January 
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629 Ali Ahmed, Interview, Washington, 15 November 2010.  
630 Wahba, US Embassy in UAE, (Abu Dhabi), US State Department, (Washington), “UAE has 
Unfinished Business over its Border with Saudi Arabia”, 04ABUDHABI1989, available at 
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Jeddah in 2004, but this did not work. The UAE then realised that the question of Khor 
al-Udaid, 25 km west of Abu Dhabi, was not a negotiable issue.631  
It is important to state that Shaikh Zayid had already ceded Khor al-Udaid in 1974, so 
that the current UAE government had no right to claim Khor al-Udaid in, and after, 
2004. Also, it is equally important from a Saudi perspective to note that Khor al-Udaid 
had been ceded to Saudi Arabia under the Saudi-Qatari agreement of 1965, and that 
during the 1970s, Saudi Arabia probably wanted the UAE to confirm that cession, 
instead of having to negotiate Khor al-Udaid with the UAE. Based on evidence 
provided above, Saudi Arabia gained major concessions west of Sabkhat Al-Mattai, 
including Khor al-Udaid, in 1977. Hence, the current UAE government, including 
Shaikh Zayid’s sons, might not agree on the cession having been made by Shaikh Zayid 
during 1974-77, as was clearly obvious in Abdullah Rashid’s remarks to the US 
ambassador in 2004 that “the UAE realized it had conceded more than it should 
have...”632 It could also be said that the causeway project represents a last hope for the 
UAE to link its lands with Qatar.  
Another question is what benefit there is of using the UAE-Qatar causeway instead of 
the current route from the UAE to Qatar (where Emiratis have to pass through Saudi 
checkpoints to get to Qatar). Although the causeway would be a longer and more 
expensive route, it would not involve stopping at a Saudi checkpoints in order to go to 
Qatar. John Duke Anthony and Jean-Francois Sezneç both agree that a UAE-Qatar 
causeway would be “worth it.” According to Anthony, building this causeway is a 
beneficial project for both states, as it would increase travel, business, and tourism.633  
Sezneç commented that, 
Executing the UAE-Qatar causeway and the Bahrain-Qatari 
causeway would definitely strengthen the relations among UAE, 
Qatar, and Bahrain; for example if the Bahrain-Qatari causeway 
is built, that would increase the chances for Bahraini 
unemployed to find work in Qatar. Most of them are Shi’a and 
desperate to find to work in Bahrain. Also, if the Qatari-Abu 
Dhabi causeway is built it will increase movements, business, 
and the long-term ties these countries have together and create a 
                                                
631 Official Saudi sources, The Exeter Gulf  Conference, Exeter University, 2 July 2011 
632 Wahba, U.S Embassy in UAE, (Abu Dhabi), US State Department, (Washington) “UAE has 
Unfinished Business over its Border with Saudi Arabia”, 04ABUDHABI1989, available at 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1989_a.html, 16 June 2004, (Accessed 19 June, 
2013).  
633 John Duke Anthony, Interview, Washington, 29 November, 2010.  
190 
 
block to Saudi Arabia, which somehow would remind us of the 
nine federations.634 
However, executing the causeway projects among the three states have been delayed. 
Although some scholars have argued that the causeway projects are dead, Qatari sources 
have confirmed that “the [Qatari-Bahraini] causeway will, of course, see the light of 
day.”635 
7.8.3 Events in 2006 
On 26 September 2004 the UAE and Qatar signed an agreement which involved Qatar 
supplying gas to the UAE.636 The gas-supplying firm was later known as Dolphin 
Energy. Based in Abu Dhabi, Dolphin Energy had received approval from the UAE and 
Qatari governments to build a pipeline from Ras Laffan in Qatar to Taweelah in Abu 
Dhabi. Much of the work had been completed on the pipeline between 2004 and 2006, 
and Dolphin Energy was due to begin delivering natural gas to customers in Abu Dhabi 
(see Figure 7.9). However, in July 2006 the Saudi government protested about the 
project –– since the pipeline passed through Saudi Arabia’s claimed territorial waters; 
they claimed it violated their territorial waters. It was believed that Saudi Arabia had 
targeted the Dolphin project as a negotiating ploy to expand the border dispute with the 
UAE at a time when a high proportion of work on the pipeline had been completed.637 
The Saudis eventually settled the matter quietly, and construction of the Dolphin 
pipeline continued. 
Since both the UAE-Qatar causeway and the Dolphin pipeline involved alleged 
violations of Saudi Arabia’s territorial waters, the question here is why the Saudis 
dropped their complaint against Dolphin yet maintained their protest against the 
                                                
634 Jean-Francois Sezneç, Interview, Washington, 21 November 2010.  Speaking of the ‘nine federations’, 
Sezneç was referring to the federation of nine Gulf States that would have included the states of the UAE, 
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causeway. In answer to this question, Ali Ahmed said it was because the Saudis could 
take advantage of the Dolphin project by demanding fees for the passage of natural gas 
through Saudi territory but the same could not be said of the Qatari-Abu Dhabi 
causeway,638  a view shared by Sezneç.  Dolphin Energy succeeded in starting gas 
production in July 2007 that involved producing and processing natural gas from Qatar's 
offshore North Field, and transporting the processed gas by undersea pipeline to the 
UAE and Oman.639 
Figure 7.9: Map of the Dolphin Energy Project 
 
Source: Official Dolphin Energy website http://www.dolphinenergy.com (Accessed 13 March 
2013). 
7.8.4 Events in 2008 
On 5 July 2008, the Saudis signed Joint Minutes with the Qataris “concerning the desire 
of the two countries to finalize the delimitation of the maritime borders between them 
beyond [Khor] al-Udaid.”640  As mentioned earlier, the UAE had refused to recognize 
the Saudi-Qatari Agreement because it was incompatible with the 1969 Agreement 
between Abu Dhabi and Qatar as well as the 2004 UAE-Qatar Agreement to build the 
Dolphin natural gas pipeline. However, as discussed previously, it has been suggested 
that resolution of the maritime boundaries would require the renegotiation of 
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639Dolphin Energy official website at http://www.dolphinenergy.com , (Accessed 13 March 2013). 
640 United Nation Series ref. A-30249: Joint Minutes on the land and maritime boundaries to the 
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agreements among Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE since that would help in fulfilling the 
requirements of Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
7.8.5 Events in 2009 
There were two major events in 2009 that increased levels of tension over the question 
of the boundary between the UAE and Saudi Arabia; ID cards, as discussed earlier, and 
inspections at the Saudi border of trucks coming from the UAE. According to a UAE 
source, ID cards represented the second major border crisis started that year by Riyadh 
with the UAE, while “the first was the crisis over preventing the passage of trucks.”641 
The Saudis portrayed these inspections as part of an anti-smuggling campaign. 
According to a witness quoted in a news report, the process of crossing the Saudi border 
became much slower when Saudi border officials found smuggled goods.642  Gulf News 
reported in 2010 that at one point at least two thousand trucks coming from UAE had 
been left idle at the border. 
Even though the UAE had responded to Saudi demands and had changed the map on the 
back of the UAE ID cards in 2011, the Saudi inspections of UAE trucks became a 
problematic issue. According to Gulf News, the situation worsened in 2012, being 
reminiscent of June 2009 when the queue of trucks had stretched for kilometres along 
the Al-Sila-A-Ghuwaifat border, causing misery for truck drivers and losing customers 
for companies located in Qatar (see Figure 7.10).643 One of the truck drivers was 
reported as saying that, “the problem isn’t on the UAE side. It’s Saudi customs where 
the delay is. It takes so long to get there –– maybe five days. They take another day to 
get the papers handed back –– that’s if there’s no problem. If there’s a problem, then 
maybe three or more days.”644  It is believed that the intensive time-consuming 
inspections by the Saudis of trucks entering Saudi Arabia occurred just weeks after the 
UAE had pulled out of the GCC monetary union on 21 May 2009 because the GCC 
Central Bank was scheduled to be located in Riyadh instead of Abu Dhabi. According 
                                                
641 Anon, “Saudi Protest over UAE Maps Damaging Gulf Ties: Observers See Latest Saudi Move Against 
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available at http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=33830 , (Accessed 12 October 2010). 
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to Dr Karasik: “part of it relates to the monetary union, because of course Saudi Arabia 
has for a long time played the role of big brother. They can’t absorb that somebody else 
could have its own way.”645  
Figure 7.10: The Map of Al-Sila-Ghuwaifat Checkpoints 
 
Source: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/traffic-transport/truck-line-at-uae-saudi-border-
stretches-to-22km-tuesday-afternoon-1.1003364 , (Accessed 16 June 2013). 
7.8.6 Events in 2010-2011 
Another aspect of the current UAE-Saudi dispute involved their undefined offshore 
boundaries. In 2010 an armed incident occurred over the maritime boundary, details of 
which were reported by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Saudi Foreign 
Ministry: 
On the afternoon of Sunday 13/3/2010 at 16:40, three patrol 
boats carrying the numbers (746 S). (749 S) and (750 
S)…entered the UAE’s territorial sea at a location lying to the 
west of the UAE’s Island of Khardal… Immediately after that, 
the UAE patrol boats surrounded the Saudi patrol boats and 
asked them to leave the territorial sea of the UAE. One refusing 
to comply, the Saudi patrol boats were asked to head for the 
UAE’s station at Ras Khumais to explain the reason for their 
                                                
645 Loveday Morris, quoting Dr Theodore Karasik (Director of Research, Institute for Near East and Gulf 
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National, 28 August 2009, in http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/id-dispute-prompts-calls-for-
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presence in the territorial sea of the UAE. The Commander of 
the Saudi patrol boats did not comply and brandished a weapon 
in the face of the personnel of a UAE patrol boat which replied 
by firing warning shots.646 
On 21 March 2010 the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Saudi Arabian 
Foreign Ministry that “at 15:00 in the afternoon on Wednesday 17/3/2010, the crew of 
the Saudi patrol boat no (749 S) were handed over to the Saudi side and minutes to that 
effect were signed. The Saudi side did not make any observation.”647  
Interestingly, this was not the first such incident; a similar event had occurred on 8 
September 2009, when some Saudi boats crossed the median line that lies off the UAE’s 
territorial waters. The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported the incident to the 
United Nations on 12 November 2009; the Saudis replied with a note protesting that it 
had been “a coastguard patrol boat engaged in normal duties in the internal waters of the 
KSA.”648 
Such sensitive events in 2009 had not been widely reported by the media, unlike the 
incident in 2010 which attracted much media attention. The National, for example, 
reported that the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (the CNIA) had investigated 
the incident through the Saudi Gazette which indicated that Saudi fishermen were 
crossing the Saudi mainland, specifically in the Qatif area. Their chiefs said that the 
fishermen were not aware that they had crossed international boundaries and had 
strayed into UAE territorial waters. The National also quoted Dr Mustafa Alani, 
Director of the security department of the Gulf Research Centre, as saying that 99 
percent of those detained by the UAE had violated UAE territorial waters inadvertently. 
However, Alani also pointed out that, “we have a problem with the smuggling of 
humans, illegal substances, and arms. That’s why authorities arrest any fishermen who 
cross the borders so they can investigate whether it’s an innocent act or if they had any 
criminal intentions.”649 
According to a sensationalistic account by the British newspaper, The Telegraph, 
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The Saudi vessel was forced to surrender, and its sailors were 
delivered into custody in Abu Dhabi for several days, before 
being released and handed over to the Saudi embassy earlier this 
week. The clash happened in disputed waters between the coasts 
of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and the peninsula on which the gas-
rich state of Qatar sits. The seabed is rich with oil deposits, 
while the Dolphin pipeline project to carry natural gas direct 
from Qatar to Abu Dhabi has provoked irritation in the Saudi 
authorities. Nevertheless, direct conflict between the two 
countries’ armed forces is highly unusual.650 
Eventually, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appealed to the United Nations and by 2011 the 
two sides had firmly established their positions. In a note to the UN’s Secretary-
General, the Saudi government called for the UAE to comply with implementation of 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Jeddah.651 The UAE on the other hand wrote to the UN 
Secretary-General saying that the UAE government “reconfirms that Article Five of the 
1974 agreement is no longer capable of implementation and is included among other 
Articles of the 1974 Agreement in which the Government of the United Arab Emirates 
had called and still calls for their amendment.”652   
7.9 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia had been fully aware 
of the UAE’s dissatisfaction with the Jeddah Treaty since 1975 and had therefore taken 
steps towards the implementation of the Treaty Articles since the 1990s. First, Saudi 
Arabia established the Al-Ghuwaifat checkpoint in 1990; secondly, it published the 
Treaty of Jeddah in 1995; and thirdly, exploitation of Zararah/Shaybah was undertaken 
in 1998. The registration of the Treaty was very disappointing to the UAE side, which 
had been sending letters to Saudi Arabia since 1975 requesting amendments to some of 
the Articles of the Treaty before its publication. However, Saudi Arabia insisted that the 
Articles had been strictly binding on the UAE since 1974.  
Despite following developments relating to the disputed Articles from 1975 up to 2012, 
no sources were available concerning government statements and/or the UAE’s position 
on the Treaty of Jeddah’s Articles from 1979 to 1990. This study speculated that during 
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this period, there was a great deal at stake in the Gulf region, including the Iraq-Iran war 
and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Therefore, all the small Gulf States needed to find a 
formula for cooperation under the Saudi umbrella, and this culminated in the 
establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council.    
The chapter concluded that the most controversial Articles were those related to the 
Zararah/Shaybah oilfield (Articles 3 & 4), official maps (Article 6) and the maritime 
boundaries (Article 5). The Saudis have insisted on fulfilling Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Jeddah on the strictest terms, while the UAE insists that Article 5 is no longer capable 
of implementation; nor are other Articles of the Treaty, especially Article 3 related to 
oil. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the successful fulfilment of 
Article 5 would most probably further require renegotiation of both the 1965 Saudi-
Qatari Agreement (which was reaffirmed in 2008), and the 1969 Abu Dhabi-Qatari 
Agreement. 
As was discussed, once the UAE had revived the question of the boundary in 2004, the 
various methods of retaliation employed by Saudi Arabia against the UAE suggested 
serious tensions and deterioration in UAE-Saudi relations. Saudi measures including 
preventing Emiratis travelling with UAE national identity cards from crossing the Saudi 
border, harassing the UAE maritime boundary, protesting against the causeway and the 
Dolphin Energy projects, and holding up trucks for days, have all had negative effects 
on UAE-Saudi relations.  
Under Shaikh Khalifa, the current UAE government’s negotiating strategy for dealing 
with the boundary question with Saudi Arabia has deviated from that of Shaikh Zayid’s 
regime. As indicated, Shaikh Zayid had already ceded the area west of Sabkhat al-
Mattai in 1976, a cession that had also been confirmed in a map published by the UAE 
Ministry of Petroleum in 1976 (see Figure 7.1). However, Shaikh Zayid had continued 
hoping to renegotiate the expected 20 percent share of the Zararah oil field revenues.  
From 2004 onwards, the UAE government declared that Shaikh Zayid had ceded more 
territory than he should have done. The current UAE government properly requested 
some adjustment over the area west of Sabkhat Mattai. When Khor al-Udaid was seen 
as a non-negotiable issue for the Saudis, the Qatar-UAE causeway emerged as a way to 
link the UAE and Qatar. The UAE negotiating strategy shifted to focus on the 20 
percent of the Zararah oil field that lies in Abu Dhabi territory.  Thus, the current UAE's 
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negotiating strategy can be seen as an attempt to push Saudi Arabia toward and 
integrative negotiation strategy to finalise the remaining issues. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
 
There are two schools of thought on Britain’s role in delimiting the boundaries of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Some scholars have portrayed Britain as having arbitrarily delimited 
these boundaries without adequate consideration for existing economic, political and 
social organization.653  The best example of this is Britain’s unilateral delimitation of 
the Abu Dhabi-Saudi boundary in 1955 –– an imposition only made possible by 
Britain’s dominant military power in the region at the time.  
Significantly, the Treaty of Jeddah in 1974 superseded Britain’s 1955 unilaterally 
declared boundary. For twenty years following the Treaty of Jeddah, Arab scholars 
promoted another interpretation: the ‘Arab solutions’ model, which held that a 
resolution of the UAE-Saudi border dispute only became possible after Britain 
withdrew from the Gulf and the UAE became fully independent.654  This model is 
flawed for two reasons. First, advocates of the ‘Arab solutions’ model did not have 
access to the text of the Treaty of Jeddah; their belief that the treaty was equal and fair 
to both parties was based on hearsay alone –– the text of the Treaty did not become 
public until 1995. Second, the Treaty of Jeddah failed to resolve the dispute: the UAE’s 
government has been dissatisfied with the Treaty dates back to 1975, it has been 
actively and publically attempting to revise the Treaty since 2004 –– as Chapters 7 
explain. 
The interests of British and American oil companies played a decisive role in the 
territorial dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. As Chapter 3 discusses, Abu 
Dhabi’s territorial claims were located in the British ‘sphere of influence’, east of the 
Blue Line, where British oil companies operated: the Iraq Petroleum Company, the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company. The eastern 
Saudi territories were operated by the US-owned Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO), which meant that any territorial concession Abu Dhabi made to Saudi 
Arabia would benefit ARAMCO, and therefore the US, if that territory contained oil or 
gas.  
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  J. B. Kelly, and Julian Walker	  
654 Abdullatif A. Alshaikh, Abdulkarim M. Hamadi, and Hesam M. Al-Ulama.	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Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that, for more than two decades, from 1935 
to late 1955, British self-interest and Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims conveniently 
coincided. During the Anglo-Saudi territorial negotiations of 1935-55, the British 
government worked to maintain the concessions held by British oil companies east of 
the Blue and Violet Lines, which meant defending Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over the 
territories claimed by Saudi Arabia. However, during the final phase of Anglo-Saudi 
negotiations (1970-71), Britain sought Saudi guarantees that British oil concessions 
would be honoured if Saudi Arabia obtained sovereignty over Zararah/Shaybah and 
Khor al-Udaid. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, King Faisal assured Sir William Luce that 
British oil companies would keep their concession rights in any area conceded by Abu 
Dhabi to Saudi Arabia.655 
This thesis offers eight conclusions about the UAE-Saudi border dispute, shedding new 
light on the subject.  The first four concern the role and influence of Britain in the 
settlement of dispute, while the last four concern factors that hindered the dispute’s 
resolution.  On the basis of these conclusions, it offers an assessment at the end of this 
chapter about the future prospects and progress toward a lasting resolution of the UAE-
Saudi border dispute. 
The first conclusion is that the British only acted decisively on frontier issues when they 
felt compelled to do so, usually within the context of Britain’s larger regional mission. 
Britain’s changing roles in the Gulf during 1800-71 influenced the course of the 
settlement of the dispute. Before the oil era, Britain focused mainly on the coastal areas 
and did not actively intervene in the affairs of the hinterland. British policy towards the 
hinterland before the development of oil interests there can be summarised as follows:  
The British Government has always been averse to the extension 
of [Wahhabist] influence in Oman. No precedent can be quoted 
of actual interference between Muscat and [Wahhabi] powers by 
our Government, but it has always lent moral support to Muscat 
in the differences of that State with [Wahabbis] by sending 
vessels-of-war to the Arab Coast when hostilities threatened.656  
                                                
655 Foreign Office Minutes by J.P. Bannerman, ‘Rights of Oil Concessionaries and the Abu Dhabi/Saudi 
Frontier Dispute,’ 4 October 1972, FCO8/1813, TNA, London in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 13, ed. 
Schofield, pp. 520-521. 
656 “The Occupation of Buraimi” by Sayyid Azzan b. Qais 1869-1870, in  Records of The Emirates, 
Primary Documents 1835-1871, Vol. 3, ed. Penelope Tuson (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1990), p. 378. 
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Britain only intervened diplomatically in cases impacting on the stability of the coast, 
undermining Britain’s maritime truce and its influence with the coastal rulers.657  
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, when the British pressured the Ottoman governor of Egypt 
in 1838 to withdraw from from Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis, it was because they feared an 
Ottoman threat to Britain’s sphere of influence in the coast.  Britain’s approval of Abu 
Dhabi’s punitive raid against the Qubaisat at Khor al-Udaid in 1837 was done in the 
context of Britain’s responsibility for maintaining the maritime peace against piracy and 
protecting its trade with India. An extremely important aspect of Britain’s Gulf mission 
was preventing imperial encroachment on Britain’s sphere of influence; actions to 
contain the Ottomans in the Arabian Peninsula were justified by the Ottoman’s failure 
to combat piracy. Britain’s recognition of Abu Dhabi’s sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid 
in 1871 was done in the context of imperial rivalry between Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire; it was done to stop Ottoman encroachment into Britain’s sphere of influence.  
The Ottomans’ competing claim over Khor al-Udaid forced Britain to recognize Shaikh 
Zayid the Great’s claim.658 Likewise, the Exclusive Agreement of 1892, through which 
Britain obtained control over Abu Dhabi’s foreign affairs and maritime defence, was 
also designed to protect Britain’s sphere of influence against rival imperial powers, 
initially the Ottomans and French, later the Germans and Russians.  
During the 1930s, when Britain’s sphere of influence was threatened by Ibn Saud’s 
territorial claims east of the Blue Line, it used Khor al-Udaid as a bargaining chip with 
the Saudis in 1938 (and again in 1964).  When British interests were threatened in 
World War II and Britain needed Ibn Saud to remain neutral in the war, Britain offered 
Shaikh Shakhbut Al Nahyan £20,000 as compensation for conceding Khor al-Udaid to 
Saudi Arabia. Since ‘spheres of influence’ are not recognised under international law, 
Britain had to defend it sphere of influence along the coast through a combination of 
means.659 
The second conclusion is that Britain’s approach to the affairs of the Gulf shaped the 
development of the Saudi-UAE border dispute and likely prolonged it.  For example, 
Britain’s assertion, first made in 1934, that Saudi Arabia was a successor-state to the 
Ottoman Empire was, for many reasons, not a convincing argument and indeed had 
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been quite a dubious concept from the beginning. First, when the British embraced the 
Ottoman successor-state argument, it was judged by a Foreign Office lawyer, W. E. 
Beckett, to be illegal under international law.  Second, what strengthened the Saudi 
position against the Ottoman successor-state argument was Britain’s recognition of Ibn 
Saud as an independent ruler in the Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915 and 1927. Neither of 
these treaties mentioned anywhere that Britain considered Saudi Arabia to be bound by 
the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914.  
This study also reveals that Britain did not always fulfil its treaty obligations towards 
the states it was protecting.  Most notably, during the period between King Faisal’s 
proposal of 4 May 1970 and Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf on 1 December 1971, 
Britain chose to ignore its treaty obligation to defend Abu Dhabi against Saudi 
territorial claims. 
The third conclusion is that the past history of Anglo-Saudi negotiations (from 1935 to 
1955) shaped the 1970-74 negotiations, although that history had a varying influence on 
the participants: Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and the British themselves. Shaikh Zayid 
believed that this past history meant that he could trust Britain support his territorial 
claims in the 1970s, but his trust proved to be ill-placed. Britain did not meet his 
expectations because Britain had a conflict of interest: it had substantial strategic and 
commercial interests, forcing it to limit its role as an ‘honest broker’ in order to avoid 
damaging British interests in either Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi after 1971.  It was likely 
for this reason that Britain chose to describe as a “substantial concession” King Faisal’s 
1970 offer to abandon claims to the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region. That offer probably 
did not strike Shaikh Zayid as a “substantial concession” at all.   
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Abu Dhabi and Oman had administered the Al-
Ain/Buraimi oasis region jointly from 1869 to the present, except during the Saudi 
occupation of 1952-55.  This study has found no evidence proving an effective Saudi 
presence in Buraimi after 1869, with the exception of 1952-55.  Shaikh Zayid was thus 
fully aware that King Faisal was merely offering him territory that was already his. 
Supposedly, if the British and Saudis were promoting Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region as a 
“substantial concession” to Abu Dhabi, this concession should have been recorded 
automatically in the Treaty of Jeddah of 1974 by way of confirmation. But Al-
Ain/Buraimi oasis is not even hinted at in the Treaty. 
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For King Faisal, the past history influencing his perception of the dispute in the 1950s-
70s was Britain’s expulsion of Saudi forces from Hamasa and its unilateral delimitation 
of the boundary with Saudi Arabia in 1955  –– both of which were humiliating defeats 
for the Saudis.  Saudi Arabia never accepted the 1955 boundary that recognised Khor 
al-Udaid, the Liwa oasis, and the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region as belonging to Abu 
Dhabi. The absence of a written agreement on the 1955 boundary made it even harder 
for Abu Dhabi and the British to negotiate with Saudi Arabia during the 1970s. This 
thesis argues that, since Saudi Arabia had offered to drop Al-Ain/ Buraimi oasis region 
in 1970, the Saudis had most probably maintained their 1949 claim (which included the 
Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region) as the basis of their negotiations during 1970-74. At the 
same time, during these negotiations, Saudi Arabia threatened Abu Dhabi by stating that 
it would revert to its original 1949 claim if Shaikh Zayid did not accept the Saudi 
proposal of 1970. In fact, it is hard to reconcile the Saudi negotiating position in the 
absence a mediator who could have offset Saudi power during the last phase of the 
negotiations. 
For the British government, it was the Buraimi Crisis of 1952-55 that most influenced 
the way it saw and managed the dispute. Britain had hoped that the expulsion of Saudi 
forces at the end of the Buraimi Crisis and its unilateral delimitation of the boundary 
with Saudi Arabia might settle the question of Al-Ain-Buraimi oasis region once and for 
all.  After Britain found itself in a conflict of interest over the dispute during the last 
years of its negotiations, however, Britain nonetheless tried to persuade Shaikh Zayid 
that the Saudi offer to drop its claim to Buraimi was a “substantial concession”.  
The fourth conclusion is that the Saudi-Abu Dhabi territorial negotiations of 1970-71 
and the Saudi-UAE negotiations of 1971-74 differed significantly, particularly with 
regard to Britain’s role and involvement.  During 1970-71, Britain was still treaty-
bound to defend Abu Dhabi territory under the terms of the Exclusive Agreement of 
1892.  Despite this, Britain advised Shaikh Zayid to accept King Faisal’s proposal of 
1970. This study reveals that Britain’s announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw its 
military from the Gulf and its protection from Abu Dhabi in 1971, had a significant 
impact on Britain’s role.  Britain switched from defending Abu Dhabi’s claims to 
attempting to persuade Shaikh Zayid to make concessions.  In 1970, Britain declared 
itself to be an ‘honest broker’ in dealing with the dispute.  This was, in practice, an 
unlikely role for Britain to play.  For one thing, Britain had substantial oil interests in 
the disputed areas, especially with regard to the Zararah/Shaybah oil field. This placed 
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Britain in a conflict of interest position after Saudi Arabia guaranteed it would British 
concessions in Zararah/Shaybah if the area was conceded to Saudi Arabia. 
After Britain withdrew its military from the Gulf in December 1971, it proclaimed a 
new role for itself in the dispute: that of ‘disinterested party’ –– an advisor and observer 
rather than a participant. However, the new role was strongly challenged by Saudi 
Arabia.  It wanted Britain to use its influence with Shaikh Zayid to reach an outcome in 
its favour. It placed considerable pressure on Britain in this regard, threatening to cancel 
its lucrative military contracts with Britain if Britain did help persuading Shaikh Zayid 
to accept Saudi terms.  But Britain refused, and the contracts were cancelled. 
After 1971, Britain wanted to avoid damaging Anglo-Saudi relations as well as its 
relations with UAE, and attempted to remain neutral in the dispute, but Saudi Arabia 
placed great pressure on Britain to help settle the dispute in its favour and would not 
accept neutrality.   
The fifth conclusion is that the US Twin Pillars policy shaped the context of the UAE-
Saudi border dispute. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran had border disputes with the UAE.  
Both placed pressure on Britain to persuade the ruler of the UAE to agree to their terms. 
Under the Twin Pillar policy, Iran and Saudi Arabia were expected to assume Britain’s 
role of guaranteeing Gulf security, ensuring that Britain’s withdrawal did not leave 
behind a security vacuum.  This greatly increased Saudi Arabia’s bargaining position 
during 1970-74, further reinforced by its threat to use military force to settle the dispute 
and its refusal to recognise the newly-established federation of the UAE until the 
dispute was resolved to its satisfaction.  The Twin Pillar policy helps explain why the 
British government did not publically condemn Iran’s occupation of the Lesser and 
Greater Tunb islands belonging to Ras al-Khaimah, even though the occupation had 
occurred while the emirate was still a British protected state. It was in that context that 
the Saudi Minister of Defence, Prince Sultan, warned the UAE in 1973 that “sooner or 
later, if things don’t get sorted out, we might have to impose a Saudi solution; we know 
from the Iranian experience on the Islands that no one will do anything to stop us.”660 
The US Twin Pillar policy legitimised Saudi Arabia and Iran’s exercise of power in the 
Gulf region at the expense of the small Gulf States. This severely limited Shaikh 
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Zayid’s options in resolving the dispute. If he asserted UAE territorial claims, he might 
find himself portrayed as an “impediment” to the resolution of the dispute. If he 
accommodated Iran’s demands, he might be perceived as betraying the interests of Ras 
al-Khaimah and Sharjah, both of which had a separate dispute with Iran concerning the 
islands, as well as strong political ties with Saudi Arabia. If he accommodated Saudi 
Arabia, he could be challenged by ‘hawks’ in the Abu Dhabi government who argued 
that Al-Ain/Buraimi was not  a “negotiable issue”661 and who were strongly opposed to 
making any significant territorial concessions to the Saudis.  Jim Treadwell, Britain’s 
Political Agent in Abu Dhabi during 1968-71 and Britain’s first Ambassador to the 
UAE, went further in his assessment by claiming that if Shaikh Zayid accommodated 
Saudi Arabia, he might be assassinated by the ‘hawks’ within the royal family in Abu 
Dhabi –– just like Shaikh Khalid Al-Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjah, who was assassinated in 
January 1972 after he agreed to cede half of the island of Abu Musa to the Iranians two 
months before.  The Twin Pillars policy meant that the future of the UAE depended on 
Shaikh Zayid’s ability to satisfy both Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
The sixth conclusion is that several factors favouring Saudi Arabia hindered the 
settlement during 1970-74.  British records portray Shaikh Zayid’s refusal to accept 
King Faisal’s proposal of 1970 as the greatest single obstacle.  Britain’s Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia during 1968-72, Sir Willie Morris, believed that “our difficulty has always 
been to persuade [Shaikh Zayid] to meet [King Faisal’s] demands in the south and 
west.”662 However, as Shaikh Zayid’s position weakened after 1968 and again after 
1971, he slowly changed his position on King Faisal’s 1970 proposal from resistance, to 
concession, and finally to accommodation.  All the while, King Faisal stuck to the 1970 
proposal, offering no real concessions in return.  
King Faisal’s inflexibility undoubtedly caused Britain to focus on Abu Dhabi’s 
negotiating approach rather than Saudi Arabia’s. The two major obstacles to the 
dispute’s resolution were, first, Britain’s unilateral declaration of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi 
boundary in 1955 and, second, King Faisal’s refusal to consider Abu Dhabi’s counter-
proposals.  Britain confessed to the obstacle caused by its imposition of the boundary in 
1955. As Ambassador Morris commented in June 1970, “we are basing ourselves only 
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on our own view of the legal justification for our action in 1955, which has never been 
accepted by the Saudis.”663 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1955 boundary declaration 
awarded Liwa oasis, the Al-Ain/Buraimi oasis region and Khor al-Udaid to Abu Dhabi, 
but Saudi Arabia persistent refusal to accept that boundary eventually forced Abu Dhabi 
to settle the dispute. Unwritten agreements about any lines proposed by the British 
between 1935 and 1971 in fact made it even harder to base the 1970-74 negotiating 
process on a solid foundation, as did the timing of Britain’s withdrawal, which left the 
UAE vulnerable to Saudi military action, placing Shaikh Zayid under considerable 
pressure to accept Saudi Arabia’s terms.  
The evidence suggests that Saudi negotiating behaviour impeded the progress of UAE-
Saudi territorial negotiations during 1970-74.  That obstacle was represented by a Saudi-
controlled negotiating strategy that was implemented with contentious tactics such as 
threats, a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude, extreme demands and, most importantly, 
interference in the UAE’s domestic affairs and its refusal to negotiate over Shaikh 
Zayid’s offer of oil-sharing or joint sovereignty with respect to the Zararah/Shaybah 
oilfield and Khor al-Udaid.  But, ultimately, it was this same strategy and tactics that 
forced Abu Dhabi to settle the dispute on Saudi terms. 
The seventh conclusion is that there was no negotiating approach that would have 
suggested any interest in a mutually-integrative solution between the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia during 1971-74. As explained in Chapter 4, there are certain strategies that can 
be brought in during the negotiation process that utilise either contentious or problem-
solving tactics. Saudi Arabia pursued a strategy aimed at controlling the negotiation 
process in its favour and gave Abu Dhabi no choice other than to accommodate Saudi 
demands. As a control strategy, this approach allowed for a ‘win-lose’ outcome only. 
As discussed at some length in Chapters 5 and 6, to achieve its goals, Saudi Arabia 
pursued a controlled negotiation strategy, supported by contentious tactics including 
serious threats that were both explicit and implied.  The explicit threats included 
refusing to recognise the UAE diplomatically until the dispute had been resolved, and 
threatening to return to Saudi Arabia’s 1949 territorial claims if the 1970s Saudi 
proposal was not accepted without further negotiation. The first threat jeopardized the 
existence of the UAE and the second jeopardized the territorial integrity of Abu Dhabi. 
The implied threat involved Saudi Arabia informing Shaikh Zayid that if the dispute 
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were not resolved during King Faisal’s lifetime, Saudi ‘hawks’ would take the disputed 
areas by force, as Britain’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during 1972-76, Sir Alan 
Rothnie, told the Foreign Office in 1972: “Some of the younger princes around [King 
Faisal] were beginning to argue that the dispute might have to be settled by force.”664  
By contrast, and due to Saudi Arabia’s fixed position and Britain’s passive role in the 
negotiations of 1970-71, Shaikh Zayid’s negotiating strategy seems to have been 
confused and unclear. It could be said that before Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 
1971, his negotiating strategy had been based on compromise in order to move Saudi 
Arabia towards mutual concessions and cooperation.  However, after Britain’s 
withdrawal, Shaikh Zayid soon exhausted all remaining means to gain a better offer 
than that made by King Faisal and had little choice but to settle the dispute as soon as he 
could by adopting what is known as an ‘accommodating strategy’ –– a strategy through 
which a negotiator satisfies his opponent by abandoning his own interests.665  
As Chapter 4 explained, accommodation and control strategies are not negotiation 
strategies based on mutually positive outcomes. This thesis defines negotiation as a 
peaceful process aimed at a mutual resolution of a conflict. Applying this concept to the 
negotiations of 1970-74 reveals that there were no ‘negotiations’ as such –– the huge 
differences in power between Saudi Arabia and the UAE enabled the former to more or 
less impose a settlement on the latter. It is most likely that Saudi Arabia imposed the 
Hamzah Line of 1935, the first line proposed by Saudi Arabia in the Anglo-Saudi 
territorial negotiations of 1935-49 that included both Khor al-Udaid and part of Liwa 
oasis. Supposedly, Saudi Arabia had won the Hamzah Line in 1974 and formalised it in 
the map attached with the Treaty of Jeddah. As shown in chapter 7, the UAE had 
published two maps, one that conformed to the map annexed with the Treaty of Jeddah, 
and one that depicted the line imposed on Saudi Arabia in 1955 –– i.e., the map on the 
back of the 2009 issue of the UAE national identity card, the map in the 2006 UAE Year 
Book, and the map found in many Emirati academic publications. Thus, it could be said 
that the imposed line of 1955 and the map of 1974 were not reached through a mutually 
integrative approach between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  This is why the UAE 
government felt justified reviving the question of the boundary in 2004 in order to 
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renegotiate the Articles of the Treaty of Jeddah: the Articles had not been ‘negotiated’, 
they were not the result of mutual compromise, they had simply been imposed. 
The eighth conclusion is that the UAE agreed in July 1974 to make a deal with Saudi 
Arabia, albeit under unclear conditions, based on the Saudi proposal of May 1970. What 
is significant to note is that Shaikh Zayid made a deal on only part of King Faisal’s 
proposal, which was to cede territory west of Sabkhat Al-Mattai,666 including Khor al-
Udaid. To remove any doubt as to whether or not the UAE had ceded Khor al-Udaid 
officially in 1976, Shaikh Zayid gave further concessions to Saudi Arabia, starting from 
west of Ras Khumais including Khor al-Udaid. More recently a US document 
confirmed in 2003 that the cession was only made in the west of Abu Dhabi, at Khor al-
Udaid: “Shaikh Zayid made resolution of the dispute with the Al Saud a top priority 
and, in 1974, initiated an agreement allowing for cession by Abu Dhabi of some 
territory in the west of the country to Saudi Arabia in exchange for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations.”667   
Thus, under this cession, the current UAE government had no right to claim Khor al-
Udaid in 2004. In fact, during Shaikh Zayid’s lifetime, there had been no statements or 
action made regarding the status of Khor al-Udaid. Map 7.1 by the UAE Ministry of 
Petroleum in 1976 shows that Saudi Arabia had gained more concessions in 1976 than 
in 1974.668 I found no evidence in British records that Shaikh Zayid offered any 
proposal to cede the whole Zararah/Shaybah oil field during 1970-74.  The UAE’s 
position was clear –– from the beginning, the complete loss of Zararah had been an 
unacceptable concession.  
In fact, the oilfield was the sticking point in the whole negotiation process. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Shaikh Zayid believed he had agreed to an oil-
sharing arrangement in July 1974, though this is not reflected in the actual text of the 
Treaty of Jeddah. After reaching the conclusion of the Jeddah Treaty, “Shaikh Zayid 
denied to Sir G. Arthur that there [had] been any special arrangements for oil [...] both 
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states retain full rights and responsibilities for oil development and production on their 
respective sides of the border.”669 This study shows that, unlike some of his negotiating 
teams, Shaikh Zayid seems to have believed that the Treaty of Jeddah gave the UAE 
oil-sharing rights at Zararah.  After the Treaty of Jeddah had been signed, Shaikh Zayid 
firmly believed that Zararah was to be shared between UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Some of 
the UAE negotiation team statements emphasised that the Saudis assured Shaikh Zayid 
on 29 July that Abu Dhabi would keep 20 percent of the Zararah revenues.  This reveals 
that the verbal negotiations in July were not reflected in the Treaty of Jeddah on 21 
August 1974. 
Unfortunately, details of the secret negotiations were not recorded, so it is difficult to 
follow the final phase of the negotiating process. British and American reports indicate 
that there was considerable ambiguity during the final phase of negotiations. It appears 
from these records that some of the UAE representatives did not act responsibly with 
regard to the provisions of the Treaty, or failed entirely to understand the scope of their 
assigned duties. Francis Vallat (former Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office) indicated 
that the UAE negotiating team was not eligible to negotiate with Saudi Arabia because 
it was “weak”, and indeed the UAE team included no legal experts, technician, lawyers, 
or geographers. That partly explained why Schofield described the Saudi-UAE border 
agreement of 21 August 1974 and its outcome as “the most bizarre international 
boundary agreement ever signed between two states.”670  
The lack of experts on the UAE negotiating team would explain, in part, the poor 
outcome for Abu Dhabi.  When Shaikh Zayid came to realise the gap between the oral 
agreement of 29 July 1974 and the text of the Treaty signed on 21 August –– mainly 
Article 3 relating to Zararah –– he was quick to express his dissatisfaction.  Abu Dhabi 
sent several letters of protest to Riyadh, beginning in 1975, with copies lodged with the 
United Nations.  The UAE government’s position on Article 3 of the Treaty therefore, 
dates back to 1975 and not to 2004, when it was first made public.  
From the eight conclusions above, the following can be deduced: the prospect of a final 
settlement of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute is not possible at present, unless the 
parties make fundamental changes to their positions. Saudi Arabia wants to negotiate 
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only on Article 5 of the Treaty concerning the maritime borders in the Khor al-Udaid 
area, while the UAE insists that some of the Treaty Articles are no longer acceptable, 
especially Article 3 on Zararah/Shaybah. Given the events since 2004, it would be 
difficult to say that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have moved further towards adopting an 
integrative negotiation strategy. What has changed is that, in the context of the United 
Nations, Saudi Arabia and the UAE theoretically now are equally capable of treating 
negotiation as a zero-sum game; both countries have adopted incompatible positions 
with respect the possible amendment of the Treaty of Jeddah. 
There are a few possible ways to settle the dispute. Much of the border tension between 
UAE and Saudi Arabia over the Khor al-Udaid region to the west of Abu Dhabi could 
have been eliminated. Since the 1990s, land travel between the UAE and Qatar (through 
Saudi Arabia) has been naturally subject to Saudi checkpoints. The project of the UAE-
Qatari causeway is a very time-consuming, expensive, and technologically challenging 
alternative to the current road, which passes through Saudi Arabia. This thesis suggests 
the construction of a new direct land route between UAE and Qatar would eliminate the 
burden of a UAE-Qatar causeway and avoid potential future maritime conflicts between 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The way in which border formalities can be eliminated are 
to follow the kinds of examples that exist elsewhere in the world of “non-stop” roads, 
which connect two countries. There are examples of “non-stop” roads, which connect 
two countries without border formalities when the road crosses the territory of a third 
country. For example, the road from Dubai to Hatta passes through a small part of the 
Omani territory. Before 1990, West Berlin was connected with West Germany by a 
“non-stop” railway built through East Germany. Thus, the UAE and Qatar could in all 
reality share a direct land route border with one another without having to confront the 
formalities of Saudi checkpoints.  
Interestingly, a month after the signing of the Treaty of Jeddah, British officials 
believed “the border agreement is in general terms which allow for the establishment of 
a joint working party to settle details such as oil exploitation and maritime boundaries 
later on.”671 The agreement, then, provided for joint mechanisms to determine details of 
maritime boundaries and oil production. At the same time, it noted a great deal of 
confusion among Emiratis in Abu Dhabi as a result of “the vagueness of the 
                                                
671 Brian Pridham (Abu Dhabi), to (Foreign Office), 9 September 1974, FCO8/2358,TNA, London, in 
Arabian Boundaries, vol. 15, ed. Schofield, p.288. 
210 
 
agreement.”672 The present agreement is vague in terms of UAE ownership of offshore 
islands, the Al-Ain/ Buraimi oasis region, the oil sharing arrangements at Zararah and 
the definition of the UAE and Saudi maritime boundaries. All of this indicates that the 
Treaty of Jeddah’s provisions were more like a draft rather than a final agreement. The 
effects of the Treaty have been described as a “stroke of the pen.” 673 Thus, the Treaty 
requires drastic amendments with regard to maritime boundaries and the Zararah oil 
field to reduce tensions in the UAE-Saudi relationship. Clear maritime boundaries are 
not possible until the UAE and Saudi Arabia reach a new maritime agreement that 
defines the ownership of the offshore islands and a definitive offshore boundary line in 
order to reach to a clear understanding of the Saudi and the UAE territorial waters.  
Regarding Article 3, this does not give the UAE the right to develop or exploit the 20 
percent of Zararah that lies within Abu Dhabi–– there is no provision for revenue 
sharing. UAE efforts since 1975 have not persuaded the Saudis to reconsider Article 3. 
However, if the Saudis were to reconsider their position on Article 3 and a settlement 
became possible, that would not only impact positively on UAE-Saudi relations, it 
might have a positive influence on a number of GCC issues as well. This thesis suggests 
that resolving Article 3 in the UAE’s favour would likely encourage the UAE to agree 
to many GCC initiatives and projects initiated or backed by Saudi Arabia. The UAE 
could therefore link the resolution of the Treaty’s Articles to GCC issues of importance 
to Saudi Arabia. For instance, there is the issue of the UAE’s withdrawal in 2009 from 
the GCC’s negotiations for a future monetary union. If the UAE was to consider 
returning to the negotiations and accepting Riyadh as the location of the future GCC 
Bank, the Saudi government might consider that a sufficient concession to begin a 
renegotiation of the Treaty’s Articles.  
Finally, since UAE maps including the contested areas since 2006 have repeatedly 
angered the Saudis, a mutually-agreed map is required. The establishment of a new land 
border between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, the resolution of the maritime boundary, and an 
equitable division of the Zararah oil field revenues are prerequisites for such a map.   
 
                                                
672 Ibid., p.288. 
673 H.St.J.B Armitage, (Dubai), to T.J.Clark (Foreign Office), UAE-Saudi Arabia, 14 December 1974, 
FCO8/2358,TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 15, ed. Schofield, p. 303. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Agreement on the Delimitation of Boundaries  
(with Exchange of Letters) 
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